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Summary 
 
The use of psychiatric medication is an important part of modern medical and 
psychiatric practice.  Clinical psychopharmacology raises a broad range of philosophical 
issues, including metaphysical, epistemological, and moral questions.  This dissertation 
attempts to provide a conceptual framework for addressing several of these questions, 
and for formulating a conceptual basis for psychiatry in general and clinical 
psychopharmacology in particular.   
The dissertation begins by heuristically contrasting two broad approaches towards 
a range of questions in the philosophy of science, language, and medicine.  A classical 
position takes an essentialist and objective view of categories while a critical position 
emphasizes that categories are often metaphoric and subjective.  A synthetic or integrated 
position might be possible, in which radial categories are often based on metaphoric 
extensions of basic-level sensorimotor-affective experience, and are embodied in the 
brain-mind and in social practices. 
Rather than attempt to defend an integrated position in purely conceptual terms, 
the dissertation supports this view of categories using data from the cognitive-affective 
sciences.  An important category for philosophy of medicine is disorder, and the 
dissertation argues that certain universal considerations explain agreement about 
prototypical disorders.  Extensions of disorder metaphors are theory-driven and value-
laden, and although disagreement about atypical conditions is likely, reasonable debate is 
possible.   
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The dissertation then considers several conceptual questions, namely the nature of 
psychotropics, of emotion, and of the self.  In each case, a classical position which 
attempts an essentialist definition is contrasted with a critical position which emphasizes 
that these constructs are socially constructed and crucially subjective.  Cognitive-
affective data is then employed to support an integrative position which emphasizes the 
embodiment of complex brain-mind phenomena in the brain-mind and in social practices.    
Explanatory questions considered are how best to explain pharmacotherapy and 
psychotherapy, how to account for placebo responses, and the relevance of evolutionary 
explanations of disorder.  It is argued that a functionalist account fails to explain 
psychopharmacological phenomena, including pharmacotherapy and placebo effects.  
Instead, an account which emphasizes how psychobiological mechanisms produce 
complex brain-mind phenomena is needed.  Evolutionary explanations add to this 
account, but cannot by themselves differentiate disorder from non-disorder.   
Ethical questions include the question of whether psychiatric disorders should be 
treated, whether such disorders should be treated with psychotropics, and whether 
psychotropics should be used to enhance.   The cognitive-affective sciences support the 
treatment of typical disorders.  In more atypical cases, pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, 
and non-medical interventions should be considered on an individual basis.  As 
technologies expand, considerations about the value of accepting fate versus the value of 
attempting to improve life by a range of methods, will need to be weighed carefully. 
In summary, this dissertation puts forward a philosophy of psychopharmacology 
which argues that psychiatry practice can be viewed, naturalistically, as based on the 
natural and human sciences.  At the same time, good psychiatric practice involves an 
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engagement with the complex realities of the human condition, including a consideration 
of individuals’ suffering.  Good psychopharmacological practice requires integrating the 
objective and the subjective, considering both explanation and understanding, and 
providing a balanced view of the good and bad of psychotropics that avoids both 
unrealistic optimism and undue pessimism.   
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Opsomming 
 
Die gebruik van psigiatriese medikasie maak ŉ belangrike deel uit van moderne 
mediese en psigiatriese praktyk.  Psigofarmakologie bring ŉ wye reeks filosofiese 
kwessies ter sprake, met inbegrip van metafisiese, epistemologiese, en morele vrae. 
Hierdie proefskrif poog om ŉ konseptuele raamwerk te verskaf ten einde verskeie van 
hierdie vrae die hoof te bied, en na die formulering van ŉ konseptuele basis vir psigiatrie 
in die algemeen en kliniese psigofarmakologie in die besonder om te sien.   
Die proefskrif begin deur twee algemene benaderings ten opsigte van ŉ reeks vrae 
in die filosofie van wetenskap, taal en geneeskunde te kontrasteer.  ŉ Klassieke posisie 
huldig ŉ essensialistiese en objektiewe siening van kategorieë, terwyl ŉ kritiese posisie 
klem daarop lê dat kategorieë dikwels metafories en subjektief is.  ŉ Sintetiese of 
geïntegreerde posisie is dalk moontlik, met radiale kategorieë wat dikwels op metaforiese 
uitbreidings van konsepte op basiese vlak sensorimotor-affektiewe ervaring gebaseer 
word, en in die bewussyn-brein en in sosiale gebruike vergestalt word. 
Eerder as om te probeer om ŉ geïntegreerde posisie in suiwer konseptuele terme 
te verdedig, steun die proefskrif hierdie siening van kategorieë met behulp van data uit 
die kognitiewe-affektiewe wetenskappe.  ŉ Belangrike kategorie vir die filosofie van 
geneeskunde is steuring, en die proefskrif voer aan dat sekere universele oorwegings ’n 
verklaring bied vir ooreenstemming ten opsigte van prototipiese steurings. Uitbreidings 
van die steuring metafoor is teoriegedrewe en waardebelaai, en alhoewel daar 
waarskynlik meningsverskil omtrent atipiese toestande kan voorkom, is redelike 
bespreking haalbaar.  
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Die proefskrif neem dan verskeie konseptuele vrae in aanmerking, naamlik die 
aard van psigotropika, van emosie, en van die self.  In elke geval word ŉ klassieke 
posisie wat ŉ essensialistiese definisie aandurf, gekontrasteer met ŉ kritiese posisie wat 
beklemtoon dat hierdie konstrukte sosiaal gekonstrueer en besonder subjektief is. 
Kognitiewe-affektiewe data word dan aangewend om ŉ integratiewe posisie te handhaaf 
wat die vergestalting van komplekse bewussyn-brein fenomene in die bewyssyn-brein en 
in sosiale praktyke beklemtoon.    
Verklarende vrae het aandag geskenk aan die beste wyse om farmakoterapie en 
psigoterapie te verklaar, aan die wyse waarop placebo-reaksies verklaar kan word, en aan 
die rol van proksimale en evolusionêre verklarings.  Daar word aangevoer dat ŉ 
funksionalistiese verklaring nie daarin slaag om psigofarmakologiese verskynsels, met 
inbegrip van farmakoterapie en placebo-effekte, te verklaar nie.  In plaas daarvan word ŉ 
verklaring wat beklemtoon hoe psigobiologiese meganisme komplekse fenomene kan laat 
ontstaan, benodig.  Evolusionêre verklarings dra tot hierdie verklaring by, maar kan nie 
op sigself steuring van niesteuring onderskei nie.   
Etiese vrae sluit die vraag in of psigiatriese steurings behandel moet word, of 
sodanige steurings met psigotropika behandel moet word, en of psigotropika gebruik 
moet word om te verhoog.  Die kognitief-affektiewe wetenskappe ondersteun die 
behandeling van tipiese steuringe.  In meer atipiese gevalle moet farmakoterapie, 
psigoterapie, en nie-mediese intervensies op ŉ individuele basis oorweeg word.  
Algaande tegnologieë uitbrei, moet ons  oorwegings van die waarde van lotsaanvaarding 
sowel as die waarde van ’n poging om ’n mens se lewe te verbeter, versigtig in ag neem. 
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Ter opsomming, hierdie proefskrif stel ŉ filosofie van psigofarmakologie voor 
wat aanvoer dat psigiatriese praktyk naturalisties verstaan kan word, soos gebaseer op die 
natuur- en geesteswetenskappe.  Terselfdetyd, behels goeie psigofarmakologiese praktyk 
‘n verwantskap met die komplekse werklikhede van die menslike kondisie.  Dit vereis ‘n 
omvattende oorweeging van en omgang met individuele pasiënte se lyding.  Goeie 
psigofarmakologiese praktyk integreer die “objektiewe” en die “subjektiewe” aspekte van 
die menslike bestaan, streef na sowel verklaring en verstaan, verskaf ‘n gebalanseerde 
perspektief oor die goed en die sleg van psigiatriese medikasies, en middel tussen 
onrealistiese optimisme en buitensporige pessimisme.     
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 9
Table of Contents 
 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 11 
1.  Psychopharmacology – A Remarkable Development ............................................. 18 
1)  The Length, Breadth, and Depth of Psychotropic Use ........................................ 18 
2)  The Advent of Empirical Psychopharmacology .................................................. 21 
3)  Gains and Gaps in Psychopharmacology ............................................................ 25 
2.  Philosophical Questions Raised by Psychopharmacology ...................................... 30 
1)  Conceptual Questions Raised by the Effects of Psychotropics ........................... 31 
2)  Explanatory Questions about How Psychotropics Work .................................... 32 
3)  Moral Questions About When to Use Psychotropics .......................................... 34 
4)  Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 36 
3.  How to Think about Science, Language, and Medicine:  Classical, Critical, and 
Integrated Perspectives ................................................................................................. 38 
1)  Classical and Critical Approaches - Algorithms vs Narratives ........................... 40 
2)  A Naturalist Approach - Roschian Categories and the Embodied Brain-Mind .. 51 
3)  The Category of Disorder - The Data on Disorder as Metaphor ......................... 61 
4)  Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 71 
4.  Conceptual Questions about Psychotropics ............................................................. 73 
1)  Medications, Substances, Neutraceuticals, and Enhancements – What are the 
Distinctions amongst Psychotropics? ....................................................................... 74 
2)  Psychotropics for Personality – What is Emotion? ............................................. 83 
3)  The Psychobiology of Self-Representation – What is the Self? .......................... 95 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 10
5.  Explanatory Questions About Psychotropics......................................................... 108 
1)  Psychotropics vs Psychotherapy – Explaining Brain-Mind / Nature-Nuture .... 109 
2)  Placebo vs Nocebo  – Explaining Symbol Grounding / The Unconscious ....... 120 
3)  Evolutionary Psychopharmacology – Explaining Function / Dysfunction ....... 128 
6.  Moral Questions About Psychotropics .................................................................. 145 
1)  Is Treatment of Psychiatric Disorder a Good Thing? ........................................ 146 
2)  Is Pharmacotherapy a Good Kind of Intervention? ........................................... 158 
3)  Is  Pharmacotherapy for Enhanced Performance a Good Thing? ..................... 168 
7.  Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 187 
The Possibility of a Naturalistic Approach to the Philosophy of 
Psychopharmacology .............................................................................................. 187 
References ................................................................................................................... 199 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 11
Introduction 
 
At times, new scientific data lead to a revolution in how we think about ourselves.  
Copernicus’s data showed that the earth and its inhabitants were not situated at the 
geographic epicentre of the Universe.  Darwin’s observations indicated that humans did 
not exist in a natural realm apart from other primates.  Freud’s cases suggested that the 
rational conscious mind was not necessarily the primary determinant of human 
behaviour.  This dissertation begins with the idea that revolutionary data about the brain 
and the mind, and especially about medications that act on the brain-mind, will 
fundamentally change our thoughts about humans. 
 
Mind-altering or psychoactive substances, also known as psychotropics, have been used 
since antiquity for both recreational and therapeutic reasons.  Noah celebrated with wine, 
and Plato philosophized about its appropriate use1.  Paracelsus knew the value of 
laudanum, and Pinel not only unshackled the insane but also prescribed opium.  
Nevertheless, the modern field of empirical psychopharmacology is only a few decades 
old.  Psychopharmacologists have mostly been interested in basic science investigations 
of the mechanism of new drugs and in clinical studies of their efficacy in treating 
psychiatric disorders.  They haven’t paid much attention to the more abstract question of 
whether their data change our understanding of the nature of cognitive science and of 
psychiatry.  This is an important gap, and this dissertation hopes to begin to close it. 
                                                 
1
 Plato’s “A Touchstone for Courage” (Plato, 1970) is perhaps the first philosophy of psychopharmacology 
in the West.  Aristotle similarly considered issues around alcohol and responsibility (Nichomachean Ethics, 
1980). 
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Working with the new psychiatric drugs raises crucial philosophical questions, and so 
encourages a rethinking of cognitive science and particularly of psychiatry.  The value of 
the new psychiatric drugs as things-with-which-to think (Papert, 1980) lies not only in 
their efficacy for major psychiatric disorders, but in also in their potential use in a range 
of additional contexts.  There is, for example, growing interest in smart drugs to improve 
intellectual, sporting, or military performance, in mood brightening and personality 
enhancing drugs, and in pep pills to enhance motivation and energy.  Scientists and 
societies are increasingly grappling with questions about using medical treatments 
including psychotropics, for purposes that are “Beyond Therapy” (The President's 
Council on Bioethics, 2003), or “Better than Well” (Elliott, 2003). 
 
Such so-called “cosmetic psychopharmacology” (Kramer, 1997) immediately raises a 
range of conceptual (or metaphysical) questions about the nature of the entities that are 
used by psychiatrists:  How do we best define medical and psychiatric disorders?  Are 
psychiatric disorders a kind of medical disorder, or are they a different kind of category?  
Can psychotropics change personality, and if so, what are the implications for our 
concepts of self?  How do we distinguish the use of psychotropics for therapy from their 
use for enhancement, or psychotropic medications from legal substances such as alcohol, 
illicit substances such as cocaine, and nutrients or nutraceuticals? 
 
Second, psychopharmacological data raise a series of explanatory (or epistemological) 
questions focused on how to best understand brain-behaviour phenomena.  How can we 
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understand the way in which psychotropics work to alter thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours, and should our explanations differ from those we develop for understanding 
how psychotherapy leads to change?  How can we best conceptualise placebo and nocebo 
responses to psychotropics, and the relevant unconscious processes involved?  What is 
the relevance of Darwinian or evolutionary mechanisms when investigating 
psychopharmacological phenomena?   
 
Thirdly, psychopharmacological data raise a series of moral (or ethical) questions.  When 
is the use of psychotropics for psychiatric disorders appropriate?  Depressive realism 
refers to the phenomenon that people with depression appear to be more realistic in their 
appraisals of the world, the self, and the future than are people without depression – is 
depressive realism best left untreated?  Should cosmetic psychopharmacology – the 
treatment of undesirable traits (poor memory, shyness, impulsivity) that cannot be 
characterized as psychiatric disorders - be encouraged or deplored, do we believe in a pill 
for every psychic ill? 
 
To discuss the questions raised by psychopharmacology, we need a framework that can 
address related questions in philosophy of science, medicine, language, mind, emotion, 
personal identity, the unconscious, and evolution.  I have found it useful to summarize 
this immense philosophical literature by contrasting two camps – a “classical” and a 
“critical” approach to cognitive and clinical science.  While this contrast entails a great 
deal of oversimplification, and may not apply to the work of any particular thinker, it 
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serves as a useful foundation for putting forward an integrative approach to answering the 
questions of psychopharmacology. 
 
Very briefly, the classical position can be traced back to Plato, runs through the work of 
the early Wittgenstein, was taken up by the logical positivists, and continues to be a 
major force in contemporary philosophy.  It has viewed cognition in terms of 
computation, and has defined psychiatric disorders in similarly restrictive ways.  In 
contrast, the critical position also has early roots, was strongly influenced by thinkers like 
Vico and Herder, played an important role in post-modern movements, and continues to 
be central for continental philosophy.  It has emphasized the importance of human 
understanding and of social context, and has regarded mental disorders as representing 
merely another way of living. 
 
Instead, this dissertation puts forward an approach that highlights the findings of 
cognitive-affective science;  this is a framework that allows for an approach to the brain-
mind that emphasizes the embodiment of cognition and affect in neuronal circuitry and in 
the interaction of people with the physical and social world, and that provides an 
expansive space for considering psychiatric disorders as complex, significant, and real 
phenomena.  It is an approach that is consistent with a naturalized philosophy, with 
scientific realism, and also with a range of psychological and philosophical work that 
views the brain-mind as neither a computational algorithm, nor as a social construct, but 
rather as fundamentally embodied. 
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The term “cognitive-affective” is used here rather than merely “cognitive” or “affective”;  
because the affective realm and its integration with the cognitive one has been too often 
ignored in both psychology and philosophy of psychology.  The term “brain-mind” is 
used rather than merely “brain” or “mind”;  again to emphasize how the two constructs 
are in fact impossible to disentangle.  Similarly, I later refer to “psychobiological” 
mechanisms.  These hyphenated constructs, although perhaps clumsy at first, serve to 
highlight, first, how complex thoughts and feelings are ultimately based in more basic 
constructs such as body representation, and second, how the brain-mind is not a 
computational apart-from-the-world passive reflector but rather a thinking-feeling actor-
in-the-world and active constructor. 
 
Psychotropics are remarkably useful things with-which-to-think.  This is not only because 
they are used in a range of different contexts, but also because of the highly complex 
issues that they raise, touching on questions in philosophy of science, medicine, 
language, mind, emotion, personal identity, the unconscious, and evolution.  Conversely, 
answers to the questions raised by advances in psychopharmacology may have profound 
implications for a broad range of philosophical problems, including metaphysical, 
epistemological, and moral issues.  Wittgenstein was fond of the metaphor of philosophy 
as a useful medical treatment, this dissertation suggests that psychopharmacology 
provides a useful subject matter for philosophy2.   
 
                                                 
2
 The work of a number of important physician-philosophers, such as William James and Karl Jaspers, 
begins with a careful consideration of psychology and psychopathology.  Subsequently a number of 
philosophers such as Austin (in the linguistic-analytic tradition) and Merleau-Ponty (in the continental 
tradition) early on suggested or employed psychiatry as a significant resource for philosophy. 
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Insofar as this dissertation addresses so many well-discussed questions in philosophy, 
much of it depends on standing on the shoulders of giants.  I am particularly indebted to 
the work of Roy Bhaskar on philosophy of science, George Lakoff on the cognitive 
science of categories, and Mark Johnson on moral reasoning.  Arguments here are 
informed by a broad range of philosophical work, including writings at the intersection of 
philosophy and psychiatry – pioneered by Karl Jaspers, and now an increasingly 
productive area.   
 
At the same time, I would venture that comparatively little philosophical work has been 
done in the area of psychopharmacology in general, and cosmetic psychopharmacology 
in particular.  This dissertation outlines philosophical questions raised by 
psychopharmacology, discusses possible answers from the classical and critical 
perspectives, and draws on the cognitive-affective sciences to provide an integrated set of 
answers.  I hope that by doing so, the dissertation contributes to providing a conceptual 
foundation for good clinical psychopharmacology. 
 
Solomon Stein gave me a life-long interest in the question of whether pharmacology was 
good or bad.  Sally and Leslie Swartz were instrumental in helping me to begin on the 
road to philosophy more than two decades ago.  Jeremy Barris, Arnold Abramovitz, 
Ronald Rieder, and Michael Schwartz gave encouragement at crucial points.  Derek 
Bolton helped give me the courage to pursue the current project.  Anton van Niekerk was 
crucial in providing a supportive intellectual framework within which I could attempt to 
move forward.  Both Derek and Anton gave me a great deal of encouragement with, and 
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much useful advice on, the manuscript; this work would not have appeared without their 
generous mentorship.  Many other colleagues have helped me think through questions 
covered here;  particular thanks to Ineke Bolt, George Ellis, Jacques Kriel, Willem 
Landman, Ronald Pies, and David Walwyn for their comments and suggestions on early 
versions.  Finally, I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude my wife, Heather, and my 
children, Gabriella, Joshua, and Sarah, who have put up with my irritable mood when 
attempting to do philosophy, as well as with the inevitable absences from family life that 
this attempt entailed. 
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1.  Psychopharmacology – A Remarkable Development 
 
Psychopharmacology, the study of psychotropics, or mind-altering substances, is a 
fascinating field at the confluence of neurochemistry and behaviour.  Basic 
psychopharmacologists are mostly interested in how psychotropics work, often studying 
neurochemical properties of different compounds in animal models.  Clinical 
psychopharmacologists are mainly interested in the clinical applications of psychotropics, 
often working in psychiatric settings.  But what exactly are psychotropics?  How in fact 
do they work?  How widely are they used, and do they really help people? 
 
In this chapter I begin by outlining the broad scope of psychopharmacology;  
emphasizing that psychotropics have been long, widely, and intensively used by 
humankind for a range of purposes, describing the relatively recent birth of modern 
psychopharmacology as an empirical science, and noting that despite the remarkable 
progress in the field to date psychopharmacology is at an early stage in its development.  
Then, in the next chapter I go on to consider the major philosophical issues raised by the 
advent of modern psychopharmacology. 
 
1)  The Length, Breadth, and Depth of Psychotropic Use 
 
“And he drank of the wine, and was drunken; and he was uncovered within his tent” 
(Genesis 9:21, King James Version) 
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“What is better adapted than the festive use of wine, in the first place to test, and in the 
second place to train the character of a man, if care be taken in the use of it?” (Plato, 
1970) 
 
 
Humans use psychotropic agents in a range of different contexts.  We imbibe stimulants 
such as caffeine as part of our regular diet and to enhance our attention and performance, 
we celebrate social occasions and perform religious rites with alcohol, we experiment 
with consciousness altering drugs, and we take psychiatric medications when we suffer 
from symptoms such as depression and anxiety.  There is no reason to suspect that we 
have not been engaged in these kinds of activities since the dawn of human time 
(Moreno, 2006a; Playfair, 1987; Rivers, 2001). 
 
This use of psychotropic agents by homo sapiens is remarkable in a number of different 
ways.  For one thing, reliance on psychotropics is a phenomenon that differentiates 
humankind from most other species.  In the laboratory, a range of animals can certainly 
become addicted to substances.  But in the wild, there is only accidental contact with 
psychotropics.  While there have been occasional reports of non-human primate use of 
plants for medicinal purposes, such reports have rarely if ever extended to psychotropic 
agents (Rodriguez et al., 1985; Whiten & Boesch, 2001). 
 
Indeed, in comparison to the use of other pharmaceuticals, human use of psychotropics is 
remarkable for its broad range.  Humans throughout the world have long relied on agents 
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that act on organs such as the gut, the skin, or the heart.  However, such pharmaceuticals 
have invariably been restricted to the prevention or treatment of symptoms of disorders.  
In contrast, psychotropics have a range of other uses, including as an everyday nutrient 
and social “lubricant” (spirits), component of religious rituals and spiritual voyages 
(entheogens), and performance or cognitive enhancers (nootropics). 
 
The use of psychotropics is also notable for its intensiveness.  Ginseng, for example, is a 
psychotropic herb that played a key role in changing the fortune of Chinese dynasties, 
due to its high demand and the consequent profits earned from its trade (Taylor, 2006).  
Alcohol, opium, and cocaine are amongst the addictive substances that have been at the 
centre of underground battles or international wars, again because each has a substantial 
market.  Modern psychotropic medications have been blockbusters for the pharmaceutal 
industry, earning it billions of dollars in revenue. 
 
This broad and deep range of uses depends in turn on the complexity of our nervous 
system – which provides multiple targets for psychotropics to act on, and on the 
importance of this system to our being - so that psychotropics can have wide-ranging and 
profound effects.  It also reflects the vast range of psychotropics available to our species; 
psychoactive agents are found in abundance in the plant kingdom (eg steroidal hormones 
are found in yams, monoamine oxidase inhibitors are present in St John’s wort, alcohol is 
obtainable from fermented fruits), and are now also readily synthesized in the laboratory. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 21
Pharmacological agents may in general be the same as endogenous compounds (eg 
insulin for diabetes), may act as agonists or antagonists at particular receptors so 
augmenting or blocking endogenous processes (eg diuretics enhance diuresis), or may 
have complex stabilizing or destabilizing effects (eg anticonvulsants lower seizure 
threshold).  In the case of psychotropics, we have agents that employ each of these 
possibilities (eg exogenous testosterone acts in the same way as endogenous testosterone, 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors enhance serotonergic neurotransmission, alcohol 
has destabilizing effects on neuronal membranes). 
 
2)  The Advent of Empirical Psychopharmacology 
 
“He who had drunk of this potion would not shed tears for a whole day even if his mother 
and his father were to die, and even if his most beloved son were slaughtered before his 
eyes”  (Homer, Odyssey) 
 
“Psychopharmacology is an interdisciplinary science in which many techniques and 
branches of knowledge are brought together.  In seeking to modify human behaviour by 
the use of chemical substances, it lies at the crossroads of the biological sciences and the 
humanities, because every psychopharmacological problem concerns the relationship 
between the body and the mind” (Delay, 1967) 
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The history of psychopharmacology is notable for its length and breadth and depth, but 
the advent of psychopharmacology as an empirical science is a recent development 
(Healy, 2002).  The term “psychopharmacology” has been in use since the early twentieth 
century, and gained currency in the 1950s, at a time when the first randomised controlled 
trials of psychotropic agents were undertaken (Thullier, 1999)3.  The field grew 
exponentially thereafter, driven by rapid advances in both basic science (e.g., molecular 
neurobiology, behavioural pharmacology, synthetic chemistry) and in clinical science 
(e.g. operational diagnosis, symptom measurement, trials methodology). 
 
First generation psychotropics were often found serendipitously.  For example, the first 
antipsychotic agent, chlorpromazine, was developed as an anaesthetic;  when it was later 
found to decrease psychotic symptoms, further investigation established that it was a 
dopamine blocker (Thullier, 1999).  Similarly, the first monoamine oxidase inhibitor – a 
powerful class of antidepressants – was developed as an antituberculous drug.  Once 
again, investigation of the mechanisms of action led to a focus on monoamines in 
depression. 
 
Whereas these early agents often had multiple actions, affecting different receptors, 
second generation agents were specifically developed in order to act on one receptor at a 
time.  A well-known example is fluoxetine, originally marketed as Prozac, a selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor (or SSRI).  In contrast to the tricyclic antidepressant agents, 
                                                 
3
 One of the first to use the term “psychopharmacology” was Jean Delay, a pioneering French psychiatrist, 
who testified in the Nuremberg trials, and who had a doctorate in philosophy.  During the student protests 
of 1968, strongly influenced by the work of psychiatrists or those using examples from psychiatry (Fanon, 
Foucault, Goffman, Laing, Marcuse, Szasz), his office was ransacked, and he was forced to resign. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 23
which act on serotonin and noradrenaline receptors, as well as on the cholinergic system, 
fluoxetine primarily affects the serotonin system.  Interestingly, recent agents have been 
specifically engineered to act on more than one receptor system.  These potentially offer 
the advantage of altering the multiple neurotransmitter systems that may be involved in 
complex disorders. 
 
A number of points can be made about modern psychotropics.  First, they cannot be 
likened to neuronal sledgehammers – fluoxetine acts on the product of a single gene (of 
the 23,000 odd in the human body).  Second, their effects are nevertheless complex – 
serotonin interacts with multiple other systems, so that fluoxetine eventually affects range 
of neuronal circuits and ultimately thoughts and emotions and behaviours.  Most 
psychotropics can be termed neuromodulators – they act on multiple circuits that spread 
throughout the brain.  Third, the adverse effects of psychotropics are sometimes 
overstated;  for example, while some medications are addicting, antipsychotics and 
antidepressants are not.  Fourth, this does not mean they don’t have crucially important 
side effects, they do.   
 
Progress in psychopharmacology has had an enormous influence on the theory and 
practice of psychiatry.  Indeed, psychiatry is now primarily “biological” in its approach – 
whereas the field (particularly in the United States) was dominated by psychoanalytic 
theories and practices in the 1950s, by the end of the 20th century psychiatric research 
leaned strongly on the neurosciences, and psychiatric practice relied heavily on 
psychopharmacological interventions (Luhrmann, 2000; Sabshin, 1990; Shorter, 1998).  
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While psychiatrists continue to be trained in psychotherapy, and optimal prescription of 
psychotropics requires a rigorous appreciation of the psychodynamics of the patient, the 
shift in the field has been revolutionary in its extent and impact. 
 
These developments need to be understood not only in terms of the scientific advances 
allowed by the new psychotropics, but also in more socio-political terms.  The 
pharmaceutical industry has played a key role in developing and marketing psychotropic 
products (Angell, 2004; Degrandpre, 2006; Healy, 2004; McHenry, 2006; Moynihan & 
Smith, 2002; Smith, 1991; Starcevic, 2002; Szasz, 2001; Valenstein, 1998).  Although 
much research on psychopharmacology is funded by government sources, such as the 
National Institutes of Health in the USA, most large randomized controlled trials on 
psychotropics are funded by the industry.  Indeed, psychotropics have proven to be 
particularly profitable pharmaceutical agents;  the market for these agents amounts to 
billions of dollars per annum (IMS Health, 2002).  Large amounts of money may be 
devoted even to niche areas such as work on psychotropics to enhance performance in the 
military (Moreno, 2006b). 
 
The relationship between academic psychopharmacology and the pharmaceutical industry 
has been subjected to a number of critiques.  There are, for example, important concerns 
about the objectivity of academic researchers who are primarily funded by industry 
(Angell, 2004; Healy, 2004).  Clinicians have in turn been criticized for overdiagnosing 
and overtreating psychiatric disorders (Horwitz & Wakefield, 2007; Moynihan et al., 
2002).  More radically, an anti-psychiatry movement, which questions the scientific 
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validity of psychiatric diagnoses, and is concerned that psychiatric interventions are 
better understood in terms of the control of social deviance, has criticised the use of 
“chemical straitjackets” and the marketing of psychotropics as panaceas (Breggin, 1993; 
Ingleby, 1981; Sedgwick, 1982). 
 
3)  Gains and Gaps in Psychopharmacology 
 
“The expectations I have formulated some 25 years ago regarding developments in the 
pharmacotherapy of depression have not, or only to a small extent, materialized.  Neither 
have they been refuted.” (van Praag, 2001) 
 
Critiques of psychopharmacology which emphasize the use of medication to control 
social deviance, criticise the use of “chemical straitjackets”, and the marketing of 
psychotropics as panaceas ignore some empirical data.  First, the global burden of 
psychiatric disorder is enormous, with 5 of the 10 most disabling medical disorders 
comprising neuropsychiatric conditions (Murray & Lopez , 1996), and second, despite 
their prevalence and associated impairment, severe psychiatric disorders continue to 
remain relatively underdiagnosed and undertreated in both developed and developing 
countries (Demyttenaere, Bruffaerts, Posada-Villa, & et al, 2004).  Nevertheless, this 
dissertation is primarly concerned with potential problems in the widespread use of 
psychotropic agents for a range of other psychic ills.  While there may have been major 
gains in psychopharmacology, it is important to also understand the significant gaps in 
this field. 
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Modern psychopharmacology has on the one hand arguably achieved remarkable 
successes.  The closure of large long-term psychiatric hospitals - deinstitutionalization - 
was largely brought about by the success of antipsychotic agents in treating serious 
psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.  Although depression and 
anxiety disorders continue to be underdiagnosed and undertreated, there are now effective 
medications available for many psychiatric conditions.  It is possible that decreases in the 
prevalence of suicide in some developed countries reflect the better diagnosis and 
pharmacotherapy of depression (Carlsten, Waern, Ekedahl, & Ranstam, 2001), although 
not all data is consistent (Helgason, Tomasson, & Zoega, 2004). 
 
Modern antipsychotics and antidepressants are relatively safe, well-tolerated, and non-
addicting, so that many early concerns about the use of psychotropic agents for 
psychiatric disorders have diminished over time.  New psychotropics are introduced only 
after carefully conducted randomized controlled trials show both safety and efficacy.  
The pharmaceutical industry is closely regulated by governmental agencies.  Advances in 
basic mechanisms continue to be made, new agents continue to be introduced, and there 
is no reason not to suspect that future pharmacological interventions will be even more 
useful than those currently available. 
 
At the same time, there are notable gaps in our knowledge of the brain-mind in general 
(Sala, 1999), and of psychopharmacology in particular.  First, a full appreciation of the 
mechanisms of action of psychotropics remains a goal for the future.  Although we 
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understand a good deal about the receptors at which most psychotropics act, we 
understand much less about how changes at these receptors translate into further changes 
“downstream” at the so-called 2nd and 3rd messenger level, and we don’t have a complete 
understanding of how these changes in turn alter systems that underpin cognition and 
affect. 
 
Furthermore, currently available psychotropics almost all work by changing 
monoaminergic neurotransmitter systems;  despite the introduction of new and useful 
drugs in recent decades, these continue to work on similar pathways as did the earliest 
agents.  Thus, although many psychopharmacologists are excited about the progress that 
has occurred, a number have warned against exaggerating what has been achieved (van 
Praag, 1998).  While modern agents may be better tolerated than older ones, the lack of 
truly innovative new interventions in psychopharmacology is worrisome to many. 
 
An early idea in psychopharmacology was that of “pharmacotherapeutic dissection”;  if 
disorders A and B responded to medication X but not Y, while disorders C and D 
responded to medication Y but not to X - then disorders A and B would have nosological 
and biological overlap with one another, but not with the overlapping disorders C and D 
(Klein, 1964).  Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), for example, responds more 
robustly to clomipramine, a predominantly serotoninergic reuptake inhibitor, than to 
desipramine, an agent that is also a tricyclic antidepressant, but that is predominantly a 
noradrenergic reuptake inhibitor (Zohar, Insel, & Zohar-Kadouch, 1988).  Furthermore 
benzodiazepines are useful in certain anxiety disorders, but not in OCD.  Analogously, 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 28
whereas dopamine blockers typically cause sedation in healthy volunteers, they result in a 
decrease in psychotic symptoms in those with schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, 
underscoring the boundaries between psychotic disorders and normality.    
 
Nevertheless, this principal has not been entirely productive in more contemporary 
research;  for example, clomipramine is more effective than desipramine not only for a 
number of conditions that have much in common with obsessive-compulsive disorder (eg 
body dysmorphic disorder), but also for a number of apparently quite unrelated 
conditions (eg premenstrual dysphoric disorder) (Stein, 2001).  Conversely, when a 
medication is effective, we can’t necessarily deduce a great deal about the mechanisms 
involved in the relevant disorder.  It turns out that there is surprisingly little evidence of 
serotonergic dysfunction per se in OCD.  It is possible that a quite different 
neurochemical system is at fault in OCD, and that serotonergic medications are effective 
only via their secondary effects on that other system (Stein, 2002).  Furthermore, 
dopamine releasing agents are not only effective in improving concentrations in patients 
diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (AD/HD), they may be used by 
ordinary college students or by military personnel to enhance cognitive performance 
(Chatterjee, 2006; Kadison, 2005; Vastag, 2004), so raising questions about the validity 
of AD/HD as a disorder. 
 
In addition to gaps in our understanding of basic mechanisms in psychopharmacology, 
there are also important lacunae in clinical psychopharmacology.  The majority of 
randomized controlled trials of psychotropics to date have been undertaken in Western 
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adult populations, over the short-term, and in tertiary settings.  Regulatory authorities 
require only a few positive trials for an agent to be released on the market, typically for a 
single indication (such as major depression).  There is comparatively little data on the use 
of psychotropics in other kinds of populations (eg children), over the long-term, and in 
general psychiatric or primary settings (Klein et al., 2002; Wells, 1999).  For many 
psychiatric disorders, should a first-line medication fail, there is surprisingly little 
evidence on which to base the choice of a second-line medication (Fawcett, Stein, & 
Jobson, 1999; Stein, Lerer, & Stahl, 2005). 
 
Thus, while the advent of modern psychopharmacology has been a remarkable 
development, this is a young field, and much additional empirical basic and clinic 
research remains to be done (Klein, 1993; Klein et al., 2002).  Of particular relevance to 
the current dissertation, is the gap in empirical research on “off-label” indications for 
psychotropic medications.  Once a psychotropic medication is made available, additional 
data on safety may become available on the basis of post-marketing surveillance.  
However, the prescription of psychotropics for non-registered conditions (for example, 
the prescription of an antidepressant for depression that does not meet criteria for a major 
depression) may continue on the basis of clinical judgment rather than empirical trials.  
The lack of data in this area contributes to the difficulty of the philosophical questions 
raised by modern psychopharmacology, the focus of the next chapter. 
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2.  Philosophical Questions Raised by Psychopharmacology 
 
In addition to the many empirical questions that remain for psychopharmacology, the 
field has raised important philosophical issues for the cognitive and clinical sciences.  
Philosophy of medicine, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of cognitive science 
have only recently begun to address conceptual issues in neuroscience (Bechtel, Mandik, 
Mundale, & Stufflebeam, 2001; Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Bickle, 2003; Churchland, 
2002; Mishara, 2007), and by and large have ignored the area of clinical 
psychopharmacology  This dissertation attempts to begin to address this notable gap in 
the literature. 
 
A host of philosophical questions are raised by modern psychopharmacology.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, these can be divided into 1) conceptual or metaphysical 
questions about categories relevant to psychopharmacology, 2) explanatory or 
epistemological questions addressing our knowledge of how psychotropics work, and 3) 
moral or ethical questions about when psychotropics should be used.  In the rest of this 
chapter I will very briefly outline each of these categories of questions;  the rest of the 
dissertation will then consider each of these categories and questions in turn, exploring 
them in more detail. 
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1)  Conceptual Questions Raised by the Effects of Psychotropics 
 
Psychopharmacology raises questions about a number of categories employed in 
psychiatry.  Most importantly, it raises the question of how optimally to define medical 
and psychiatric disorders4.  The definition of disorder lies at the heart of philosophy of 
medicine, and how we think about disorder may well impact on how we think about 
interventions, including treatment with pharmaceuticals or psychotropics.  Some may go 
so far as to argue that if a particular medical or psychiatric intervention is useful, then this 
helps define the existence of an underlying medical or psychiatric disorder (Kessler et al., 
2003; Reznek, 1988).  Is disorder the kind of thing that can be defined in terms of 
necessary and sufficient conditions (eg a square has certain essential features), or is it 
more of a category that mainly reflects particular social practices (eg what counts as a 
weed may vary from time to time and place to place)?. 
 
A second set of conceptual questions relates to psychotropic medications themselves.  
The question of how to define a pharmaceutical and a psychotropic are not entirely 
straightforward.  For example, what is the distinction between the use of psychiatric 
medications for therapy versus enhancement?  What are the boundaries between 
psychiatric medications, legal drugs (alcohol, nicotine), and illicit substances of abuse 
(cocaine, heroine)?  Are nutrients such as the amino acid, tryptophan, which may act to 
increase serotonergic neurotransmission, best conceptualised as pharmaceuticals (that is, 
so-called neutraceuticals)?  How important is it to draw a distinction between 
                                                 
4
 I use the term “disorder” rather than “disease” only by convention.  The term “disease” connotes an 
understanding of precise pathology, which is often absent in psychiatric conditions. 
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psychotropics that are identical to endogenous compounds, and those that act to perturb 
endogenous mechanisms?   
 
A third set of conceptual questions raised by psychopharmacology has to do with 
defining emotions and the self, the person, and his or her character.  It seems 
unproblematic to assert that if an individual imbibes alcohol and acts impulsively or 
rashly, then a sympathetic audience might characterize this behaviour as out of character.  
What happens when an individual experiences gradual positive psychological changes in 
response to a psychotropic, so that they later come to see themselves as having previously 
suffered from a chronic disorder? – have they lived their life “out of character”?  These 
questions in turn raise questions about of how best to understand how psychotropics 
work. 
 
2)  Explanatory Questions about How Psychotropics Work 
 
Psychopharmacology raises the epistemological question of how to understand the mind-
body in general and psychotropics in particular.  Psychopharmacologists have produced a 
range of neuroscientific data about how psychotropics act to effect one or other biological 
system (eg benzodiazepines act on the γ-aminobutyric acid or GABA receptor).  
However, it is unclear whether such work fully addresses the question of how these 
agents work to change thoughts, feelings, and behaviours (how does a benzodiazepine 
results in reduced anxiety?).  Our accounts of how psychotropics work and of how 
psychotherapy works seem to operate on entirely different levels of discourse (eg we 
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describe a psychotropic as altering a neuronal receptor in the brain, but we describe a 
psychotherapeutic intervention as leading to a change in the patient’s way of thinking or 
feeling); what is the relationship between such views?  An immediate possibility is that 
psychotherapy affects the software of the mind, but that medication affects the hardware 
– is such a view valid?  The problem of understanding how treatment works also raises 
the related question of understanding how disorders arise, of conceptualizing how genetic 
and environmental factors underlie pathology. 
 
A second set of explanatory questions relates to placebo and nocebo effects.  Clinical 
psychopharmacology relies on the use of double-blind placebo-controlled trials in which 
participants are randomised to receive either active medication or an inert substance, with 
both physician and patient kept “blind” about the identity of the tablet.  In such controlled 
trials, there is often a sizeable clinical response in patients given the inert substance (the 
placebo effect).  Conversely, a remarkable number of subjects experience adverse events 
in response to administration of an inert substance (the nocebo effect).  How should these 
phenomena best be conceptualised?  How should the unconscious processes at play here 
be characterized? 
 
A final group of explanatory questions about psychotropics involves the discipline of 
evolutionary psychology.  There is a growing literature which argues that thoughts, 
feelings and behaviours should not merely be explained in terms of their underlying 
proximal mechanisms, but that it is also relevant to consider their more distal, 
evolutionary origins (Cosmides & Tooby, 2003; Laland & Brown, 2002).  Evolutionary 
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explanations have increasingly been applied to medicine in general (Nesse & Williams, 
1994) and to psychiatry in particular (Baron-Cohen, 1997; McGuire & Troisi A, 1998; 
Stevens & Price, 1996).  Instead of focusing on the proximal factors that underlie 
pathology, an evolutionary perspective focuses on the distal or evolutionary mechanisms 
that create vulnerability to disease.  Is such a perspective valuable in understanding the 
effects of psychotropics? 
 
3)  Moral Questions About When to Use Psychotropics 
 
It seems clear that if a patient has a life-threatening pneumonia then it is a reasonable 
medical decision to administer an effective antibiotic.  By analogy, if a person has a life-
threatening depression it seems logical that it is valuable to arrange for a physician to 
prescribe an effective antidepressant.  However, it is unclear whether this argument 
would hold for a range of other psychiatric symptoms, such as chronic low-grade 
depressive symptoms (dysthymia), variations in temperament (such as shyness) or 
behaviours that seem bad rather than mad (for example, impulsive-aggression). 
 
This problem is made particularly acute by the argument that psychological phenomena, 
including psychiatric symptoms can be understood as meaningful within their particular 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic framework (Bolton & Hill, 1996).  Apparently negative or 
destructive emotions, such as shyness, aggression, or jealousy, have important positive 
features (Goldie, 2000).  Similarly, in the realm of cognition there is the phenomenon of 
depressive realism – people with depression may be more accurate in judging 
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contingencies between responses and outcomes in the world than people without 
depression (Haaga & Beck, 1995).  Pharmacotherapy of cognitive-affective symptoms, 
perhaps particularly if unaccompanied by the insight that psychotherapy can bring, 
therefore arguably runs the risk of being harmful. 
 
What about so-called “cosmetic psychopharmacology”?  This term was coined by the 
psychiatrist Peter Kramer, who addressed this potentially new use of psychotropics in his 
volume “Listening to Prozac”, perhaps the first extended meditation on the conceptual 
implications of modern psychopharmacology for society and for psychiatry (Kramer, 
1997).  Pharmaceuticals are increasingly used to enhance athletic or sexual performance 
(Flower, 2004), and plastic surgery is widely used to enhance physical appearance (Bolt, 
Wijsbek, de Beaufort, & Hilhorst, 2002).  Is there a rationale for using psychotropics to 
optimize psychological well-being and function, even in the absence of disorder?  If 
novel agents act to improve memory, decrease shyness, or reduce impulsivity, for 
example, what are the pros and cons of widespread prescription of such agents? 
 
Considerations about when and how it is appropriate to treat disorders and symptoms 
cross the fact-value divide (Bolt et al., 2002; Canguilhem, 1966; Fulford, Broome, 
Stanghellini, & Thornton, 2005; Fulford, 1989; Hare, 1983; Sadler, 1997; Sadler, 2002; 
Schaffner, 1999; Wakefield, 1992b).  Furthermore, there is a tension in Western society 
between values of self-improvement, which would encourage people to use novel 
technologies including psychotropics, and values around tradition and nature, which 
argue that such changes are not authentic (Elliott, 2003; Parens, 1998b; Parens, 2005).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 36
Such debate is stirred by technical breakthroughs such as gene therapy (Anderson, 1989; 
Jonas, 1974; McGee, 1997; Walters & Palmer, 1997), or the development of selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitors such as fluoxetine (Prozac).  However, the debate has 
occurred many times in the past;  early psychotropics such as barbiturates5, cocaine, and 
benzodiazepines were initially viewed as having significant value as cosmetic 
psychotropics that were useful even in those who did not suffer from disorders (Elliott, 
2003). 
 
4)  Conclusion 
 
There are a number of philosophical questions that relate to psychopharmacology, but 
that will not be addressed here, as they arguably involve broader issues in philosophy of 
medicine and psychiatry, or in philosophy of mind, rather than issues more specifically 
tied to the philosophy of psychopharmacology per se.  These include questions such as 
consent with regard to psychotropic medication in research and in the clinic, the use of 
psychotropic medication to compel truthfulness under interrogation or to end life during 
euthanasia, and the ethics of animal and stem cell research on psychopharmacology.   
 
On the other hand, the questions raised here will ultimately lead to a whole range of more 
general philosophical and clinical questions, including questions about how to 
conceptualize science, language, and mind, about disease and illness, pharmacotherapy 
and psychotherapy, and placebos and the unconscious.  These questions are not the 
                                                 
5
 Barbiturates were perhaps the first synthetic psychotropics marketed as enhancers.  In 1863 Adolf van 
Baeyer synthesized barbituric acid, which he named after his girlfriend Barbara. 
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primary focus of the dissertation, but we need to address them in order to provide a 
framework for considering the questions raised by psychopharmacology. 
 
While a great deal of work has been done on the philosophy of science, language, mind, 
and medicine, the intersection between philosophy and psychiatry per se is a more 
circumscribed one.  Relatively little philosophical work has been done in the area of 
psychopharmacology in general, and cosmetic psychopharmacology in particular6.  I 
hope that this dissertation begins to break some new ground in this area, and by so doing 
contributes to providing a conceptual foundation for good clinical psychopharmacology. 
                                                 
6
 A number of the questions raised by psychopharmacology are also raised by other branches of science in 
general (eg genetics) and neuroscience in particular (eg brain imaging).  For example, progress in genetics 
has raised the question of what it means to be 98% chimpanzee (Marks, 2002), and advances in neuro-
imaging raise a number of conceptual questions (Fusar-Poli & Broome, 2006).  We will refer at times to 
this parallel literature. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 38
3.  How to Think about Science, Language, and Medicine:  
Classical, Critical, and Integrated Perspectives 
 
 
To address specific conceptual questions about psychopharmacology, we first need to 
consider a number of larger questions about science, about language, about medicine, and 
even about philosophy.  In many ways, this dissertation is about all of these issues.  
However, we need to begin with a single starting point, and so we will begin with what is 
perhaps the most important question in philosophy of medicine -  “What is a medical 
disorder?”, and perhaps the most important question in philosophy of psychiatry - “What 
is a psychiatric disorder?” (Engelhardt & Spicker, 1977; Engelhardt, 2000; Stempsey, 
2004).   
 
These turn out to be useful questions-with-which-to-think (Papert, 1980).  Beginning 
with these two questions provides an opportunity to demonstrate the approach taken 
throughout this dissertation.  First, the two questions are central to medicine and to 
psychiatry, and so provide a segue into many other issues.  Second, there have been well 
delineated formal definitions of disorder (the classical approach) as well as a range of 
arguments that no scientific response is possible (the critical approach);  providing a 
foundation on which a contrasting position can be built here. 
 
The position here draws on cognitive-affective science and emphasizes that the brain-
mind is embodied;  over the course of this chapter we will gradually try to reach a 
conclusion that sensorimotor-affective neuronal circuitry allows humans to interact 
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with their physical and social world, and this in turn leads to the development of 
basic-level and abstract cognitive-affective maps (or metaphors) for understanding 
the world.  Before we get there, however, in order to clarify the way in which this 
position contrasts with the classical and critical positions, we need to begin by delineating 
those positions in more detail.  Any attempt to include a whole range of thinkers under a 
simple rubric must fail, and the aim here is to attempt to show some important family 
resemblances, rather than to stake out necessary and sufficient criteria for belonging to 
these divergent schools of thought. 
 
Many prior authors have contrasted two broad schools and so helped shape the argument 
here (Berlin, 1980; Bhaskar, 1978; Cilliers, 1998; Flanagan, 2003; Keat & Urry, 1982; 
Suppe, 1974; von Wright, 1971).  A series of useful distinctions have been drawn 
between erklären (explanation) and verstehen (understanding) (Dilthey, 1883; Jaspers, 
1963; Strasser, 1985; van Niekerk, 1989; von Wright, 1971), tough-minded and tender-
minded (James, 1907), objectivism and intellectualism (Merleau-Ponty, 1942), platonism 
and nominalism (Quine, 1969), metaphysicists and ironists (Rorty, 1979), objectivism 
and relativism (Bernstein, 1983; Harman & Thomson, 1996; Johnson, 1993)7, rationalism 
and romanticism (Gellner, 1985), universalism and historicism (Margolis, 1986), 
positivism and anti-realism (Miller, 1987), the nomological and the idiographic 
(Schwartz & Wiggins, 1987), the modern and the post-modern (Bertens, 1995), 
empiricism and post-empiricism (Bolton et al., 1996), essentialism and normativism 
                                                 
7
 Johnson (1993) mostly refers to absolutism rather than objectivism.  One summary of this broad range of 
contrasts, listed here according to year of publication, would be in terms of their accounts of (general and 
medical) entities (objective vs subjective, essentialism vs nominalism), accounts (explanation vs 
understanding, disease vs illness) and values (absolutism vs relativism, medicine as science vs humanity). 
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(Schaffner, 1999), and the objective and the reactive (Elliott, 2003).  The differentiation 
here will begin by focusing on the different approaches of the classical and critical 
schools to categories in general, and then on their different approaches to the category of 
disorder in particular.  In later parts of the dissertation, we will also focus in greater detail 
on differences in their approach to explanation, and to ethics. 
 
1)  Classical and Critical Approaches - Algorithms vs Narratives 
 
“Madness need not be regarded as an illness.  Why shouldn’t it be seen as a sudden – 
more or less sudden – change of character” (Wittgenstein) 
 
Abigail Adams one day saw a newspaper advertisement aimed at people who worry 
about embarrassing themselves when they have to talk in front of others, or go to small 
gatherings and parties.  She had felt uncomfortable in social situations for as long as she 
could remember and read further with interest.  The advert had been placed by 
researchers at a local medical school, and she decided to make an appointment to learn 
more.  At the appointment she met Dr.  Bapela Bamanzini, who told Abigail that she 
suffered from a condition called social anxiety disorder.  On her way home, Abigail was 
somewhat sceptical;  she had always known that she was reserved, but she felt that in 
many ways this trait was a valuable asset. 
 
A classical approach to categorization holds that membership in categories can be 
described in terms of necessary and sufficient characteristics (Smith & Medin, 1981).  
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For example, a square is defined as having four features:  1) four sides; 2) four angles; 3) 
all sides are equal; and 4) all angles are equal;  all members of this category are 
homogeneous insofar as each has all of these defining attributes.  Furthermore, the 
category of squares exists independently of people, and independently of the 
characteristics of human categorizers.   
 
This kind of approach to science and to language has roots in Plato’s work, was adopted 
by logical positivism and the early Wittgenstein, and continues to be enormously 
influential in Anglo-American analytic philosophy (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).  This approach has also strongly influenced particular 
schools in psychology and psychiatry;  in particular behaviourism, certain schools of 
psychoanalysis, and symbolic cognitivism.  Although thinkers within this tradition differ 
markedly from one another, common themes are that science is comprised of formal 
laws, that language entails the use of specifiable terms, and that mind involves the 
processing of symbols. 
 
The idea that science is comprised of formal laws has a long history.  Plato (427-347BC) 
held that knowledge was best exemplified by mathematics, and that understanding reality 
involved a priori reasoning to discover the abstract objects that existed in a timeless 
“realm of the intellect” (“Plato’s Heaven”).  Mill, in a particularly important work of 
nineteenth century positivism, emphasized the uniformity of the laws of nature, arguing 
that the scientific method comprises inducing laws from empirical data (Mill, 1843)8.  
                                                 
8
 Bacon and the English empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) influenced Comte, who in turn influenced 
Mill’s view of the continuity between the methods of the natural and human sciences.  Mill’s book can be 
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Frege and Russell, at the turn of the 20th century, attempted to reduce mathematics to 
logic, arguing that logic is a complex structure resting on a finite set of basic elements, 
and that rules or algorithms could then be used to produce more complex structures. 
 
A classical approach has often held that the universal method of science includes the 
study of both physical and human phenomena, including those related to health and 
illness.  Mill (1843), for example, argued that scientific laws applied equally to physical 
and psychological events.  This position often includes a reductionistic element, which 
argues that the most basic and important laws are those formulated in the physical 
sciences (Neurath, Carnap, & Morris, 1969).  In this perspective, physical and 
psychological phenomena can be studied in the same scientific way, and a definition of 
medical disorders and of psychiatric disorders can follow essentially the same form.  This 
approach was taken by early authors in the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry 
(Boorse, 1976a; Hempel, 1965), and it continues to be followed by influential thinkers 
(Wakefield, 1992a). 
 
A classical approach to language holds that meaning can be fully specified in terms of 
our direct knowledge of the world, and subsequent definitions and logic.  Hume 
distinguished between “matters of fact” and “relations of ideas” (Hume, 1739), while 
Kant contrasted synthetic and analytic judgments (Kant, 1781); laying the foundation for 
the idea that the sentences which comprise human knowledge are true by virtue of the 
facts of the world, or true by virtue of the meanings of their terms.  Carnap and other 
                                                                                                                                                 
considered as having set off the methodenstreit in Germany.  We later also briefly discuss the implications 
of a “unified conception of science” for biology. 
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logical positivists went on to argue that analysis of the meaning of terms is key not only 
for understanding logic, but also for addressing broader philosophical questions.  Ayer, 
working in the linguistic-analytic tradition, not only attempted to put forward a principle 
of verification (an empirical statement is not meaningful unless some empirical 
observation is relevant to its truth or falsity), but also argued that philosophy is an activity 
of analysis (of words and their meanings) and so identical with the logic of science (Ayer, 
1936).9  
 
Classical approaches to science and language have influenced several views in 
philosophy of mind and in clinical psychology.  An early view in philosophy of mind was 
that mental and physical concepts belong to different categories, but mental states can 
analysed in terms of dispositions to behave (Ryle, 1949)10.  A more recent position 
conceptualizes the mind in terms of the processing of symbols; the mind is functionally 
analogous to the rules (software) running on a computer (hardware) (Putnam, 1967; 
Fodor, 1974, 1975).  In psychology, behaviourists have argued that psychological science 
should focus on determing the laws that describe the relationship between stimuli and 
responses.  Some psychoanalysts have emphasized the importance of describing 
unconscious rules that produce human thoughts, feelings and behaviours.  Symbolic 
cognitivists have argued that the mind can be understood as a system of internal 
representations (Fodor, 1987).  Despite the important differences between these 
psychological schools, their proponents emphasise the rules and algorithms which govern 
behaviours and representations. 
                                                 
9
 Ayer’s volume was important in introducing logical positivism to the English speaking world. 
10
 Ryle’s logical behaviourism was influenced by the work of psychological behaviourists. 
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One of the earliest attempts to define the category of medical disorder from a classical 
approach was that of Boorse (Boorse, 1975; Boorse, 1976a; Boorse, 1997), who argued 
that medical disorders can be defined in terms of malfunction.  Working in the same 
tradition, a range of authors have attempted to further refine this definition (Caplan, 
McCartney, & Engelhardt, 1981; Carson & Burns, 1997; Humber & Almeder, 1997; 
Sadler, Wiggins, & Schwartz, 1994) and to employ it in the clinic (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994; Kendell, 1975; Klein, 1978; Spitzer & Endicott, 1978), and in health 
planning (Daniels, 1994; Sabin & Daniels, 1994).  Although the classical view has 
predominantly argued for a view of medical disorders as value-free,  Wakefield has 
suggested that while “dysfunction” can be defined in a value-free way, the concept of 
disorder necessarily entails a negative evaluation, so that medical disorders can be 
defined in terms of “harmful dysfunction” (Wakefield, 1992a).  Subsequently he has 
argued strenuously and elegantly that this formal definition covers the necessary and 
sufficient characteristics of disorder (Wakefield, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999a, 1999b, 2001).  
There are close links between a classical view of disorder, and the “medical model” 
(Macklin, 1973), which focuses on physical causes of disorder, and on technical 
interventions. 
 
A more critical approach argues that categorization is a social practice, and that 
categories reflect ways of life, reflecting human interests, rather than universal forms.  
Certainly, we should be aware of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”, which warns 
us not to reify abstract categories of thought (Whitehead, 1948).  A critical approach is 
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central to a strand of philosophy that stands in opposition to traditional thought, but that 
also has long historical roots, was re-invigorated by the later Wittgenstein and 
existentialism, and continues to comprise a crucial strand of contemporary thought about 
science and language, particularly in continental philosophy and in post-modern 
movements (Bhaskar, 1979; Bolton et al., 1996).   
 
This approach has also strongly influenced particular schools in psychology and 
psychiatry, including phenomenology, interpersonal schools of psychoanalysis, and 
situated cognitivism.  Although thinkers within this tradition differ markedly from one 
another, common themes are that all observation is theory-laden (what scientists observe 
necessarily reflects their pre-existing views), that knowledge of humans requires a 
subjective understanding (scientists are necessarily participants in the human interactions 
that they observe, rather than simply objective outsiders), that language reflects its 
speakers’ way of life so that meaning cannot be reduced to formal rules, and that the 
mind can only be understood in terms of the context and culture of the individual to 
whom it belongs. 
 
Vico and Herder were key figures in the critical tradition, laying the ground for the 
emphasis on understanding (verstehen) in the knowledge of humans (rather than merely 
explanation (erklären)).  A focus on narratives and their interpretation has continued to 
play an important role in a critical approach in the philosophy of science.  A critical 
approach to the philosophy of science argues that science itself comprises merely one 
way of reading the world, and is a perspective that is not necessarily more privileged than 
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any other.  Thus “scientists (even physical scientists) are a fickle lot”, and the history of 
science “is a tale of multifarious shiftings of allegiance from theory to theory” 
(Feyerabend, 1975), as its paradigms (Kuhn, 1971) and programs (Lakatos, 1978) change 
over the course of time, partly in accordance with shifts in power (Barnes, 1974; Bloor, 
1991; Bourdieu, 1998; Collins, 1985; Latour & Woolgar, 1992; Longino, 1990). 
 
A critical approach to language argues that language reflects a speakers’ way of life, and 
meaning cannot be reduced to formal rules.  Particular statements reflect not only 
observations, but also a range of theoretical assumptions (Quine, 1960).  Furthermore, 
insofar as speakers are situated in the world and speech is intentional, sentences 
compromise more than mere representations.  In Searle’s Chinese room experiment, for 
example, he notes that even if a computer is expert at manipulating Chinese and English 
symbols, translating the one language to the other, it is nevertheless unable to understand 
either (Searle, 1983).  A continental tradition puts a great deal of emphasis on language, 
not with the aim of discovering logical truths, but rather because of its emphasis on the 
narratives (including scientific texts) and discursive practices which shape societies and 
individuals.  This emphasis shifts the logic of verification to a logic of validation (van 
Niekerk, 1989). 
 
Critical approaches to science and language have influenced several views in philosophy 
of mind and in psychology.   Philosophers have emphasized that by focusing only on 
observable stimuli and responses, behaviourism ignores the crucial realm of human 
subjective experience (Strawson, 1974; van Niekerk, 1986).  Furthermore a range of 
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thinkers including Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1967),  have argued that purely 
representational accounts fail to account for the intentionality (Brentano, 1973) of mental 
states (Davidson, 1984; Dennett, 1987; McDowell, 1998).  A discursive turn in 
psychology has emphasized that psychological phenomena cannot be reduced to brain 
events or computational states, but instead are crucially dependent on interpersonal 
processes (Harré & Gillett, 1994).  Some psychoanalytic theoretists have conceptualized 
psychotherapy in terms of narrative text, have emphasized the intersubjective aspects of 
analytic phenomena such as the transference, or have focused on the discursive nature of 
the unconscious (Habermas, 1971; Klein, 1976; Mitchell, 1988; Ricoeur, 1970; Ricoeur, 
1981; Schafer, 1976).  Situated cognitivists have emphasized that cognition occurs within 
a particular context (Gibson, 1977; Neisser, 1976), and have focused on computational 
models, such as neural networks or robotic agents that operate within particular 
environments, which allow cognition to be embodied, and which blur the software-
hardware distinction (Clark, 1997; Dreyfus, 2005; Ramsay, Stitch, & Rumelhart, 1991).  
Despite important differences between psychological schools that take a critical position, 
they emphasise that psychological phenomena cannot be specified in terms of rules and 
algorithms, but rather involve multilayered narratives and discursive practices (Bennett et 
al., 2003; Harré et al., 1994). 
 
Similarly, many authors have emphasized that medical disorders are social constructs11.  
They argue that categorizing any particular phenomenon as a disorder reflects cultural 
                                                 
11
 Ironically, Virchow, a pathologist who made significant contributions understanding the cellular basis of 
disease, was one of the first to recognize this.  Thus he wrote, “What we call disease is solely an abstract 
concept with the help of which we separate particular phenomena of daily life from all others, without there 
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and historical theories and values, rather than any underlying universal truth about the 
relevant phenomenon.  This kind of approach has arguably been particularly useful in 
studies of medical history and medical anthropology;  the hindsight provided by history 
and the farsightedness provided by anthropology throw the theory-bound and value-
bound aspects of medicine, including psychopharmacotherapy, into sharp relief12.  
Lilienfeld and Marino (Lilienfeld & Marino, 1995; Lilienfeld & Marino, 1999) provide 
perhaps the most comprehensive philosophical response to Wakefield’s essentialist 
analysis (and certainly the one which he regards as the most important alternative 
(Wakefield, 1999a));  they argue that the category of disorder is based on socially 
constructed prototypes rather than universal natural kinds, and conclude that there is no 
scientific way of deciding what does and does not fall in this category.  There are close 
links between critiques of the classical view of disorder, and the attempt to replace the 
pathology-centred “medical model” with an emphasis on detailing the experience of 
illness, understanding its emergence within a meaningful context, and  providing more 
comprehensive and holistic approaches to intervention, including an emphasis on the 
doctor-patient relationship and on social change (Gadamer, 1993; Greenhalgh & Hurwitz, 
1998; Kriel, 2000; Leder, 1984; Tauber, I, 2006; van Leeuwen & Kimsma, 1997).13 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
being a separation in nature itself”.  Similarly, he argued, “Medicine is a social science, and politics nothing 
but medicine on a large scale” (quoted in Porter (Porter, 1997)). 
12
 A range of authors have contributed to this literature (Canguilhem, 1966; Conrad & Schneider, 1980; 
Davis, 1995b; Doyal, 1979; Ehrenreich & English, 1973; Farmer, 2003; Foucault, 1973; Holmes, Murray, 
Perron, & Rail, 2006; Illich, 1977; Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; Packard, 1977; Parsons, 1951; Rothman, 1997; 
Schaler, 2004; Showalter, 1987; Sontag, 1977; Staiano, 1979; Szasz, 1972; Zola, 1972). 
13
 Although the medical model is often referred to as Cartesian, debate about whether behavioural 
disturbance is best understood as “medical” or “moral” goes back at least to Plato (Kenny, 1969; Simon, 
1978). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 49
The question, “what is a medical disorder?”, raises the parallel question, “what is a 
psychiatric disorder?”, and the orthogonal question of whether medical and psychiatric 
disorders should be defined in the same way.  This in turn raises the more fundamental 
questions of naturalism;  should the human “sciences” be conceptualised in the same way 
as the natural sciences, and should they proceed in the same way?  These questions in 
turn lie at the heart of the philosophy of the social sciences in general (Bhaskar, 1979; 
Harré, 1986a; Keat et al., 1982; Piaget, 1970; Sayer, 2000) and of philosophy of 
psychiatry in particular (Bolton et al., 1996; Hundert, 1989; Jaspers, 1963). 
 
A classical approach has held that the categories of science can be conceptualized in 
terms of a universal theory and method that includes the study of both physical and 
human phenomena.  In this perspective, physical and psychological phenomena can be 
studied in the same scientific way, and a definition of medical disorders and of 
psychiatric disorders can follow essentially the same form.  As noted earlier, this 
approach was taken by early authors in the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry 
(Boorse, 1976a; Hempel, 1965), and it continues to be followed by influential thinkers 
(Wakefield, 1992a).  Hempel, for example, challenged nosologists to provide a 
classification that carves nature at its joints, and to use operational criteria (Bridgman, 
1927).   
 
A classical approach to psychology, combined with a classical approach to somatic and 
psychological disorder, underpins a number of models in clinical psychiatry, particularly 
the so-called organic model.  In this model, psychiatric disorders are viewed as 
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essentialist entities, caused by internal dysfunction, objectively diagnosable, and 
deserving of individual treatment (Macklin, 1973; Zachar & Kendler, 2007).  This model 
has its origins in the success of the germ theory of disease, and argues that specific 
lesions in brain regions or systems lead to psychopathology.  Proponents of the organic 
model emphasize the links between psychiatry and neurology, often referring to 
psychiatric disorders as brain disorders (Guze, 1989). 
  
A more critical approach, however, has argued against the idea that social studies, 
including psychiatry, are best understood as sciences.  Several authors have argued that 
both medicine and psychiatry reflect social practices, so that concepts of psychiatric 
disorder are theory-bound and value-laden (Engelhardt, 2000; Fulford, 1989; Gillett, 
1999; Kovacs, 1998; Lilienfeld et al., 1995; Margolis, 1976; Nordenfelt, 1995; Reznek, 
1988; Sadler, 2002; Toulmin, 1997).  Some proponents of a critical position accept the 
argument that medical disorders can be defined in universal terms, but argue against 
naturalism, noting that psychiatric classification cuts nature at joints that merely reflect 
human practices and interests, and so conclude that psychiatric disorders involve a 
category fallacy, with the metaphors of medicine incorrectly extended to cover 
psychological phenomena (Ingleby, 1981; Sedgwick, 1982). 
 
A critical approach to psychology, combined with a critical approach to psychological 
disorders, underpins a number of models in psychiatric practice, particularly those that 
emphasize patients’ narratives and experiences.  In such clinical models, a narrow focus 
on psychiatric disorder is considered reductionistic, instead the emphasis is on 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 51
understanding patients as agents who develop meaningful symptoms, within the context 
of their particular histories and environments (Harré et al., 1994; Zachar et al., 2007). A 
merger between psychiatry and neurology is therefore far from simple (Pies, 2006).  Such 
views may also downplay the contemporary emphasis on evidence-based medicine and 
evidence-based psychiatry as overly simplistic or wholly flawed, and emphasize instead 
the importance of the service user movements and the value of a self-help culture 
(Bracken & Thomas, 2005; Bracken, 2003; Lewis, 2006).   
 
In summary, the question of whether or not Abigail has a disorder, leads to two important 
traditions of thought which provide contrasting approaches to the general question “what 
is category x?”, and to the more specific questions, “what is a medical disorder?” and 
“what is a psychiatric disorder?”.  A classical tradition, often exemplified in Anglo-
American analytic philosophy, emphasizes the algorithms and rules underlying science, 
language, and the mind, and attempts to rigorously define the necessary and sufficient 
characteristics of categories such as disorder, explaining them in according to formal 
rules, and holding that they are value-free.  A critical tradition, on the other hand, often 
exemplified by philosophers influenced by the later Wittgenstein, continental philosophy, 
and anti-psychiatry theory, emphasizes the contextuality and subjectivity inherent in 
science, language and the mind, explaining them in terms of multilayered narratives, and 
holding that our concepts and explanations are bound up with our values. 
 
 
2)  A Naturalist Approach - Roschian Categories and the Embodied 
Brain-Mind 
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“In discussing the question of how we know whether someone who is holding his cheek 
has toothache, Wittgenstein writes, “...  what if we went on asking:  - 'And why do you 
suppose that toothache corresponds to his holding his cheek just because your toothache 
corresponds to your holding your cheek?'  You will be at a loss to answer this question, 
and find that here we strike rock bottom, that is we have come down to conventions."  
What exactly does Wittgenstein mean by 'conventions' here?  When we have toothache, 
we find that certain responses tend to follow - for example, crying out, holding our 
cheeks, etc.  By convention, the word 'pain' is taken to describe this set of responses - 
'pain' is what makes us cry out, hold our cheeks, etc.” (Harrison, 1979)14. 
 
The classical approach may be criticized for failing to recognize that science and 
medicine are social practices, and that definitions of disorder are necessarily theory-
bound and value-laden.  Conversely, the critical approach may be criticized for failing to 
recognize that science and medicine are not entirely subjective or relativistic, but that the 
theories and values reflected in medical and psychiatric nomenclatures can be rationally 
debated.  On the basis of this kind of philosophical reasoning, a number of authors have 
argued for an approach which acknowledges that natural and social sciences are social 
practices, but also allows that natural and social sciences provide knowledge of real 
structures and their mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1978) and functions (Bolton et al., 1996).  
Such an approach attempts to avoid both the charges of “scientism” and “cynicism” 
(Haack, 2003).   
                                                 
14
 Wittgenstein’s discussion here is in the Blue Book p24-26 (Wittgenstein, 1960), although he also 
addresses pain in Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1967).  Harrison holds that Wittgenstein is not 
making a behaviourist argument, nor solely emphasizing that language involves conventions, but rather is 
arguing for a continuity between the conventions of language and the nature of the world. 
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While natural science may provide an understanding of kinds that reflect the essence of 
nature’s structures and mechanisms, social science cuts nature at joints that instead reflect 
human practices and interests, and the emergent phenomena of more complex sciences 
cannot be fully specified in the terms of more basic sciences (Bhaskar, 1979).  Complex 
brain-mind phenomena, such as pain, need to be investigated with a range of theories and 
methods (Degenaar, 1979; Jaspers, 1963; Panksepp, 1998).  Such an approach to natural 
and human science arguably then forms the basis for an integrative and realist view of the 
sciences (Bhaskar, 1978), for a non-reductionistic naturalist approach to psychology 
(Manicas & Secord, 1983), and for a view on categorizing medical and psychiatric 
disorder that goes beyond the classical and critical perspectives (Stein, 1991).   
 
Are there any data which can be used to support such an apparently attractive and 
synthetic position?  It turns out that a range of empirical data can now inform our view of 
categories in general and the category of disorder in particular.  Cognitive science as 
initially conceptualized incorporated cognitive psychology, linguistics, artificial 
intelligence, neuroscience, anthropology, and philosophy (Gardner, 1985), and we will 
explore next the way in which each of these sub-disciplines has tackled the general 
question of categorization.  In addition, we add developmental psychology, and 
evolutionary psychology, two increasingly important fields in the cognitive-affective 
sciences. 
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Cognitive psychology has emphasized that categories are not homogenous, but rather 
have central and peripheral exemplars (Rosch, 1978).  Prototypes are category members 
which serve as the most central, or typical exemplars.  For example, when presented with 
a list of different birds (robin, owl, ostrich), research subjects agree fairly consistently on 
which kinds of birds are typical birds (e.g.  robin), which are less typical (e.g.  owl), and 
which are atypical (e.g.  ostrich).  Typical exemplars, or birds that lie at the centre of the 
category, may have such attributes as having feathers and wings, and being able to fly 
and sing; atypical exemplars may not.  Different experimental paradigms, including 
reaction times, production of examples, and similarity ratings, confirm that many 
categories have graded structures.  Categories are intimately related to human actions and 
activities. 
 
Linguistics has provided additional evidence that abstract categories (such as disorder) 
are crucially dependent on neuronally-based sensorimotor and affective experience (such 
as the experience of pain).  Lakoff's elegant analyses point to the existence of what he 
terms radial categories, made up of a central case (based on basic-level sensorimotor-
affective experience) and conventionalized variations (requiring metaphoric extensions or 
mappings from the central case) (Lakoff, 1987).  For example, the central case in the 
category of mothers describes a female who gives birth to a child, supplies half of the 
child's genes, nurtures the child, and so on.  Variations on the central case include such 
entities as stepmother, adoptive mother, birth mother, or foster mother, which lack one or 
more attributes of the central case.  In addition, Lakoff emphasizes that complex abstract 
concepts (such as marriage) are structured in terms of more basic-level metaphors (eg 
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MARRIAGE as a JOURNEY).  Thus linguistics suggests that the brain-mind relies on 
prototypes and metaphors grounded in human experience, rather than on the formal 
manipulation of abstract representations (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980). 
 
The field of artificial intelligence can potentially provide useful models of categorization. 
In particular, connectionist models are able to show how simple neural networks process 
complex graded and radial categories (Churchland, 1995; Ramsay et al., 1991; 
Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986).  Consider for example a neural 
network that classifies faces.  It turns out that such a neural network has minima for male 
and female faces that are based not on necessary and sufficient criteria, but rather on a 
graded kind of pattern recognition.  The parallel distributed processing of such networks 
is characterized by several features that may be important in simulating categorization;  
cognitive-affective processing in the absence of central control; processing in parallel 
rather than serially; content addressable memory rather than memory located by an 
abstract name; relatively slow processing in individual units in contrast with rapid 
processing in the whole network; processing by different areas of interacting modules 
using reciprocal connections; learning via adjustment of synaptic strengths; efficient 
pattern recognition; and graceful degeneration rather than sudden crashing of the system 
after disturbances to the network (Norman, 1986).  More recently, sophisticated 
biologically based robotic and connectionist models have helped explain how the brain-
mind grounds meaning in perception and action, and relies on embodied prototypes rather 
than solely on binary rule-like representations (O'Reilly, 2006; Roy, 2005). 
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Work in neuroscience and anthropology can be used to determine the lower and higher 
level constraints on categorization;  this is seen for example in work on colour 
classification (Berlin & Kay, 1969; Kay & McDaniel, 1978).  Languages do not simply 
carve up the colour spectrum in arbitrary ways;  some languages employ highly 
differentiated classification of basic colours (up to eleven basic colours), while others 
have little differentiation (cool vs.  warm colours).  While the boundaries between colour 
ranges differ from language to language, focal colours are classified in highly regular 
ways by speakers of languages with the same colour category differentiation.  Thus, in 
languages with a basic term for the range of blue colours, all speakers choose the same 
focal blue as the best example of blue.  Colour categorization is a product of human 
neurophysiology and culturally-specific cognitive-affective operations;  our categories 
are embodied in neuronal circuits which mediate our sensorimotor-affective experience 
of the physical and social world15. 
 
Evolutionary theory (with its focus on phylogenesis) is increasingly contributing to 
cognitive-affective science.  In general, the idea is that the brain-mind has evolved to 
optimize the way in which particular organisms make their living (Duchaine, Cosmides, 
& Tooby, 2001; Papineau, 2003; Ruse, 1995).  In all animals, the nervous system 
contributes to homeostasis by approaching rewarding stimuli and avoiding punishing 
ones.  In the case of humans, our brain-minds have specialized in complex decision-
making, including planning the future.  For such purposes it may be useful to include 
                                                 
15
 The idea that similar processes underlie the perception of action, action, and social cognition has been 
termed the “motor theory of social cognition”.  Such an account may be particularly relevant for basic-level 
processing (Hurley, 1998; O'Regan & Noë, 2001), although complex cognitive-affective processing may 
not be reducible to motor processes (Gallagher, 2005). 
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self-representation (see later chapter on the self).  However, at a simpler level it turns out 
that humans make finer discriminations between greenish, yellowish, and orangish 
colours than they do in bluish regions.  At a proximal level, this can be explained by the 
neurophysiology of vision.  But at a distal level, there are evolutionary reasons for this 
human capacity.  Other species, which have different ways of living in the world, have 
different neurophysiologies, and discriminate better amongst different colours than do 
humans. 
 
Developmental cognitive-affective science (with its focus on ontogenesis) may also 
contribute to understanding categories.  The idea that neuronal circuits involved in 
sensorimotor-affective experience (eg of pain) are used to structure basic and abstract 
categories (eg disorder) has early roots in psychology (Piaget, 1952; Vygotsky, 1934).  
Connectionist models are able to show how neural networks learn.  Such work highlights 
how the brain-mind can early on make simple kinds of categorization, but over time with 
more participation-in-the world it can make highly abstract differentiations (Mareschal et 
al., 2007).  Such work shows that categories, like other cognitive-affective phenomena, 
cannot be understood in terms of simply nature or nurture, but rather reflect a complex 
interaction between genetic and environmental variables.  Colour categorizations reflect 
the molecular genetics of our visual system, but also particular cultural approaches to 
colour classification. 
 
What can philosophy contribute to cognitive science?  One idea is that philosophy puts 
forward the ideas first, and cognitive science repeats them (Fodor, 2000).  Certainly, 
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thought experiments have long been used to demonstrate that human categories are fuzzy 
at the edges.  The physician-philosopher Locke, for example, distinguished between what 
he termed nominal and real essences, and argued that there are no fixed boundaries in 
nature (Locke, 1694).  Similary, the notion that the brain-mind is situated in the body and 
its interaction with the world is an old one.  Spinoza, for example, noted that “The Mind 
does not have the capacity to perceive … except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the 
modifications (affections) of the body” (de Spinoza, 1677)16.  Kant made an attempt to 
describe schemas as structures that while internal, are modified in response to the 
experience of the external world, a position that is partially consistent with much modern 
cognitive-affective science (Kant, 1781)17.   
 
Similarly, the later Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1967) emphasized that representations do 
not simply mirror the world, but rather that concepts involve sets of family resemblances, 
they are tied to our interests, and their meaning is grounded in social activity;  a position 
that has since been drawn upon to argue for the modern cognitivist view that information 
is encoded in the brain-mind (Bolton et al., 1996).  Alongside such work, continental 
philosophy has developed a concept of the lived-body (Merleau-Ponty, 1963b);  the body 
does not merely involve mechanically caused acts;  rather it is an intentional entity that 
“understands” the world by perceiving its surroundings and moving towards goals.  
                                                 
16
 Whereas Descartes’s thinking was imbued with physics, Spinoza had a particularly biological 
perspective.  Hampshire argues that this had a number of consequences for Spinoza’s unique contributions, 
including his preference for descriptions of individual natures rather than of universal laws, his notions of 
physical and psychological explanation (akin to erklären vs verstehen), and his view that the vocabulary we 
use for ethics should be the same that we use for describing nature (Hampshire, 2005). 
17
 Kant has a chapter on “schematism” in the “Critique of Pure Reason”.  He discusses how there must be 
some connection between the experienced idea and the experienced world, the schema is “properly, only 
the phenomenon, or sensible concept, of an object in agreement with the category”.  Thus despite an 
attempt to reconcile rationalism and empiricism, his view is rather different from the cognitive-affective 
science construct of an embodied schema. 
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Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) and Straus (Straus, 1963), for example, have both 
emphasized that sensory perception cannot be reduced to the Cartesian alternatives of 
merely a mechanical process or a disembodied type of thought, but rather involves a 
bodily intelligence and affectivity, a body-subject, a “being-in-the-world”18.  This kind of 
thinking has provided a foundation for the so-called “corporeal turn” in a broad range of 
contemporary theoretical work which emphasizes the importance of embodiment in 
social practices (Witz, 2000). 
 
Thus, a range of disciplines within the cognitive-affective sciences, including philosophy, 
provide increasingly sophisticated ideas and data, on the embodied brain-mind and its 
categories (Churchland, 2002; Clark, 1997; Gibbs, 2006; Varela et al., 1991; Wheeler, 
2005).  The current dissertation rests on the shoulders of authors who have suggested 
ways of going beyond the classical versus critical divide by understanding how categories 
or cognitive-affective maps emerge from the interaction of our brain-minds with the 
physical and social world, by emphasizing the continuity between philosophical work on 
these kinds of notions of embodiment and subsequent cognitive-affective science data on 
the centrality of embodiment to brain-mind processes, and by suggesting the possibility 
of a naturalized philosophy at the intersection of conceptual and empirical work on the 
brain-mind (Bolton et al., 1996; Churchland, 2002; Clark, 1997; Gallagher, 2005; Lakoff 
et al., 1999; Varela et al., 1991). 
 
                                                 
18
 “Being-in-the world” can be contrasted with Sartre’s “being-in-itself” (or matter) and “being-for-itself” 
(or mind”).  Note also Bourdieu’s view of habitus - the socialized body, or the individual’s physiological 
incorporation of social norms (Bourdieu, 1998). 
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With the range of data from cognitive-affective science in mind, we can return to our 
general question, “what is the category x”, and to our specific question, “what is a 
disorder?”.  These data allow one to go beyond the classical and critical approaches, by 
showing that categories, like other cognitive-affective phenomena, are embodied in the 
neuronal circuits of the brain-mind, and in its interactions with the world (Bolton et al., 
1996; Lakoff et al., 1999; Varela et al., 1991).  While it may be possible to define some 
categories in terms of natural kinds that exist independently of humans (Kripke, 1980; 
Putnam, 1975), many categories are explicitly tied to human practices and interests 
(Fulford, 1989; Thornton, 2002).  Thus, abstract categories like disorder cannot be 
defined in terms of formal rules that describe necessary and sufficient criteria (as posited 
in the classical approach), nor can they be viewed as entirely open to interpretation (as 
argued in the critical approach), but rather should be understood as emerging from 
sensorimotor-affective experience (eg of pain) and resultant cognitive-affective mapping.   
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, we do not need a very detailed understanding of the 
mechanisms by which categories emerge and operate, but in the next section the work of 
Lakoff (1999) is drawn on in order to provide a framework for considering how the 
category of disorder is structured.  This approach is then used to consider the range of 
conceptual problems raised by modern psychopharmacology. 
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3)  The Category of Disorder - The Data on Disorder as Metaphor 
 
A) Conrad Cleese is a young man living in the 21st century.  He is in good health; 
indeed, he eats a balanced diet, exercises regularly, and does not smoke.  One 
morning he wakes up, notes that he has a fever and a cough, and feels too ill to go 
to work.  Conrad calls a doctor who diagnoses a bacterial throat infection, 
prescribes an antibiotic, and books him off work.  After a few days of treatment he 
is well enough to return to work. 
B) David Donaldson is a young man who is a slave on a plantation in the American 
South in the early nineteenth century.  After a series of altercations with his 
master, he gradually begins to demonstrate discipline problems, and is ultimately 
caught attempting to run away.  A doctor is called, a diagnosis of drapetomania is 
made, and strong discipline and labour are prescribed.  David remains under 
close observation for a long time, for fear his drapetomania will return. 
 
How is the category of disorders structured? – which sensorimotor-affective structures 
are used to construct relevant basic-level cognitive-affective maps, and how are these 
then combined and extended to provide abstract understandings of disorder?  This 
question is perhaps best addressed by rigorous empirical studies (Campbell, Scadding, & 
Roberts, 1979).  Nevertheless, even a superficial exploration of Western concepts yields a 
number of pertinent mappings of disorder;  disorder as involving warfare, disorder as 
contamination, disorder as impediment, disorder as breakdown, and disorder as 
imbalance.  (In other cultures, a range of other mappings, including disorder as ancestral 
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intervention, may also be common).  Each of these metaphors entails a view (or a 
schema) of cause, effect, and treatment of the disorder.  Thus, we have the following: 
 
DISORDER  as  WARFARE/BATTLE19 
 
Cause:  Enemy 
Effect:  Defeat 
Treatment: Weapons 
 
DISORDER  as  CONTAMINATION 
 
Cause  Pollutant 
Effect  Contamination 
Treatment Cleansing agent 
 
DISORDER  as  IMPEDIMENT20 
 
Cause:  Blockage 
Effect:  Stumbling 
Treatment: Overcoming blockage 
                                                 
19
 Both the DISORDER as WARFARE/BATTLE and the DISORDER as CONTAMINATION metaphors 
can be conceptualized as variants of the OBJECT (possession) version of the more general EVENT 
STRUCTURE metaphor (Lakoff et al., 1999). 
20
 Both the DISORDER as IMPEDIMENT and the DISORDER as BREAK-DOWN metaphors can be 
conceptualized as variants of the LOCATION (pathway) version of the more general EVENT 
STRUCTURE metaphor (Lakoff et al., 1999). 
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DISORDER  as  BREAK-DOWN 
 
Cause:  Breakage 
Effect:  Breakdown 
Treatment: Fixing breakdown 
 
DISORDER  as  IMBALANCE21 
 
Cause:  Novel stressor 
Effect:  Disruption of homeostatis 
Treatment: Restore balance 
 
A first point to be made here is that the category of disorder has a graded structure, with 
some exemplars central and others peripheral.  Conrad Cleese’s infection, presented 
earlier, represents a central, prototypical exemplar of medical disorder.  The centrality of 
this case is enhanced by the ready identification of an external cause, which in turn 
results in negative somatic effects, for which standard medical interventions are 
available.  Thus the mapping or metaphors of disorder seem to fit Conrad’s infection well 
(perhaps because infection is a phenomenon to which our sensorimotor-affective 
apparatus is so acutely attuned).  The warfare metaphor, for example, clearly applies;  
there is an enemy (bacterium) that attacks the body, resulting in a breach of the body's 
                                                 
21
 Imbalance is what Johnson terms an image schema (Johnson, 1993).  Metaphors of IMBALANCE and 
JOURNEY are often combined to explain a psychological struggle (Johnson, 1993). 
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(immunological) defences, until additional reinforcements from the (medical) 
armamentarium are brought to bear.22 
 
Lay people would readily agree that Conrad is suffering from a medical disorder, and 
invoke related social practices (seminally defined in terms of the “sick role”).  The fact 
that his disorder is due to an external force that is transformative, that he had no personal 
responsibility for it, and that standard medical interventions exist, all contribute to the 
acceptability of categorizing his infection as a disorder, rather than as some other kind of 
deviance (Parsons, 1951).  Similarly, classical philosophers are likely to view Conrad as 
suffering from a disorder;  Boorse’s definition of medical disorder as a malfunction, for 
example, turns out to be very similar to the commonly used mapping of this category as a 
breakdown (Boorse, 1975).  Such similarities between philosophical constructs and lay 
mappings strengthen the acceptability of conceptual analysis, and make it harder to point 
out that the ways in which its metaphors are not always apt (Lakoff et al., 1999). 
 
A range of disorders are however more peripheral, and more atypical than Conrad’s 
bacterial throat infection.  These include disorders where there is no external 
transformative factor (so that the deviance seems merely a normal variation), where the 
person may have some responsibility for what has happened (eg obesity, alcoholism), and 
where interventions other than medical ones are standard (eg spiritual interventions for 
aging, legal interventions for psychopathy).  In the case of David Donaldson, for 
example, it is difficult to apply the mappings of disorder;  there is no apparent enemy or 
                                                 
22
 Psychological trauma plays a crucial role in the typical case of mental disorder;  this is seen, for example, 
in the early work of both Freud and Watson. 
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pollutant to account for his behaviour.  Instead mappings and metaphors that revolve 
around escape and freedom are clearly more pertinent. 
 
Lay people too would be loath to accept that David has a disorder, or to invoke the sick 
role.  His desire to escape would seem to be part of who he is (rather than the result of a 
transformative force), among friends he would own responsibility for his acting on this 
wish, and there is no standard medical intervention for wanting freedom; these points all 
make it difficult to categorize his behaviour as a disorder, and make it easier to see it as 
(heroically) breaking the law of the time.  Similarly, the argument of critical philosophers 
that the label of “drapetomania” says more about the theories and values of Southern 
slave owners than about David’s bid for freedom (Cartwright, 1981; Kutchins et al., 
1997), seems entirely valid.  Despite critical philosophers’ attempt to deconstruct the 
category of disorders, it turns out that there is surprising overlap between philosophical 
constructs and lay mappings (this time of non-disorders). 
 
In the realist and embodied approach taken in this dissertation, the category of disorder 
should not be understood in terms of a classical kind with necessary and sufficient 
characteristics, but rather can be depicted in terms of particular cognitive-affective 
mappings which reflect our interaction with the physical and social world.  The view of 
metaphor taken here is quite different from those which focus on the observable features 
of physical and mental disorder (Pickering, 2006; Szasz, 1972);  it emphasizes that our 
abstract constructs and their meanings are embedded in and enacted by the brain-mind.  
The more prototypic the illness (ie the more closely the exemplar, such as Conrad’s 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 66
infection or posttraumatic stress disorder, is covered by the standard metaphors of disease 
outlined above), the more unconscious are our mappings, and the more difficult it is to 
see the relevant theories and values at hand.  The less prototypic the illness (ie the more 
these standard metaphors have to be stretched in order to accommodate exemplars such 
as alcoholism or David’s drapetomania), the easier it is to show that our mappings are in 
fact metaphorical extensions, and the more obvious the social theories and values at play.   
 
On the other hand, in the approach here, the category of disorder is not merely subjective 
or relativistic, and so goes beyond the critical emphasis on the fact that the category of 
disorder is bound to a particular cultural and historical context.  Whether the mappings of 
disorder are valid for a particular exemplar is a matter that can be rigorously debated 
(Fulford, Thornton, & Graham, 2006; Sadler, 2005; Schaffner, 1999);  we can reasonably 
come to the conclusion, based on a consideration of our shared cognitive-affective maps 
of disorder, of our knowledge of medical science, and of the details of the specific cases, 
that Conrad ought to be viewed as suffering from a disorder (where the body is 
unbalanced, broken-down, etc.), whereas Donald is best understood as seeking freedom 
from slavery (with his mind balanced, working, etc.).  Just as good scientists use a 
mixture of conceptual thinking, empirical data, and scientific values to make judgments 
about when to change their theories, so good nosology requires a range of 
considerations.  However, insofar as categories are used in actions they are subject to 
objective constraints, and so may be more or less right or wrong. 
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Although there will always remain controversy about what kinds of deviance are 
disorders, it should be emphasized that there is also a great deal of universal agreement 
about basic-level experiences and mappings such as pain, and of prototypical exemplars 
of disorder.  Our shared cognitive-affective maps (which are in turn based on our 
sensorimotor and affective neurocircuits, and the interactions of the brain-mind with the 
natural and social world) are not merely subjective or relativistic, but can provide a 
reasonable way of delineating pain from other kinds of distress, or disorders (where the 
body is unbalanced, broken-down, etc) from other types of deviance.  As science 
progresses and our maps become more sophisticated and powerful, there is the promise of 
optimizing our categorization of more controversial exemplars of disorder;  we may 
choose to continue to employ existing metaphors of disorder or to create entirely new 
mappings to characterize them more aptly. 
 
Similarly, while the advent of novel medical interventions contributes to changing the 
boundaries of disorders, such changes can be rationally debated.  Prior to the advent of 
cholesterol lowering agents, rather high levels of cholesterol were defined as “normal”.  
After the advent of studies which showed that cholestatins were useful in lowering 
cholesterol and preventing medical morbidity, the cut-off for “normal” cholesterol levels 
was lowered.  Furthermore, with the lowered purchase cost of older cholestatins, and 
studies demonstrating that treatment of relatively low levels of cholesterol was cost-
effective in preventing medical morbidity, the cut-off was again lowered.  Similarly, in 
the psychiatric literature, while some have argued for the value of linking threshold for 
diagnosis to more conservative criteria such as treatment seeking (Narrow, Rae, Robins, 
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& Regier, 2002);  others have emphasized for lower diagnostic thresholds given the high 
morbidity associated with milder cases and given the existence of cost-effective 
interventions (Kessler et al., 2003)23.  (Considerations about cost-effectiveness need, of 
course, to be balanced with a range of other considerations, so as not to discriminate 
against patients who require more expensive treatments (Boyle & Callahan, 1995; Harris, 
1987; Landman & Henley, 1998; Sabin et al., 1994))24.  The introduction of new 
psychiatric agents brings hope for addressing unmet needs, but at the same time may lead 
to the overexpansion of particular diagnostic constructs (Horwitz et al., 2007; Hudson, I 
& Pope, 1990; Slavney, 1991). 
 
It is worth emphasizing that, in the approach here, the same principles of categorization 
apply to both the physical and the social worlds.  However, in the physical sciences, there 
is a focus on the categories of the physical world, while in the human sciences there is a 
focus on the categories of our social world.  There is a good deal of universal agreement 
about the nature of basic-level categories, whether physical (eg chairs) or social (eg pain).  
In contrast, there can be a great deal of controversy about more abstract physical 
categories (such as medical disorder) or human categories (such as psychiatric disorder).  
(More precisely, psychiatry involves both natural science and categories, as well as 
                                                 
23
 Implicit in this analysis, every disorder can be assessed using both categorical and dimensional constructs 
(Jablensky, 2005; Kessler, 2002; Zachar et al., 2007).  
24
 Landman and Henley note that cost is a complex concept which includes eg individual and social cost, 
material and emotional cost, and real and opportunity cost (Landman et al., 1998).  Johnson argues that a 
focus on cost-effectiveness involves a MORAL ARITHMETIC metaphor, which is at the heart of 
utilitarianism (Johnson, 1993). 
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human science and categories – for this reason we refer in this dissertation to “psychiatric 
disorder” or “brain-mind disorder” rather than to mental disorder)25.   
 
Nevertheless, in both the physical and social realms, we can rationally debate whether 
specific exemplars are being aptly categorized (as involving an unbalanced, broken-down 
body or mind, as “mad” or as “bad”, as “medical” or as “moral”, etc.), and choose 
appropriate maps based on the scientific data and other considerations.  Put in terms of 
the fact-value distinction;  although facts and values cannot be divorced in the 
consideration of medical and psychiatric disorders (Bolt et al., 2002; Canguilhem, 1966; 
Fulford et al., 2005; Fulford, 1989; Hare, 1983; Sadler, 1997; Sadler, 2002; Schaffner, 
1999; Wakefield, 1992b), we can rigorously assess these facts and values (Fulford et al., 
2006; Sadler, 2005; Schaffner, 1999).  Hippocrates, Aristotle, and subsequent 
philosophers have emphasized that medicine is not only based on scientific knowledge 
(or episteme), but also that its arts and practices (or techne), involve practical reason and 
aim at the alleviation of human suffering (Gillett, 2006; Pellegrino, 1997; Simon, 1978);  
and clinical work can therefore be carefully weighed up.  
 
As already noted, a range of authors have previously addressed the question of how to 
define medical and psychiatric disorder (Caplan et al., 1981; Carson et al., 1997; Humber 
et al., 1997; Sadler et al., 1994);  the approach here combines different aspects of two 
divergent positions (the classical and the critical).  In line with an integrative perspective 
                                                 
25
 The question has been raised of what is mental about mental disorder (Brülde & Radovic, 2006)?  The 
analysis here suggests that an answer lies in good part in understanding the graded structure of the category 
“disorder”.  We address ontological and epistemological aspects of the mind-body problem, which are also 
relevant to understanding this issue, in subsequent chapters. 
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it is notable that even Wakefield, who has rigorously pursued an essentialist view of 
disorder, agrees that disorders have an evaluative component, and admits that terms such 
as dysfunction have areas of vagueness, where boundaries are hard to define (Wakefield, 
1999a).  Conversely, Lilienfeld and Marino, who have denied a scientific basis for 
categorizing conditions as disorders, agree that at the heart of the idea of disorder is a 
breakdown, and admit that some disorders involve evolutionary dysfunction (Lilienfeld et 
al., 1999).   
 
Thus, as Bolton (Bolton, 2000; Bolton, 2008) points out, there is some convergence 
between these authors;  Wakefield as well as Lilienfeld and Marino agree that in 
approaching mental disorder one needs 1) paradigm cases to guide one, and 2) a minimal 
theoretical core to do with the idea that there is something wrong.  We will return to these 
authors and their fascinating debate later on, when we consider explanatory accounts of 
disorders and their treatment.  (Our argument will be that although evolutionary 
explanations – like other medical explanations - are important in understanding disorder 
and in considering claims that conditions are disorders, evolutionary theory does not 
itself provide necessary and sufficient criteria for the notion of “dysfunction”, or that if 
there is an insistence on defining dysfunction in an essentialist way then such a construct 
does not fully capture current (valid and evaluative) understandings of disorder). 
 
A number of other authors have also emphasized prototypes, ideal types, or exemplars in 
the clinic  (Blashfield, Sprock, Pinkston, & et al, 1985; Cantor, Smith, French, & 
Mezzich, 1980; Horowitz, Post, French, & et al, 1981; Jaspers, 1963; Livesley, 1985; 
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Livesley, 1986; Mezzich, 1989; Sadegh-Zadeh, 2005; Schaffner, 1994; Schwartz et al., 
1987), or have attempted to provide a philosophical framework for clinical practice that 
draws on diverse theories and methods (Ghaemi, 2003; Hundert, 1989; Jaspers, 1963; 
Kriel, 2000; Matthews, 2004; McHugh & Slavney, 1988)26.  One well-known clinical 
model, based on systems theory, is the biopsychosocial approach which emphasizes that 
psychiatric disorder involves multiple causal factors and which can therefore be accepted 
by those with quite varied views (Engel, 1977)27.  The current analysis makes a 
contribution by emphasizing that it is possible to simultaneously reject an essentialist 
view of disorders and also insist that altered function is underpinned by real embodied 
structures and mechanisms.  This explains why some (more typical) disorders seem so 
easily explicable using classical terms, while other (more atypical) disorders seem to be 
explained by a different, more critical approach, and allows space for the development of 
a scientific psychiatric nosology which incorporates a carefully balanced view. 
 
4)  Conclusion 
 
The conceptual approach taken throughout the dissertation will follow the tack taken in 
the chapter.  Thus, we will begin by outlining a classical approach that generally reflects 
the viewpoint of one or other philosopher within the analytic tradition.  Then we will note 
the various critiques of such an approach that can be made.  Finally, rather than attempt 
                                                 
26
 Notably, much of this work has been driven by a critical concern with the limitations of a classical view 
of medicine, and in particular its focus on the body and its neglect of the person (Kriel, 2000; Schwartz & 
Wiggins, 1986), an issue we discuss later on (eg disease vs illness).  
27
 Instead of the term “biopsychosocial” (coined by Roy Grinker) I often use the term “psychobiological” 
(popularized by Adolf Meyer), to emphasize the increasing integration of the biological and the 
psychological, and the awareness that behaviour has to be understood both in terms of its overall meaning 
and underlying mechanism.  We return to this issue below (eg explanations of pathogenesis and treatment). 
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to resolve this debate on its own philosophical terms, we will ask, what can be concluded 
from the data of cognitive-affective science?  Such data will generally reinforce a view 
that the mind-brain is embodied;  sensorimotor and affective neuronal circuitry allows 
humans to interact with their physical and social world, and this in turn leads to the 
development of basic-level and abstract cognitive-affective maps (or metaphors) for 
understanding the world.  The existence of such embodied structures and mechanisms is 
consistent with a realist position that draws on aspects of the classical position (eg its 
view that science is valid) and of the critical position (eg its scepticism about 
essentialism). 
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4.  Conceptual Questions about Psychotropics 
 
In this chapter we cover a series of questions about the nature of certain categories that 
are relevant to psychopharmacology.  We have already developed a particular contrast 
within philosophy in the discussion of categories – the classical vs critical approaches.  
The classical approach takes the view that words can mirror the categories of the world.  
The critical approach takes the view that categories are social constructs that reflect the 
subjectivity of a particular time and place.  The synthetic or integrative position taken 
here says that categories strongly reflect the way in which the brain-mind interacts with 
the world, that this interaction is biologically grounded so contributing to the existence of 
minimal standards of agreement, and that it is possible to debate reasonably (that is, 
cognitive-affectively) their validity.   
 
In the next sections this schema is used to discuss in turn, the nature of psychotropics, of 
emotion, and of the self.  We could perhaps begin with any number of other constructs in 
philosophy of medicine and mind, in order to reach similar conclusions, but these 
constructs are particularly relevant to the practice of psychopharmacology.  The aim is 
not so much to defend the schema (“classical” vs “critical”), which is an often over-
simplifying framework on which to hang the different parts of this dissertation, but rather 
to put forward a conceptual position, based in part on cognitive-affective data, on a 
number of key concepts about medications/enhancements, about affective/cognitive 
phenomena, and about the persons/patients for whom we prescribe psychotropics in order 
to alter the brain-mind. 
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1)  Medications, Substances, Neutraceuticals, and Enhancements – 
What are the Distinctions amongst Psychotropics? 
 
A) Abigail Adams recalled that during college she had managed to participate in 
social events by relying on alcohol.  Just prior to going to a party, she would 
drink several sherries in her apartment.  This helped her relax, and by the time 
she arrived at the party she would actually feel quite confident.  She made a rule 
of not drinking any longer at parties;  this was partly because she feared that if 
she had too much alcohol on board she would embarrass herself, and partly 
because she was aware that with too much alcohol she ran the risk of doing 
something really foolish. 
B) Abigail Adams read an article stating that inositol, a carbohydrate, is as effective 
for certain mood and anxiety disorders as marketed antidepressants.  She did a 
literature search on the internet, and learned that this agent has been shown 
effective for a number of conditions using rigorous randomised, placebo-
controlled trials, of the sort in which she earlier participated.  She liked the idea 
that inositol is a natural product and not a drug.  She decided to discontinue her 
social anxiety disorder medication and instead to start taking inositol. 
C) An international athletics organization barred competitors from taking 
psychostimulants and steroids.  A national coach, Ethan Endermann,  instructed 
his team to take large doses of inositol on a daily basis.  As this is simply a type of 
carbohydrate, there is no evidence from blood tests that an external agent has 
been administered.  Nevertheless, the national team feels that they have increased 
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energy and a more positive outlook on their game.  An opposing team lodges a 
formal complaint against Endermann, charging that he has flouted the rules of 
the organization. 
 
Psychotropics – or mind-altering substances - are used in a variety of contexts;  it is 
important to distinguish medical therapies from substances of potential abuse (like 
alcohol), and ordinary nutrients (like inositol).  In addition, a number of other distinctions 
are often required;  between psychotropics that have been formally registered for use in 
particular psychiatric disorders, those that are “experimental”, and drugs that are used for 
the purposes of “enhancement”.  Antidepressants are licensed as therapies for depression;  
in contrast, cocaine is classified as an addictive substance, antidepressants are considered 
experimental for adult attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and might be thought of as 
an enhancement technology for certain disadvantageous character traits such as shyness.  
 
The term “nootropic” (from the Greek noos for “mind”, and tropein meaning “towards”) 
has been used to describe cognitive-enhancing agents.  An early professional literature 
used this term to describe medications that were employed to ameliorate the side-effects 
of electroconvulsive therapy.  A more recent literature aimed at lay readers discusses the 
use of agents to enhance cognitive function (Dean, Morgenthaler, & Fowkes, 1993).  A 
range of terms has similarly been used to describe the mood-enhancing properties of 
psychotropics, ranging from the professional “thymoleptic” to the lay “happy pill”. 
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Terms such as “psychedelic” (“soul-revealing”) and “entheogen” (“become divine 
within”), have been increasingly used by those who promote the value of psychotropic 
drugs for spiritual or mystical purposes (Forte et al., 2000; Ott & Hofmann, 1996; 
Wasson, Kramrisch, Ruck, & Ott, 1988).  Empirical work on psychotropics as spiritual 
enhancers dates back several decades (Huxley, 1954; Pahnke, 1969)28.  In a recent 
rigorous study, volunteers given psilocybin reported the experience as having substantial 
personal meaning and spiritual significance, and as leading to sustained positive changes 
in attitudes and behaviour (Griffiths, Richards, McCann, & Jesse, 2006). 
 
Textbooks of biochemistry and neuroscience describe the endogenous chemical pathways 
in the body and brain.  In contrast, textbooks of pharmacology and psychopharmacology 
cover a range of agents, describing how these exogenous compounds are taken up by the 
body and metabolised (pharmacokinetics), and how they affect receptors in the body 
(pharmacodynamics).  This classical division of labour is consistent with a lay 
perspective that places a strict division between categories involving the body (and 
exogenous organic compounds) and those related to external objects (and endogenous 
synthetic compounds). 
 
More classical authors have also attempted to provide necessary and sufficient criteria for 
distinguishing between therapies and “enhancements”.  It might also be argued that those 
drugs which are found effective in randomised controlled trials (RCTs) for the treatment 
                                                 
28
 The physician-philosopher William James wrote about his experiences with nitrous oxide, concluding 
that there are many different forms of consciousness.  The term “hallucinogen” was promoted by Huxley, 
who had participated in experiments by psychiatrist Humphry Osmond, who coined the word 
“psychedelic”. 
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of disease can be considered for registration as medication, everything else should be 
considered “experimental”.  Sabin and Daniels, relying on a classical conception of 
disorder as a functional impairment, argue that therapies are interventions which address 
disease, whereas enhancements merely improve human performance or appearance 
(Sabin et al., 1994).  In the Unites States the cautions of the President’s Council on 
Bioethics against enhancements (The President's Council on Bioethics, 2003) implicitly 
accept the notion that these can readily be distinguished from treatments. 
 
In contrast, the critical position is fond of interrogating distinctions between the natural 
and the unnatural.  Social categorizations and distinctions between natural versus 
unnatural, or clean versus unclean (Douglas, 1984) say more about the culture and time at 
hand, than about the reality of the world.  Similarly, distinctions between “natural” and 
“unnatural” medications, or “clean” and “dirty” drugs, are socially constructed, rather 
than necessarily reflective of the particular properties of the relevant pharmaceuticals and 
psychotropics.  Even the criteria that define “experimental” changes from time to time 
and place to place;  most selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are not yet 
formally registered as therapeutic agents in Japan.   
 
From this perspective, the boundaries between the therapeutic, recreational, and 
enhancement use of drugs are highly permeable. Compounds like methylphenidate may 
be employed by conventional medicine (for the treatment of attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder) and by drug addicts (to obtain a high), conversely a range 
of abused substances may have therapeutic potential.   Severe shyness is characterized by 
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significant overlap with social anxiety disorder and disability, thus using a medication to 
treat such symptoms can be validly seen either as therapeutic or as enhancement.  
Similarly, a consideration of the use of growth hormone for short stature suggests that the 
distinction between treatment and enhancement is porous (Allen & Fost, 1990).  A 
bioethics report to the European Commission argued that there is no clear delineation 
between surgical treatment and enhancement (Bolt et al., 2002). 
 
What does cognitive-affective science say?  There is not a great deal of literature in its 
sub-disciplines of cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, 
developmental psychology, and philosophy that has directly tackled questions of how to 
differentiate different kinds of psychotropics.  Nevertheless, in the course of this 
dissertation we have noted how cognitive-affective research is often inconsistent with 
both algorithmic approaches to categories (which may fail to capture the graded nature 
and social construction of concepts) and narrative approaches to categories (which may 
fail to capture the underlying structures and mechanisms, which are able to provide a 
reasonable grounding of concepts, including those most relevant to the brain-mind, which 
are based in our knowledge of its psychobiology).  A detailed knowledge of the 
psychobiology of psychotropics may allow an integrated approach to conceptualizing 
their more objective or physical aspects (eg, their mechanism of action) as well as their 
more subjective or socially-constructed aspects (eg, our experience of their actions). 
 
The cognitive-affective sciences that have perhaps had the most to say about the 
distinctions between medications, substances, neutraceuticals, and enhancements, are 
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neuroscience and evolutionary science.  Neuroscience research has emphasized that 
registered medications and addictive substances associated with dependence and 
withdrawal tend to have structures that act on particular common brain-mind 
mechanisms, but there is not necessarily any such distinction in structure or mechanism 
between molecules that are manufactured in factories or extracted from herbs or foods, 
that are found endogenously or exogenously, that are formally licensed or not, or that are 
therapeutic versus enhancing. 
 
An evolutionary perspective on the distinctions between psychotropics - focusing on 
distal survival mechanisms rather than proximal brain-mind mechanisms - may also be 
useful (Nesse & Berridge, 1997; Stein, 2006).  Given our co-evolution with animal and 
plant species, it is not surprising that endogenous molecules are found exogenously (eg, 
there are endogenous cannabinoids, that are the active ingredient of marijuana), or that 
endogenous and exogenous compounds both act via the same neuronal systems and 
receptors (eg, SSRIs act at a very specific site - the serotonin reuptake pump, a protein 
that has evolved over millions of years and that ordinarily transports endogenous 
serotonin).  Medications, substances, nutrients, and other kinds of psychotropics can have 
powerful brain-mind effects precisely because they affect complex, evolved, endogenous 
circuitry. 
 
Work in cognitive psychology, connectionist modelling, and developmental science 
further contributes to understanding the mechanisms by which psychotropics act;  for 
example, registered medications and addictive substances associated with dependence 
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and withdrawal may lead to distinctive responses in particular paradigms.  There is a 
growing literature on the anthropology of psychiatric medications (Lakoff, 2006), which 
contributes to understanding the real effects of classifying a particular agent as a 
medication, substance, or nutrient.  For example, whether a particular psychotropic is 
conceptualized as a “mind-altering” medication, or as a “natural” herb, may have 
significant effects on which patients are willing to consume it.   
 
With these kinds of data and concepts in mind, we can return to our vignettes.  It seems 
that psychobiological distinctions and overlaps amongst the psychotropics are not 
necessarily reflected in our social classifications.  For example, registered medications 
and illegal addictive substances that lead to symptoms of dependence both tend to act on 
particular brain circuits and related neurochemicals, and are associated with specific 
withdrawal symptoms when discontinued.  Similarly, registered medications and herbs 
can have similar mechanisms of action;  St.  John’s Wort is a herb with serotonin 
reuptake properties, but it blocks the serotonin reuptake pump with significantly less 
potency than do formally registered selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs).    
 
In some ways the social distinctions noted in the vignettes can therefore be seen to be 
trivial.  Inositol may be a carbohydrate, but when taken in large doses it is a psychotropic, 
with both positive therapeutic and negative adverse effects (Fux, Levine, Aviv, & et al, 
1996).  The new term “neutraceutical” (Hardy, Hardy, & Ball, 2003) is in many ways apt.  
Many synthetic compounds were initially found in plants and herbs;  the body and brain 
do not distinguish whether a compound is synthesized in a plant or in a factory.  On the 
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other hand, inositol is a particular kind of compound, dissimilar in its mechanism of 
action from performance enhancing substances prohibited by sporting organizations (eg 
stereoids), and so many would argue that it can legally and legitimately be used by 
athletes.29   
 
The legal distinction between a formally registered medication, and one that is prescribed 
“off-label” is also one that typically deserves not to be made too much of.  A decision to 
attempt to register a drug for a particular licensed indication not only involves scientific 
decisions, but also marketing considerations.  Thus a drug that is known to be effective 
for a particular medical or psychiatric disorder may not be registered because it is not 
profitable, at a particular time or in a particular place, to do this.  Off-label use of 
medications, including psychotropics is, however, common – in each case the clinical 
decision-making process should be documented, in order to demonstrate an appropriate 
rationale. 
 
However, some of the issues raised by the vignettes above are far from trivial.  Many 
people may prefer “natural” herbal agents to factory made ones; despite the fact that the 
relevant compounds may not be chemically distinguishable (LaFrance, Lauterbach, 
Coffey, & et al, 2000).  This preference helps fuel the huge “alternative medicines” 
industry or “indigenous medicines” industry, despite the fact that herbal agents, like 
synthetic ones, have both therapeutic and adverse effects, but are often not rigorously 
                                                 
29
 Tamburrini (Tamburrini, 2006) argues that the essential purpose of sport is to expand the limits of our 
capacities, so that any kind of doping is acceptable.  Brown (Brown, 1984) earlier argued similarly.  A 
contrasting argument is that modern athletics now must live with the costs of always wondering how much 
of performance is enhanced by such technology. 
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studied or regulated.  Just as the psychotropics of the pharmaceutical industry require 
formal testing and licensing, so it would seem reasonable to argue that such standards 
should also apply to many of the compounds produced by alternative manufacturers 
(Wolfe, 2003).   
 
Similarly, while certain psychotropics are primarily conceptualized and marketed as 
enhancers of recreation (including nicotine, caffeine, alcohol) or performance (a range of 
molecules are advertised as increasing academic and sporting ability), the brain-
behaviour effects (whether positive or negative) of such molecules deserve serious 
consideration.  Early on tobacco was touted as having performance enhancing benefits, it 
took several decades for nicotine to be recognized as an addictive substance and 
cigarette-smoking as harmful (Pennock, 2007).  Today, the alcohol industry promotes the 
health benefits of red wine, but there is also clear evidence of individual and social harms 
associated with drinking.     
 
For this dissertation, the crucial distinction between different kinds of psychotropics, or 
different uses of psychotropics, is that between treatment and enhancement.  If there is no 
distinction between the structure of therapeutic and enhancing psychotropics, or in the 
mechanisms on which they act, a cognitive-affective perspective might then conceivably 
try to distinguish validly between the prototypic scenarios in which treatment and 
enhancement are prescribed.  If treatment is prescribed in response to disorder, while 
enhancements are provided by those in the recreational and sporting industries, this 
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would have normative implications for health care professionals (treatments should be 
offered, enhancements need not be) (Sabin et al., 1994). 
 
However, we earlier emphasized that definitions of disorder are porous.  The more 
common and disabling a “disorder”, and the more effective and inexpensive a relevant 
molecule, the more likely we are to want to justify its use in “treatment”.  Interventions 
such as routine vaccination and fluoride supplementation are no longer thought of as 
“enhancement”, even though they are preventive measures that were only introduced 
relatively recently.  In other cases, boundaries are much more difficult to decide (in some 
cases of social anxiety, the use of a psychotropic could be defined as a treatment, and in 
other cases as an enhancement).  Good judgment is therefore required for individual 
clinical decisions.  The following two chapters provide additional discussion (on 
explanatory questions, and on ethical issues) relevant to coming to such a judgment.   We 
must first, however, address some other conceptual questions relevant to 
psychopharmacology. 
 
2)  Psychotropics for Personality – What is Emotion? 
 
Abigail Adams decided to participate in the research testing a new medication for the 
treatment of social anxiety disorder.  By the end of the clinical trial she felt a different 
person.  In particular, she was more confident in social situations.  This in turn made her 
feel less worried about life and more able to enjoy things in general.  At work things 
gradually started to go more smoothly, and after a few more months she was given a 
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promotion.  At about that time she came to the conclusion;  I did have a disorder, what I 
thought of as “shyness” was in fact a definite disability.  She had read about 
Hippocrates’ classification of temperament, and decided that she had had a disordered 
temperament. 
 
The classical approach to science and language leads, as noted in the previous chapter, to 
particular views of mind and of medicine, and of categories such as emotion and 
personality.  Although linguistic-analytic philosophers have only more recently begun to 
pay attention to emotion30, the nature of emotion has long been of substantial interest to 
philosophy, with  a classical view often emphasizing the formal components of emotion, 
and arguing that any specific emotion can be characterized in terms of particular beliefs 
and desires.  An emphasis on the logical aspects of emotion has gone together with a 
tendency to ignore feeling (including bodily feeling) as part of emotion, and to overlook 
the links between emotion and character traits. 
 
The emphasis in the classical position on the importance of the rational has arguably gone 
hand in hand with a devaluation of emotion – philosophers from Plato (Plato, 2003) to 
Descartes (Descartes, 1650) and Kant (Kant, 1781) have contrasted reason with passion, 
typically favouring the former faculty31.  An early view contrasted bodily emotion, with 
the abstract realm of reason.  More recent views continue to put emotion to one side;  a 
                                                 
30
 A range of authors have contributed to this literature (Ben-Ze'ev, 2000; Blackburn, 1998; Gibbard, 
1990b; Goldie, 2000; Gosling, 1965; Greenspan, 1988; Hatzimoysis, 2003; Kenny, 1963; Langer, 1942; 
Lyon, 1980; Neu, 1977; Prinz, 2004; Roberts, 2003; Rorty, 1980; Solomon, 2004; Stocker & Hegeman, 
1992; Thalberg, 1977). 
31
 The Stoics and the Epicureans are particularly critical of the emotions as irrational;  for them philosophy 
serves as therapy, ensuring the soul is purged of such vagaries. 
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philosophical view of emotions as primarily involving beliefs and desires has been 
termed cognitivism, and within psychology schools influenced by the classical position - 
behaviourism and symbolic cognitivism - have also often downplayed affective 
phenomena per se.  Thus symbolic cognitivists’ view of the mind as a computational 
transformer means that emotion is conceptualized merely as a cognition interrupter or as 
a type of information (Le Doux, 1996), and subjective feeling is replaced with a marker 
of the intensity of emotion. 
 
Within the classical perspective, it makes sense to classify abnormalities of emotion in 
distinctive categories (eg, anxiety disorders, mood disorders), and to define these in terms 
of necessary and sufficient characteristics;  this is the approach of nosological systems 
such as the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  The emphasis in defining diagnostic criteria 
for these disorders is on objective observable criteria, rather than on subjective hard-to-
define feelings.  Thus social anxiety disorder (SAD) is listed on axis I of DSM-IV, within 
the category of anxiety disorders, and is characterized by symptoms of anxiety triggered 
in particular social contexts. 
 
From this perspective, it would similarly be reasonable to use pharmacological 
interventions to reverse abnormalities of emotion, perhaps by altering desires.  However, 
the link between emotion, character, and their embodiment in the brain-mind, may be 
overlooked.  Thus, in DSM-IV, avoidant personality disorder (APD), which is 
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social inhibition, feelings of inadequacy in social 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 86
situations, and hypersensitivity to negative evaluation, and therefore shares many features 
of social anxiety disorder, is nevertheless listed on axis II together with other disorders of 
personality.  Furthermore, whereas studies of axis I disorders have tended to focus on 
medication, most studies of anxiety II disorders, such as avoidant personality disorder, 
have tended to focus on psychotherapy. 
 
A critical view of science and language leads to an entirely different approach to 
psychology in general, and to emotion and its disorders in particular.  First, emotions 
cannot be specified in formal terms;  they have porous boundaries with one another 
(Sartre, 1948), and they are intentional – they involve feelings towards objects in the 
world (Goldie, 2000; Helm, 2001) and so must be understood within particular contexts.  
Any attempt to reduce human behaviours and feelings to universal categories– whether in 
the Hippocratic system or in DSM - is inherently problematic;  instead we should attempt 
to delineate how emotions are constructed by societies in different ways, at different 
times and places (Hacker, 2004; Harré, 1986b), and conversely, how moods connect the 
self to the world and are world-constitutive (Heidegger, 1962; Svenaeus, 2007). 
 
Second, feeling (including bodily feeling) is very much part of emotion.  Indeed, this 
subjective aspect of emotion makes it resistant to purely scientific inquiry or 
computational modelling, but also is what makes it so uniquely important.  Indeed, on the 
critical view, emotional experience is superior to cold reason;  emotions not only shape 
and determine what we value, but may be an important end in themselves.  Although 
Plato might be said by many to have a more classical view of emotion, the Phaedrus 
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notes that “the greatest goods come to men through madness” (Plato, 2003).  Insofar as 
emotion is understood within the narrative of a person’s life, there is also a strong link 
between emotion and character, with some dispositions being “deeper” than others 
(Morton, 1980). 
 
These critical positions then have implications for understanding social anxiety.  First, the 
overlap between social anxiety and normality may be emphasized;  there are no fixed 
boundaries between normal variation and psychiatric disorder - rather this later category 
reflects cultural and historical theories and values.  It may be argued that the idea that 
shyness was a social anxiety disorder gained popularity only after it was proposed by 
those with a biologically influenced construction of psychiatry, and given particular 
impetus by a pharmaceutical industry attempting to increase the market for antidepressant 
products.  This claim about “disease mongering” has been made for a range of psychiatric 
conditions (Degrandpre, 2006; Healy, 2004; Horwitz et al., 2007; Kutchins et al., 1997; 
McHenry, 2006; Moynihan & Henry, 2006; Starcevic, 2002; Szasz, 2001; Valenstein, 
1998), including social anxiety disorder (Lane, 2007; Moynihan, 2002; Moynihan et al., 
2002).   
 
It makes more sense, from a critical perspective, to view social anxiety in terms of a 
person’s experience of the world and their characteristic ways of feeling and of 
responding.  Rather than being reified as a disorder, social anxiety may represent a 
valuable response to and an authentic feeling in a world where social relationships are 
characterized by threat (Glas, 2004; Kierkegaard, 1981; Small, 1984).  Variations in 
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emotional experience, in character traits, and in our personal narratives, have been 
medicalized; another example of the way in which psychiatry has intruded into our lives 
and exerted increasing control over our thoughts and feelings.  This medicalization of 
emotional experience should be strongly resisted. 
 
What do the data from cognitive-affective science say?  A range of data indicate first, that 
emotion and character, contra the classical approach, cannot be reduced to a formal 
algorithm and are inextricably linked with reason, and second, that emotion and 
character, contra the critical approach, are not merely socially constructed, but have 
universal elements that can be understood in terms of the brain-mind, and its activity 
within the world.  This third position, integrating objective and subjective aspects of 
emotion, is consistent with a realist and embodied position in psychology, and with a 
view in psychiatry that first, psychotropics can lead to changes in emotion and 
personality, and second, that the advantages and disadvantages of this change can 
reasonably be weighed32.  To reach this conclusion, a range of cognitive-affective science 
data from different disciplines is briefly covered. 
 
Cognitive psychology has increasingly come to the conclusion that cognition and 
emotion structure one another, and so are inextricably linked (Damasio, 1994; Greenberg 
& Safran, 1991; Hamilton, Bower, & Frijda, 1988; James, 1890; Miller, Gallanter, & 
Pribram, 1960; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Power & Dalgleish, 1997; Schulkin, 
                                                 
32
 The objective and subjective components of emotion are emphasised in the clinical differentiation 
between affect (transient and objective emotional state) and mood (sustained and subjective emotional 
tone) (Selby, 2003). 
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2004; Thagard, 2006)33.  As Hume (Hume, 1739), Spinoza (de Spinoza, 1677), and others 
recognized, reason cannot easily be divorced from passion.  Thus, it is sensible to respect 
our emotional responses and to listen carefully to what they say.  Furthermore, it is not 
simply the case that emotion leads to cognition, or cognition to emotion;  rather these 
phenomena occur in parallel (Greenberg et al., 1991).   
 
The question of how best to model emotion in computational terms is a difficult one 
(Picard, 1997; Rey, 1980).  Nevertheless, current work in this area does not attempt to 
reduce emotion to a simple algorithm (Arbib & Fellous, 2004).  Instead, there is an effort 
to describe particular emotions as emerging from the interaction of a particular agent with 
its environment, and to recognize the value of dissecting out the unique physiological 
embodiment of human cognition-emotion34.  As Wittgenstein pointed out in the 
Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1967), emotional states are inextricably embedded in “the 
stream of life”;  we cannot locate them as fixed or universal forms, rather we must 
consider how they are used in particular social situations (see, for example, the quotation 
earlier from Harrison about pain).  Thus emotion emerges from a particular configuration 
of the brain-mind, and its experience in the world. 
 
Neuroscientific data are consistent with a view that emphasizes a porous boundary 
between cognition and emotion.  Although prefrontal circuits play an important role in 
                                                 
33
 James (James, 1884) put forward the “peripheralist” idea that emotion follows our responses to arousing 
stimuli (a position that has influenced Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994)).  Cannon 
took a centralist position, emphasing that emotions arise from cognitive appraisal of emotional stimuli 
(Cannon, 1927).  Today, there is growing rapprochement between these positions (Morris, 2002). 
34
 There is also the view that in order to succeed in certain kinds of tasks, computers must be emotional in 
some way (Delancey, 2001; Minsky, 2006; Picard, 1997). 
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cognition, and subcortical circuits play an important role in emotion, the different regions 
of the brain are closely and continuously interlinked (Davidson, 2003; Dolan, 2002; Le 
Doux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998).  Specific lesions may result in the apparent dissociation of 
emotional and cognitive processing, but in ordinary circumstances they inter-relate 
seamlessly (Damasio, 2003; Damasio, 1994).  Neuroscientific data also reinforce that 
emotion and character are mediated by the brain-mind, with a growing database of 
studies on the neuronal circuitry and molecular mechanisms that underpin affect and 
personality. Different emotions do not simply reduce to different circuitry (Kagan, 2006);  
for example, the amygdala seems important in modulating memory for events according 
to emotional importance, regardless of whether the emotion is pleasant or aversive 
(Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 1999).  Nevertheless, regions of the brain that monitor 
the state of the body - creating body maps - are particularly important in mediating 
feelings (Damasio, 2003; Damasio, 1994).   
 
Linguistic data confirm that the particular psychobiological underpinnings of emotion 
have led to a universality of emotional experience - the metaphors and mappings of 
emotion cut across history and geography, and prototypic emotions are therefore widely 
understood (de Sousa, 1987; Griffiths, 1997; Kovecses, 1986; Russell, 1991).  Lakoff 
(Lakoff, 1987), for example, describes how anger is universally structured in terms of a 
specific set of metaphors and mappings, drawn from the subjective feelings and bodily 
changes that occur during this emotion.  Across different times and cultures, anger is 
described as “hot” rather than “cool”, as “explosive” rather than as “contained” (Braund 
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& Most, 2004).  As James pointed out in his classical paper, “What is an emotion?”, “A 
purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity” (James, 1884). 
 
At the same time, the brain-mind operates within different social contexts which may 
structure the experience of emotion in different ways (Elster, 1999a; Walton, 2004).  
Evolutionary, developmental, and anthropological data confirm a view of brain-mind 
operating according to universal mechanisms, but within particular contexts.  Emotions 
have long-standing evolutionary value and therefore several universal characteristics 
(Darwin, 1965).  Modern evolutionary science is increasingly able to put forward data-
based hypotheses about the origins and structure of various emotions (Buss, 2005; Nesse, 
1990), including their value in rational decision-making (Evans & Cruse, 2004; Frank, 
1988).  Insofar as complex emotions are mediated by phylogenetically ancient 
mechanisms, evolutionary science provides an important perspective on the embodiment 
of emotion (explaining, for example, links between the psychobiology of physical pain, 
and the pain of social exclusion (Panksepp, 2003)).  During human ontological 
development, however, emotions are structured somewhat differently from time to time, 
and place to place (Gordon, 1987).  Developmental and cross-cultural psychologists are 
increasingly able to describe the gradual maturation of cognitive and emotional 
structures, as well as the variation of such structures across individuals and across 
communities. 
 
Conceptual work in philosophy also supports the integrative approach to emotion taken 
here.  First;  philosophers from at least as far back as Aristotle (Aristotle, 1984) have 
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noted that emotions can be reasonable (or appropriate and proportional) or not (de Sousa, 
1987; Hume, 1739; Nussbaum, 2001; Smith, 2002; Solomon, 1993).  Emotions develop 
within certain contexts, so the person who is subjected to child abuse learns distrust of 
people; but while such an emotion or character is understandable, it may no longer be 
adaptive or appropriate.  Contra a critical view that over-emotionalizes affect, there are 
degrees with which one can be reflectively aware of one’s own emotions and their 
triggers and consequences, and while culture may inform decisions about the 
appropriateness of emotions such decisions are also open to reasoned (including 
passionately reasoned) debate.  Second, philosophers have emphasized the embodiment 
of emotion, noting the close relation between passion and reason, between emotion and 
bodily feeling (Wollheim, 1999), between emotion and action in the world (Goldie, 
2000), and even the changes in the embodiment of emotion after pharmacotherapy 
(Svenaeus, 2007).  Contra a classical view that over-intellectualizes emotion, emotion is 
not simply an add-on to beliefs and desires, nor can emotion be understood as existing 
outside of its brain-mind and interpersonal context.  
 
In addition to these general concepts and data from the cognitive-affective sciences on 
emotion, there is a growing body of research on social anxiety in particular.  Social 
anxiety and related traits such as behavioural inhibition are characterized by particular 
kinds of cognitions and affects, as well as by particular neuronal and molecular features 
(Schwartz, Wright, I, Shin, Kagan, & Rauch, 2003).  While some people with 
behavioural inhibition manage fine, others develop social anxiety later in life (Kagan, 
Reznick, & Gibbons, 1988).  Such social anxiety takes place in prototypic contexts (that 
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cannot be formally specified in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria), is underpinned 
by the brain-mind and its experience of the world, and is open to rigorous debate about 
whether it is appropriate or whether it should be medically treated.  Although there is 
debate about whether social anxiety disorder represents an evolutionary based adaptive 
response (Wakefield, Horwitz, & Schmitz, 2005) or a biologically based “false alarm” 
(Stein & Bouwer, 1997), there is general agreement that people with the symptoms of this 
condition suffer distress and have functional impairment (Campbell-Sills & Stein, 2005). 
 
If (contra the classical view) we accept the view from cognitive-affective science that 
emotions cannot simply be specified in terms of formal and distinct categories, then the 
division between normal social anxiety, shyness, and social anxiety disorder may not be 
found “in nature”.  In the past, those interested in biological psychiatry and 
psychopharmacological interventions focused primarily on DSM axis I disorders, while 
those interested in personality, psychodynamics and psychotherapy focused on DSM axis 
II disorders.  But the symptoms of social anxiety disorder and the traits of avoidant 
personality disorder show a good deal of overlap (Schneier, Blanco, Antia, X, & 
Liebowitz, 2002), both fall along dimensions of severity, it is not clear that they are 
mediated by different structures and mechanisms, and both may respond to similar kinds 
of pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy (Deltito & Stam, 1989; Muller, Koen, & Stein, 
2004).  Thus, the contrast between social anxiety disorder and avoidant personality 
disorder may not have a great deal of clinical utility.   
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If (contra the critical view) we accept that the view from cognitive-affective science that 
emotions are mediated by the brain-mind and are an essential component of reasoning 
validly about the world then it is not surprising that psychotropic interventions change 
not only emotional states (classified on DSM axis I) but also character traits (classified on 
DSM axis II) in a useful way.  In particular, it would not be surprising that particular 
medications therefore decrease feelings of social anxiety, and diminish personality traits 
of social avoidance.  Similar kinds of consideration apply to other personality disorders, 
where there is growing appreciation of their underpinnings by specific kinds of 
neuroanatomical and neurochemical findings, and increasing use of pharmacotherapeutic 
interventions (Cloninger, 1987; Siever & Davis, 1991).  Just as there is no fault line in 
nature between disorder and non-disorder, so in considering particular categories of 
disorder, including social anxiety disorder (Muller et al., 2004), it is notable that their 
characteristic emotional symptoms typically fall along dimensions (Jablensky, 2005; 
Kessler, 2002; Zachar et al., 2007). 
 
The position here emphasizes that emotion is not entirely socially constructed and 
relativistic;  it is possible to debate rationally (cognitively-emotionally) as to whether a 
particular emotion is appropriate or not, and whether interventions to alter emotional 
experience are appropriate or not.  Boundaries between normal social anxiety, shyness, 
and social anxiety disorder can be validly determined (Stein, 1996b; Stein, Walker, & 
Forde, 1994), using considerations such as the nature of the underlying psychobiology, 
the presence of associated distress and impairment, and the availability of effective and 
cost-effective interventions (Ballenger, Davidson, Lecrubier, & et al, 1998).  The 
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introduction of specific kinds of pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy that are able to 
normalize the neuroanatomical and neurochemical mechanisms that mediate social 
anxiety, and to lead to a significant reduction in these symptoms (Furmark et al., 2002), is 
a welcome development, and it behoves clinicians to diagnose and treat people, like 
Abigail Adams, who suffer from social anxiety disorder or from particularly severe  
avoidant personality traits. 
 
3)  The Psychobiology of Self-Representation – What is the Self? 
 
Reflecting on her experience several months after treatment, Abigail Adams comes to the 
conclusion not merely that she suffered from a disordered temperament, but that she has 
now found her “true self”.  Before she took medication, she tells her husband, she was 
only able to be genuinely spontaneous in his company.  But now she can be her true self 
with everyone.  She loves the fact that now when she walks into the office at work, she is 
able to offer a cheery “Good morning!” to everyone in sight.  Before she was unable to 
do this, but only because of her shyness, and not because she didn’t really want to be 
able to do this. 
 
How can personal identity be defined, what is the true self?35  A classical approach might 
suggest that personhood is determinate, with necessary and sufficient characteristics, and 
                                                 
35
 Philosophy of personal identity has addressed a range of different questions including those about 
transfer of psychological life from one body to another (ie, how can continuity of a living entity be 
defined), changes in personal identity over time (ie, how can continuity of persons or selves be identified), 
authenticity and autonomy of the self (eg, are one’s thoughts and emotions truly expressive of who one is), 
and nature of personhood (eg, to what extent does a fetus have the status of a person).  For the purposes of 
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clear boundaries.  Such a view has roots in a Platonic concept of the soul (Simon, 1978).  
Descartes, for example, argued that personal identity inheres in a Pure Ego or spiritual 
substance (Descartes, 1993).  Kant refined this viewpoint, putting forward a 
transcendental idea of the self, a primordial and unified ego, which cannot appear in the 
boundaries of space and time (Kant, 1977).  A series of philosophers, including some 
with an interest in psychiatric disorders, have subsequently attempted to provide more 
precise and accurate accounts of persons, selves, and related constructs36.   
 
A classical approach might also try to identify persons or selves with the brain, the mind, 
or their experiences (Le Doux, 2002; Quinton, 1962)37.  Locke, having rejected the idea 
that personal identity resides in a spiritual substance, famously suggested that experience-
memory is the defining characteristic of persons over time (Locke, 1694).  He 
disentangled this notion of personal identity from the brain, arguing that experience-
memory could be transplanted onto another body.  Others have argued, however, that 
neurophysiological facts are key in understanding personal identity;  for example, data 
that emerge from split-brain studies require a reconceptualization of the self (Nagel, 
1989). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
drawing a broad conceptual contrast, these are to some extent conflated here.  A partly related  philosophy 
of “theory of mind”, focused on understanding not the self but the other, will not be directly addressed. 
 
36
 A range of authors have contributed to this literature (Atkins, 2005; Dennett, 1991; Fletcher, 1975; 
Glover, 1988; Goldie, 2004; Heginbotham, 2000; Lewis, 1983; Mackie, 1976; Martin, 1998; McGinn, 
1983; Perry, 1975; Radden, 1996; Rorty, 1975; Schechtman, 1996; Seigel, 2005; Strawson, 1997; 
Strawson, 1977; Taylor, 1989; Wilkes, 1988; Williams, 1994; Wollheim, 1984) 
37
 The identification of self (or mind) with brain has been termed “neuroscientific essentialism” (Garland, 
2004).   
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 97
A classical approach to persons tends to be associated with a view of the self that 
emphasizes its unitary, conscious, and rational aspects, and that tends not to emphasize 
change in the self over time.  This position leads to a certain kind of view within 
psychology, where the self can be neatly defined, perhaps in terms of a particular role 
that it plays within the mind.  Similarly, in thinking about psychopathology, the idea of 
the self emerging only after the prescription of medication would likely seem counter-
intuitive from this perspective.  A classical position would more readily consider 
exemplars of a person taking a substance of abuse, like alcohol;  here the person might, 
for example, ultimately be excused from acts committed after consuming alcohol (Locke, 
1694);  insofar as they acted out of character38. 
 
A critical approach to persons and selves might on the other hand, emphasise the 
difficulty in defining personal identity in any determinate way – the self is decentred, 
multiple, and malleable, and cannot be specified in terms of a formal algorithm.  An 
emphasis on the decentred self has been a central feature of continental philosophy and of 
psychoanalysis (Elliott, 2001; Hansen & Maynes, 2005; Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, 
Venn, & Walkerdine, 1984).  Freud noted that, “There are cases in which parts of a 
person’s own body, even portions of his mental life – his perceptions, thoughts and 
feelings – appear alien to him and as not belonging to his ego; there are other cases in 
which he ascribes to the external world things that clearly originate in his own ego and 
that ought to be acknowledged by it.  Thus even the feeling of our own ego is subject to 
                                                 
38
 Locke’s position is more complex than the classical approach sketched here.  He is well aware of 
changes in persons over time, and understands that persons are self-constituting (Schechtman, 1996).  His 
view about punishing drunkards is also complex, while God may excuse alcohol-induced behaviour, it is 
just for man to inflict punishment. 
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disturbances and the boundaries of the ego are not constant” (Freud, 1961).  More 
ordinarily, events such as physical disorder disrupt the self, threatening to make us 
different persons (Zaner, 1981). 
 
A critical perspective may emphasize that the self is a fiction, that cannot simply be 
reduced to the physical continuity of the brain, nor to the psychological continuity of the 
mind.  Hume argued that the self consists only of a bundle only of impressions strung 
together by the imagination, and so is a useful fiction for ordering our perceptions 
(Hume, 1739).  Similarly, James denied that there was any single entity at the core of the 
self that could be called an “I” – we experience ourselves as unified beings only on the 
basis of our passing states of consciousness.  A range of philosophers have since explored 
the self in terms of narrative (Dennett, 1991; MacIntyre, 1981; Phillips, 2003; Ricoeur, 
1992; Taylor, 1989; Velleman, 2006).  The idea of the individual may have roots in 
Greek philosophy but it essentially is a modern Western construct (Giddens, 1991; 
Morris, 1973), and modern technologies, including psychotherapy or psychotropics, 
should not be seen as enabling progress (Fukuyama, 2002) or as helping to determine the 
“true self” (Crossley, 2003; Elliott, 2003; Murray, 2007; Rose, 1998a; Rose, 2007), but 
rather should be understood as allowing social discipline (Martin, Gutman, & Hutton, 
1988) or control (Deleuze, 1995).  Foucault, for example, argues that whereas for the 
Greeks medicine was an instantiation of the “technology of life” (or “how to live the 
good life”), it has increasingly become a “technology of the self” (providing the very 
terms of the self) (Martin et al., 1988; Murray, 2007).  
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A critical approach to persons tends to be associated with a view that emphasizes the self 
as fractured, unconscious, and irrational, and this leads to particular views within 
psychology and psychopathology.  Certainly, since Freud, it has also been difficult to 
accept people’s view of their own selves without scepticism.  While a critical perspective 
might accept the idea that medication is useful in experiencing one aspect of our selves, it 
is unlikely to accept any particular articulation of the self as necessarily more valid.  
Whereas a classical view typically characterizes behaviour on substances as “out of 
character”, a critical view might emphasize the value of such experience, referring to the 
therapeutic importance of “mind-altering substances” or to the right to use drugs for 
recreational purposes (Husak, 1992).  Indeed, a strand of anti-psychiatry has opposed the 
use of psychotropics, but encouraged the use of substances of abuse (Ingleby, 1981; 
Sedgwick, 1982). 
 
What does the cognitive-affective science data say?  A range of data indicate first, that 
personal identity, contra the classical approach, cannot be specified in terms of 
unchanging necessary and sufficient characteristics, and second, that personal identity, 
contra the critical approach, is not merely a social construction, but can be understood in 
terms of the brain-mind, and its experience within and of the world.  Selves are embodied 
in the brain-mind, they are constructed within the narratives provided by social 
interaction, they are multidimensional and they change over time (Bermúdez, Marcel, & 
Eilan, 1995; Churchland, 2002; Flanagan, 1998; Sellars, 1963; Varela et al., 1991).  This 
third position is consistent with a realist and embodied position in psychology, and with a 
view in psychopharmacology that, first, psychotropics can lead to a change in the self, 
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and, second, that the advantages and disadvantages of this change can reasonably be 
weighed.  To reach this conclusion, we will briefly cover a range of data from cognitive-
affective science. 
 
Cognitive psychology has contributed a range of data on self-awareness, self-recognition, 
and self-schemas (Harter, 1999; Leary & Tangney, 2002; Snodgrass & Thompson, 1997).  
A minimal sense of self emerges from our concrete perceptions and movements, while a 
sense of personal identity with continuity over time is enabled by and mediated through 
more abstract narrative (Bruner, 1990; Gallagher, 2000; Metzinger, 2003; Neisser, 1988; 
Neisser & Fivush, 1994).  Such views are to some extent consistent with Hume’s 
argument that the self consists of a bundle only of impressions strung together by the 
imagination, and so is a useful fiction for ordering our perceptions (Hume, 1739).  Like 
other schemas, self-schemas are only partial, and are subject to error.  Personal awareness 
is certainly quite different from our knowledge of others, but a wholly introspectionist 
position is incorrect;  any first-person reporting of mental states is fallible insofar as it 
may conflict with the person’s actual actions (Goleman, 1996; Leary, 2006; Wegner, 
2002). 
 
Artificial intelligence work on robots operating within particular contexts have 
increasingly attempted to specify how top-down processes (modelling of the world) and 
bottom-up sensorimotor processes (representing environmental contexts) interact to 
structure the self (Gallagher, 2000).  In one example, a robot modeller has argued that the 
self comes into existence when, in response to outside demands, the relationship between 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 101
top-down and bottom-up processes becomes incoherent (Tani, 1998);  this kind of 
approach is consistent with a view of the self as embodied, interactively constructed, and 
impermanent39.   
 
Language and narrative play a crucial role in the development of selves and persons 
(Erchak, 1992; Harré, 1983; Leary et al., 2002; Neisser et al., 1994; Shweder & Bourne, 
1991).  Linguistic and anthropological data indicate that in the West and elsewhere, one 
common mapping of the self contrasts the Essential Self (the “true self”) with a Second 
Self (not “true”) which is incompatible with the Essential Self, and which is 
conceptualised as either a person or a container the first self hides in (Lakoff et al., 1999).  
As Merleau-Ponty pointed out, we make sense of the world from the perspective of the 
body;  even our concept of the self therefore necessarily has the character of an oriented 
space.  This standard map of the self is similar in important ways to the classical view of 
self as unitary and rational, and allows us to reach conclusions of the form used by 
Abigail, namely – “I have found my true self”.   
 
Neuroscience data confirms the embodiment of the self in the brain-mind (Feinberg & 
Keenan, 2005; Kircher & David, 2003; Le Doux, 2002; Mishara, 2007).  A basic level of 
self-processing involves sensory integrative functions of the sort carried out by the 
parietal lobes, while more complex self-processing involves interaction of the inferior 
frontal cortex and the superior parietal lobe (Damasio, 1999).  Affect likely plays a key 
role in the basic sense of self (Panksepp, 2005).  A developed sense of self appears to be 
                                                 
39
 Sheryl Turkle has noted how the introduction of computing and the internet has made it easier to 
understand the notion of the decentred self (Turkle, 2004). 
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underpinned by the right hemisphere (Feinberg, 2001; Keenan, Gallup, & Falk, 2001), 
while the left hemisphere plays a crucial role in generating narratives about the self 
(Gazzaniga, 1998).  Although lesion and imaging studies cannot reduce selves to brain 
circuits (Dumit, 2004), they are leading to specific hypotheses about the anatomic bases 
of self-processing and self-monitoring (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Northoff et al., 
2006).  Similarly, substance abuse and other neuropsychiatric disorders can also 
precipitate depersonalization, allowing study of the neurochemical basis of selfhood 
(Hobson, 2001; Stephens & Graham, 2000).  Again, while the self is far more than the 
genome, neurogenetics is gradually contributing to understandings of individual 
differences (Parens, 2004).   
 
Developmental and evolutionary data confirm a view of the self as embodied in the brain-
mind and in interpersonal interaction, as constructed, and as malleable.  Studies of infants 
have indicated considerable cognitive-affective sophistication, suggesting that at birth 
there is a minimal self that is embodied and interactive (Rochat, 1995).  Over time, 
through cognitive (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 1999; Piaget, 1952) and emotional 
(Schore, 1994; Stern, 2000) interaction with the world, the self becomes increasingly 
structured.  In parallel, there is growing evidence of a minimal self in non-human 
primates, with evolution eventually allowing the development of more complex narrative 
selves when human brain-minds are situated in human groups.  The self is not merely 
socially constructed or spiritual;  our mapping capacities are evolution’s extensions and 
elaborations of the rudimentary self rooted in somatosensory and autonomic systems 
(Churchland, 2002; Gallagher, 2000; Lakoff et al., 1999; Varela et al., 1991).   
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Philosophy confirms a view of the self as constructed and malleable, but also as 
embodied.  Persons need to be understood both as objects (with crucial biological 
underpinnings), and as subjects (intentional agents with thoughts and emotions) 
(Schechtman, 1996).  If we are to define the nature of a person – it would be, following 
Merleau-Ponty, as “an auto-constitution” – a being that is structured but that also 
constructs, with the structures that define and limit man’s potentialities at the same 
ensuring that personhood cannot be restricted to a fixed set of categories (van Niekerk, 
1986).   In addition, the standard metaphoric mapping of the Essential Self is flawed;  as 
Hume (Hume, 1739) suggested, persons are similar to clubs or nations;  they exist, but 
over time, as their membership changes, the cut-offs between the old entity and the new 
entity become impossible to define.  Even our notion of the self as the centre of a unique 
and private self-consciousness may well be a reflection of current discourse (Rorty, 
1979).  A range of thought experiments have contemplated persons being changed trait 
by trait, or neuron by neuron (often by a callous neurosurgeon), these show that there is 
no specific cut-point at which one person becomes another;  personal identity lies on a 
continuum (Parfit, 1984), and there are degrees of personhood (Perring, 1997a).  Finally, 
as both Hume and Merleau-Ponty noted;  the self does not exist apart from the body.  
Philosophers have since continued to emphasize that the interpretation and organization 
of experience is always mediated through a body that is embedded in the world 
(Churchland, 2002; Legrand, 2006; Radden, 1996; Strawson, 1974; Thornton, 2003; van 
Niekerk, 1986).  
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In addition, we can reasonably consider whether some of our potential selves are better or 
worse than others (White, 1991).  If we think about persons, contra a classical approach, 
not as immutable natural kinds, but rather as clubs with fuzzy boundaries, this has 
implications for our thoughts about changing them.  For example, Parfit concludes that 
by treating people as nations, we adopt a more utilitarian approach (thus, we might not 
want to prioritize helping people who have previously suffered, but rather aim at 
relieving as much suffering as possible) (Parfit, 1984).   Similarly, if we think of persons 
as clubs, it may change our perspective on interventions that result in changes.  When we 
make a change to a natural kind, this is necessarily drastic, because it becomes a different 
kind.  But when we make a marked change to a club – for example, altering its uniform – 
the consequences may be less all-or-nothing. 
 
Furthermore, contra an entirely subjective or relativistic approach to personal identity and 
selves, there are justifiable reasons for preferring some selves to others.  Sadler has noted 
a “self-illness ambiguity” (Sadler, 2003), a fundamental blurring of personal self and 
psychiatric illness which leads to a metaphor not of “having a sickness” but of “being 
sick”.  Such new selves can be judged as better or as worse.  People with schizophrenia 
may be viewed as experiencing the world in a uniquely creative way (the argument of 
anti-psychiatry), or as being-in-the-world in a way that is ultimately impoverishing (the 
argument of most clinicians).  Of course a person with schizophrenia may make a correct 
or incorrect assessment about the extent to which their self-during-treatment is an 
improvement.  But even if both clinician and patient agree that there is an overall 
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improvement, the patient may feel some sense of loss of personal identity on treatment;  
the self-illness ambiguity creates ambivalence about treatment (Sadler, 2003).    
 
With this conceptual framework in place, we can now return to Abigail.  A person with 
social anxiety disorder may interact in the world in an entirely different way after 
successful pharmacological treatment, and it is therefore unsurprising that they 
experience this in terms of a new self.  By altering the neurocircuitry underpinning the 
relevant systems, psychotropics may well influence abstract self-representational 
capacities and cognitive-affective maps.  The standard metaphor of illness may not easily 
apply here, because there is not simply a response by the self to an external threat or 
obstacle, but rather there is a change in self.  Indeed, when we consider aspects of 
identity the line between normal variation and pathology is often fuzzy (Elliott, 1999).  
Conversely, while the metaphor that the Essential Self has been changed or found may be 
used, selves are complex phenomena, even the concept of an authentic self is a self-
narrative, and we need to think very carefully, using appropriately rigorous concepts, 
about the potential benefits and costs of treatment.  “Technologies of the self” should not 
simply be seen as an advance, or necessarily viewed as problematic, but they need to be 
carefully assessed and evaluated40. 
 
In subsequent chapters, we will go beyond the focus here on categories, considering also 
explanatory and ethical issues, in order to be able to consider fully such benefits and 
costs.  In the interim, it can be briefly be noted that there may be good reasons for 
                                                 
40
 A discussion of authenticity ultimately leads to a discussion of what it is to be human, a point to which 
we return later. 
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viewing Abigail as experiencing life as more authentic on treatment (eg, she has less fear, 
and more options), and for characterizing people who are addicted to substances as 
experiencing inauthentic selves (eg, they have more dysphoria, and their options are more 
restricted)41.  Although social anxiety disorder is a relatively new diagnosis and its 
treatments only recently developed, there may be underlying psychobiological 
mechanisms that account for the disorder, and which cut across time and place (we can 
point to historical figures who suffered from this disorder, and who recognized the 
significant limitations that this caused them).  Furthermore, we can interview people with 
social anxiety disorder before and after treatment, and assess the way in which their 
symptoms decrease, or in which their lives have been enriched (in the clinical context, a 
judgment of improvement requires both medical knowledge and empathic skills). 
 
What of the fact that Abigail did not originally regard herself as having a disorder?  What 
of the fact that even though we do not believe in the concept of a true self, Abigail does?  
It is relevant to note that cognitive-affective science provides multiple exemplars where 
self-reporting of mental states is erroneous (Churchland, 2002; Gallagher, 2000; 
Goleman, 1996; Wegner, 2002).  As noted above, like other schemas, self-schemas are 
only partial, and are subject to error.  The point that a person’s real interests and 
perceived interests are not necessarily the same has been made since ancient times, and 
has been emphasized by a broad range of more recent thinkers (Bhaskar, 1979; Bhaskar, 
1986; Giddens, 1984; Thompson, 1984; Williams, 1985).  As Socrates noted,”No 
                                                 
41
 Over the course of the dissertation, it will become apparent that I am advocating an approach to 
authenticity that is not simply essentialist (eg, less fear and more options) nor existentialist (ie, wholly 
relativistic), but which requires that we aim for as comprehensive a knowledge of human beings and of 
particular individuals as possible (ie, a humanistic and non-reductionistic naturalism). 
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physician, in so far as he is a physician knows himself” (Plato, 1997).  Or as both Freud 
and Merleau-Ponty have pointed out more generally, consciousness is not completely 
transparent to itself.  Indeed, a range of complex psychological and clinical phenomena, 
including self-deception, intra-personal conflict, and akrasia, may require concepts of the 
self that emphasize its fractured, non-conscious, and malleable nature (Radden, 1996)42.     
 
One way of understanding Abigail’s case may be in terms of a disjunction between 
“disease” and “illness” (Frank, 1979; Kleinman, 1988; Stein, 1993)43.  “Disease” refers 
to structures and mechanisms that are altered by the pathology, while “illness” refers to 
the subjective expression and experience of the pathology.  This is particularly useful in 
the clinic, where the clinician is required to negotiate with the patient about theories and 
values.  When the clinician views the phenomena (eg social anxiety) as a disorder (eg 
SAD), and the patient disagrees (viewing her experience as normal temperament), then 
the clinician may usefully explore the patient’s understanding, and try to come to a 
shared treatment plan.  It should be noted that this framework does not assume that the 
patient’s view is incommensurable with, or as valid as, the clinician’s;  rather there is an 
awareness of the importance of the clinician-patient relationship, and of setting 
reasonable goals that are able to incorporate scientific explanation as well as empathic 
understanding of patients’ perspectives.    
                                                 
42
 As Johnson (Johnson, 1993) succinctly puts it, “In a sense, we grope around for our identity, which is 
never a fixed or finished thing.  It changes over time, while preserving some degree of continuity with our 
previous identitities.  That is why we can always be surprised by discovering new things about who we are, 
why we do what we do, and how others see us”. 
43
 Kleinman’s view is perhaps partly related to, but also rather different, from the approaches taken by  1) 
Boorse (Boorse, 1975) takes, where he argues that disease can be defined factually, whereas illness adds an 
evaluative component, and 2) Fulford (Fulford, 1989), where he argues that disease can be understood as a 
failure of function (in a part of a person), but illness is best understood as action failure (of the person). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 108
5.  Explanatory Questions About Psychotropics  
 
In this chapter we cover a series of questions about explanations that are relevant to 
understanding philosophical issues in psychopharmacology.  We have already begun to 
develop a particular contrast in philosophical discussion of explanations – the classical vs 
critical approaches.  The classical approach takes the view that it is possible to generate 
systematic generalizations or covering laws that describe the facts of the world (eg, of the 
brain), and their relationships.  The critical approach argues that human phenomena 
require a different kind of knowledge, one that is based on subjective understanding (eg, 
of agents and their minds).  The synthetic position taken here says that our brain-minds 
engage in various kinds of activity - both physical and social, are able to develop maps 
which provide explanations of the natural and human world, and can reasonably 
(cognitive-affectively) debate these maps and attempt to come up with ones that have 
greater explanatory power.  Such explanatory power lies in understanding structures and 
their mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1978) and functions (Bolton et al., 1996).  
 
In the next sections this schema is used to discuss in turn how pharmacotherapy and 
psychotherapy work (which entails some discussion of brain-mind and nature-nurture 
relations), how placebo and nocebo effects occur (which leads to some discussion of 
symbolic grounding, and of the unconscious), and how evolutionary theory impacts on 
our understanding of cognitive-affective processes including those involved in the 
response to psychotropics and substances (which then involves some discussion of the 
constructs of function and dysfunction).   As before, this schema of different approaches 
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to explanation is an oversimplification, and as before rather than directly debating the 
contrasting views, we will put forwards a conceptual position that is based in part on data 
from the cognitive-affective sciences44.   
 
1)  Psychotropics vs Psychotherapy – Explaining Brain-Mind / Nature-
Nuture 
 
A) Fabian Fanchetti came into the hospital complaining of obsessions and 
compulsions.  He spent hours each day washing and cleaning, in order to make 
sure that he and his clothes were completely dirt-free. He put this down to 
growing up in a home where he’s been taught that “cleanliness was next to 
godliness”.  Nevertheless, he knew that this behaviour was excessive, wanted to 
stop, but couldn’t.  He agreed to take part in a research project on obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD), comparing the effects of medication and behavioural 
therapy on brain imaging.  He was randomised to the medication arm, with a 
medication called clomipramine, and did well, experiencing a marked decrease in 
his symptoms.  At first he found himself simply paying less attention to dirt, and 
feeling less anxious when he did not wash.  By the end of the trial he felt that his 
prior behaviours had wasted years of his time, but that he was now free to live his 
life more fully.  He learned that prior to treatment he had increased activity in an 
                                                 
44
 In the concluding chapter I will discuss this methodology in more detail, addressing the relationship 
between philosophical and scientific approaches.  An immediate objection to the approach here is to ask 
whether the selection of cognitive-affective data is biased to fit the conceptual position being defended 
(“cherry-picking”).  While I accept that understanding of scientific data is theory-driven, I would argue that 
science does make progress, and that the science chosen here is the best available.  Furthermore, only 
particularly sophisticated philosophical arguments will be able to underlabour for such science.  Finally, in 
those cases where there is an absence of relevant cognitive-affective data, conceptual debates may be 
particularly difficult to resolve. 
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area of the brain called the striatum, and that after treatment there has been a 
decrease in this activity.  Furthermore, this same normalization of activity was 
also seen in subjects in the behavioural therapy arm of the study. 
B) Gimoto Gasumatsu is a young woman who reported a history of repeated sexual 
abuse by her step-father during childhood.  As an adult she suffered from 
intrusive re-experiencing symptoms and difficulties in interpersonal relationships;  
she had difficulty in trusting people, and was often irritable with men.  She agreed 
to take part in a research project on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
assessing the size of the hippocampus.  It turned out that the volume of her 
hippocampus was considerably smaller than those found in a healthy control 
group.  As part of the study she received a trial of an SSRI – after treatment she 
experienced a decrease in symptoms, and the volume of her hippocampus was 
noted to increase.  At first she found that she was more comfortable  in 
interpersonal situations involving men;  she had an increased threshold for 
responding to comments with irritability.  By the end of the trial, she also 
experienced fewer flashbacks to her past, she found herself “letting go” of her 
memory of and anger towards to her step-father.  She continued on her 
pharmacotherapy for several months after the trial, and found that she was 
interested in establishing relationship with a new kind of man;  whereas she had 
always been attracted to men who were aloof and interested only in non-
committed sex, she now found herself wanting a closer relationship with a man 
who was interested in a more loving and longer lasting relationship.  
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How does pharmacotherapy work?  How does psychotherapy work?  Should there be 
different ways of understanding these two very different kinds of psychiatric 
intervention?  These questions about the treatment of psychiatric disorders also raise the 
issue of how best to understand the origins of psychopathology – are psychiatric 
symptoms best understood in terms of underlying lawful associations (eg, between 
neuronal or genetic abnormalities and particular behaviours), or as an understandable and 
intentional response (eg, to a specific environmental context)?  Such questions have been 
explored since ancient times (Simon, 1978), and they remain key for modern psychiatry 
and clinical psychopharmacology45. 
 
As outlined earlier, contrasting philosophical positions to science and to the mind 
underpin contrasting clinical approaches46.  These clinical approaches emphasize 
different explanations, and correspondingly, different treatments.  Thus, a classical 
clinical position views psychopathology as a brain disorder, emphasizes associations 
between abnormal circuitry or genes and psychiatric symptoms, and is likely to suggest 
pharmacotherapy and behavioural therapy as treatment.  In contrast, a critical clinical 
position, based on a view that psychopathology is an understandable response to the 
                                                 
45
 In the 17th century Rousseau and Locke argued respectively that behavioural development was 
determined by unseen factors, or by the environment. 
46
 A large philosophical literature focuses specifically on the so-called “mind-body problem”, and a number 
of authors have examined these debates  from the perspective of psychiatry (Goodman, 1991; Kendler, 
2001; van Staden, 2006).  Churchland (Churchland, 2002) comments, however, that that there is only a 
mind-body “problem” if one accepts that the mind is non-physical and the body is physical, and certainly 
there are ongoing advances in detailing the psychobiology of complex brain-mind phenomena (Crick & 
Koch, 2003; Edelman, 2003).  Still, there is the “hard problem” of how neurobiology produces 
consciousness (Chalmers, 1995).  For others, however, explaining how mental states and conscious qualia 
emerge from the brain is in principle unsolvable, given our limited cognitive abilities (McGinn, 1989) (a 
position that has been called mysterian).  Here we are primarily addressing a somewhat different, albeit 
related, set of questions about clinical phenomena and their explanation.    
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relevant context, typically focuses on the importance of meaning in both pathogenesis 
and psychotherapy. 
 
A classical perspective may have some difficulty in accounting for the complex clinical 
cases described above.  In particular, a reductionist view that focuses solely on the 
importance of basic physical laws in covering the data of the world, and that ignores 
emergent psychosocial mechanisms and functions, cannot easily describe how 
psychological trauma or psychotherapy leads to changes in neuronal function.  As noted 
earlier, there has been a view that axis I disorders are best treated with medication, while 
axis II disorders are best treated with psychotherapy.  However, increasingly there is 
evidence that genetic and environmental factors and nature-nurture interactions 
contribute to a range of psychopathology, and that both pharmacotherapy and 
psychotherapy are useful for a range of psychiatric symptoms. 
 
A more sophisticated functionalist approach conceptualizes the mind in computational 
terms (Putnam, 1967; Fodor, 1974, 1975).  Nevertheless, this position has also not been 
employed successfully in the clinical arena, and ordinarily it pays little attention to the 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic origins of particular states of the brain-mind.  Any idea that 
pharmacotherapy acts on the hardware of the brain, while psychotherapy acts on the 
software of the brain, seems inadequate;  after all there is no distinction in the nervous 
system that corresponds to the division between hardware and software (Churchland, 
2002).  Indeed, a functionalist position that the brain substrate of mental states is 
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essentially unimportant seems to harken back to the Cartesian division between the 
physicality of the body, and the incorporality of the mental. 
 
A critical perspective also has difficulty in accounting for the kinds of clinical cases 
described above.  This approach has tended to be sceptical about whether psychotropics 
are in fact effective, or has viewed them as chemical straitjackets – simply exerting 
control in a different, perhaps more powerful way, than older physical methods of 
restraint and seclusion.  The emphasis of this approach on the meaningfulness of 
psychiatric symptoms means that while it can readily view posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) as a normal response to an abnormal event (Small, 1984; Young, 1995), it may 
have difficulty in assimilating the contemporary view that this condition is characterized 
by abnormalities in psychobiological mechanisms such as decreased hippocampal 
volume (Rauch, Shin, Whalen, & Pitman, 1998; Yehuda & McFarlane, 1995).  Similarly, 
the critical approach has tended to view only meaning-oriented therapies as useful and 
worthwhile (Ingleby, 1981; Sedgwick, 1982). 
 
A critical perspective has, however, perhaps been useful in pointing out how classically 
influenced approaches to pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy are incomplete.  For 
example, there is a strong argument that psychoanalytic psychotherapy relies on an 
outdated meta-psychology (emphasizing psychic energy), and that its recommended 
interventions are not evidence-based (Grunbaum, 1985; Stein, 1992).  Further, there is 
now wide consensus that behaviourist models of the mind are necessarily incomplete 
(Gardner, 1985).  And despite the evidence base for cognitive therapy, the hypothesis that 
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distorted cognition leads to pathological emotions seems open to criticism.  First, it 
apparently ignores a range of evidence that biological factors are crucial in the 
pathogenesis of psychiatric disorder.  Second, it seems in conflict with current 
understandings of the way in which the brain-mind works; as discussed in detail earlier, 
we increasingly realize that cognition and affect are not neatly divorcible psychological 
faculties. 
 
What do the data from cognitive-affective science say?  Cognitive-affective science has 
investigated genetic and environmental mechanisms involved in psychopathology, as 
well as the mechanisms altered by psychotropics and psychotherapy.  Most modern 
psychotropics work by altering neurotransmission in monoaminergic neurons that spread 
diffusely through the brain, and that therefore mediate a range of cognitive and affective 
processes.  Some neuronal circuits may be particularly relevant to psychotherapy;  
prefrontal circuits, for example, play an important role in mediating extinction of fear, 
and may therefore also be altered by cognitive-behavioural interventions that reduce 
anxiety.  Indeed, there is growing evidence that effective pharmacotherapies and 
psychotherapies are both able to normalize activity in specific neuronal circuits that 
mediate particular psychiatric symptoms (Baxter, Schwartz, Bergman, & et al, 1992; 
Furmark et al., 2002; Paquetta et al., 2003; Roffman, Marci, Glick, Dougherty, & Rauch, 
2005; Straube, Glauer, Dilger, Mentzel, & Miltner, 2006). 
 
Such work depends upon, and informs, an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the 
brain-mind.  In the past, our maps of the brain-mind have been relatively crude;  for 
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example, a particularly common mapping has been of Mind as Container (Lakoff et al., 
1999).  Freud, modern therapists, and lay people, are all able to talk about how “The 
painful thought has been pushed out of your mind”.  But modern cognitive-affective 
science is able to provide more detail on how particular neurocircuitry mediates 
cognitive-affective processes.  Thus, we have moved from the nineteenth century notions 
of energy flow through the brain, to early twentieth century concepts of a “body schema”, 
to more recent theories about how cognition (Maravita, Spence, & Driver, 2003) and 
affect (Damasio, 1996) are embodied in the brain-mind.  This work should in turn lead to 
correspondingly sophisticated views on how to bring about changes in cognitive-affective 
processes. 
 
Indeed, cognitive-affective science has been able to investigate the cognitive-affective 
characteristics of and alterations in particular neuronal circuits using a range of methods.  
Circuits can be explored bottom-up (ie their neurogenetics and neurochemistry can be 
delineated in detail) or top-down (ie their activation by particular psychological factors or 
within particular social environments can be investigated).  This allows integrative 
explanations that include both low-level and high-level mechanisms and phenomena.  
This kind of approach is consistent with a non-reductionistic perspective on the 
relationship between different scientific disciplines, one that emphasizes the emergence 
of mental structures, mechanisms, and functions from the brain.  Similarly it allows an 
integration of cognitive-affective psychology with neuroscience (Churchland, 2002; 
Varela et al., 1991), a joining of meaning with mechanism (Bhaskar, 1978; Bolton, 2004; 
Bolton et al., 1996; Schwartz et al., 1986), and an understanding of how nature and 
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nurture interact to form the brain-mind (Dowling, 2004; Pinker, 2004; Ridley, 2003; 
Wexler, 2006) and its disorders (Caspi & Moffitt, 2006; Kendler, 2006).47 
 
In discussing cognitive-affective science data in earlier parts of the dissertation, the 
discussion was divided into data from cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, 
linguistics, neuroscience, developmental and evolutionary science, and philosophy.  With 
advances in our maps of the brain-mind, and the use of multiple theories and methods to 
explore the mechanisms of pathogenesis and treatment, explanations of phenomena such 
as pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy increasingly cut across these disciplines.  Work 
on changes in brain imaging induced by pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy, for 
example, requires incorporation of psychological and biological constructs, and may be 
modelled using neural networks.  Work in developmental science similarly is shedding 
increasing light on the precise nature of interactions between gene and environment, and 
on understanding the development of the brain-mind in its particular context, while work 
on evolutionary theory of the brain-mind also aims to be grounded in biological and 
ecological mechanisms (Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000).  Philosophical work has created 
the space to move beyond explanations of the brain-mind that rely solely on physical or 
intentional constructs, and that emphasize rather how meaning is encoded in the brain-
mind, and grounded in the interaction of people with their contexts (Bhaskar, 1978; 
Bolton, 2004; Bolton et al., 1996)48. 
                                                 
47
 This kind of view therefore avoids what has been termed “geneticization” (Lippman, 1992), which can be 
understood as a particularly reductionistic approach within a classical view of medicine. 
48
 As noted earlier, a non-reductionistic realist approach to complex phenomena makes space for a range of 
theories and methods.  Nevertheless, an ontological gap (Kriel, 2000) between different levels of reality, or 
an explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) in our accounts of their relationship, may be noted.  Ghaemi (Ghaemi, 
2003) contrasts an eclectic and pragmatic biopsychosocial approach (in which any explanation goes), with 
an integrationist approach (in which there is an attempt to focus on integrative explanations), and a pluralist 
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Returning to the cases described above, it seems overly simplistic, for example, to say 
that the serotonergic antidepressant, clomipramine, is effective in a particular disorder, 
such as OCD, because this disorder is characterized by a pathological serotonin system 
(van Praag, 2000).  Serotonergic circuits are likely to play a role in mediating a broad 
range of normal behaviours and pathological symptoms;  this is consistent with the fact 
that these neurons branch widely through the brain, and that they appear to have a general 
modulatory role.  Thus, rather than mediating any particular behaviour, clomipramine 
may act to change the firing setpoint for a large number of neurons, involved in a wide 
variety of functions.  By changing the activity of striatal and related circuits, which are 
involved in cognitive-affective processes such as set-switching and control of procedural 
strategies, clomipramine reduces obsessions and compulsions in OCD, but also improves 
symptoms in other kinds of disorders.  (From a philosophical perspective, clomipramine 
has an intentional component in that it alters the serotonergic system, but a non-
intentional causal effect in relation to cognitive-affective processes and psychopathology 
(Bolton et al., 1996)). 
 
Similarly, it is unlikely that we can develop an explanation of behavioural exposure 
during psychotherapy which doesn’t involve brain.  OCD, for example, is characterized 
                                                                                                                                                 
approach (in which certain accounts are viewed as more valid in particular circumstances).  The term 
“psychobiological” emphasizes the increasing integration of the biological and the psychological, and the 
idea that behaviour has to be understood both in terms of its overall meaning and underlying mechanism.  
As Merleau-Ponty notes, there are no explanations without comprehension (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  At the 
same time, a view which emphasizes that several causal mechanisms are involved in any disorder, and that 
some models are more valid than others for particular cases, is consistent with the approach taken 
throughout this dissertation.  Mitchell has proposed the persuasive term “integrative pluralism” (Mitchell, 
2003). 
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by increased activity in the cortico-striatal-thalamic-cortical (CSTC) circuits involved in 
particular cognitive-affective functions (such as set switching and control of procedural 
strategies).  Both clomipramine and behavioural therapy are able to decrease activity in 
these circuits (Baxter et al., 1992).  A similar change may well be brought about by 
particular kinds of cognitive therapy.  Cognitive-affective processes are embodied in the 
brain, and can be changed by the causal effects of both non-intentional (psychotropic) 
and intentional (psychotherapeutic) interventions (Bolton et al., 1996).  (From a 
philosophical perspective, in order to explain fully how an intervention that focuses 
primarily on meaning (psychotherapy) exerts its effects, we need to understand the 
underlying brain-mind mechanisms that underpin that meaning (Bhaskar, 1979)). 
 
Although the kinds of explanations offered here to explain clinical cases may seem 
obvious enough, this approach has significant implications for a number of debates in 
philosophy of psychology and of cognitive science (Clark, 2001; Goldman, I, 1993b; 
Greenwood, 1991; Ramsay et al., 1991).  The functionalist view that has been so popular 
in contemporary cognitive science divorces the software and hardware of the mind;  the 
brain-mind is conceptualised in terms of its functional states.  In this dissertation we do 
not address these debates directly, rather the emphasis is on the conceptual point that 
such a model simply does not allow for sufficiently powerful explanations of clinical 
phenomena.   A functionalist explanation of the efficacy of medication and of 
psychotherapy would necessarily be in terms of using psychotherapy to change the 
software, and medication to change the hardware of the mind.  But the reality is clearly 
more complex then this, with clinical research documenting the effects of psychotherapy 
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on brain, and the effects of psychotropics on cognitive-affective processes.  Thus, the 
hardware-software distinction simply fails to describe adequately the brain-mind 
(Churchland, 2002; Lakoff et al., 1999), and the way in which it mediates psychiatric 
pathology and intervention.  Instead we need a conceptual approach that recognizes the 
unique “wetware” that underpins the embodied brain-mind and its interaction with the 
world. 
 
Such a conceptual approach may also be able to go beyond the debate in cognitive 
science between symbolic cognitivists and situated cognitivists (Norman, 1993).  
Symbolic cognitivists take a position reminiscent of the classical perspective, arguing that 
cognitive processing essentially involves the manipulation of symbols, which are 
independent of their physical instantiation.  Situated cognitivists, on the other hand, hold 
that cognitive processes necessarily take place within a particular interactive social 
context, emphasize concepts such as ecology (Neisser, 1976) and affordances (Gibson, 
1977) to emphasize the environment and the properties of things in the environment that 
are relevant to the kinds of interactions that people have with them, and prefer 
computational models such as neural networks or robotic agents that operate within 
particular environments.  Some of the arguments against symbolic cognitivism are 
reminiscent of the critical position; Searle, for example, emphasizes the importance of 
human intentionality, arguing that this simply cannot be captured by formal cognitivist 
models (Searle, 1983; Searle, 2006)49.  From the synthetic or integrative perspective 
taken here, however, a cognitivist position can be developed that emphasizes the 
                                                 
49
 Searle ignores the crucial point that symbols have meaning because they are linked to sensorimotor 
capacities and to interaction with the environment (Bolton et al., 1996). 
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embodiment of mind in sensorimotor-affective circuits, with the grounding of cognitive-
affective maps in direct interactions with the physical and social world (Bolton et al., 
1996; Clark, 1997; Harnad, 1990). 
 
2)  Placebo vs Nocebo  – Explaining Symbol Grounding / The 
Unconscious 
 
Harold Hannemeyer made an appointment at his local psychiatric hospital outpatient 
clinic.  He has always been a tidy and hygienic person, but over the last few years his 
cleaning routine had gotten out of control.  He spent several hours a day washing his 
hands and cleaning his apartment, in order to make sure there were no germs.  He 
realized that this was excessive, but has felt too embarrassed to discuss it within any one.  
However, things were now at the point where he was beginning to feel demoralized and 
depressed by how much time he wasted, and by how little time he had to do anything 
productive.  At the clinic he was told about a research trial of a new medication that 
might be helpful for people with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD).  He agreed to 
take part, and within a few months was doing much better.  At the end of the trial he 
elected to continue with the same medication, now given open-label.  Within a day he 
experienced intense nausea, and could no longer continue with the medication.  It turned 
out he had been on placebo all along50. 
 
Randomised clinical trials (RCTs) are the gold standard of evidence-based medicine 
(Leber, 2000; Sackett, Rosenberg, Muir Gray, & Richards, 1996), despite their 
                                                 
50
 There is a small bioethics literature on what to do in this situation (Di Blasi, Kaptchuk, Weinman, & 
Kleijnen, 2002). 
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limitations (Cartwright, 2007).  The use of a placebo control is the best available 
methodology for differentiating the specific therapeutic effects and adverse events of a 
new medication from the non-specific placebo and nocebo effects of an inert substance.  
In this classical position, a placebo tablet represents “noise”;  it is a non-specific effect 
that must be subtracted from the specific effects of medication, so that the signal 
demonstrating efficacy can be seen more clearly (Harrington, 1999; Shapiro & Shapiro, 
2001).  This may contribute to explaining why mechanisms underlying placebo effects 
have not been particularly well explored, despite the fact that placebo is the most 
effective of all medical interventions (at least in terms of its breadth of therapeutic 
activity) (Guess, Kleinman, Kusek, & Engel, 2002; White, Tursky, & Schwartz, 1985). 
 
For the critical position, controlled clinical trials are not so much the foundation of 
medical science, but part of a fallible system that has no absolute foundations 
(Cartwright, 2007).  Furthermore, placebo effects underline that psychiatric disorders are 
ultimately social in nature.  If OCD were really a neurological disorder, like Parkinson’s 
disorder, there would be less robust placebo effects in OCD clinical trials.  The 
meaningfulness of a diagnostic label and a therapeutic relationship is sufficiently 
powerful that patients with psychiatric disorders can respond to medication even when it 
is inert.  Indeed, a great deal has been written about the meaning of the placebo (Brody, 
1980; Moerman, 2002).  As Brody states, when an encounter with a healer changes to the 
meaning of the illness experience in a positive direction, then there is more likely to be a 
placebo response (Brody, 2000).  This is particularly likely when the individual receives 
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a meaningful explanation, when he/she feels care and concern, and when there is an 
enhanced sense of mastery or control over the illness. 
 
What does cognitive-affective science say?  We can begin by noting that although 
evidence-based medicine is sometimes caricatured in classical terms, good evidence-
based practice integrates research evidence with both clinical expertise and patient values 
(Sackett et al., 1996; Stein et al., 2005).  Further, although it is important to separate 
placebo effects from measurement artefacts (Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, 2001; McDonald, 
Mazzuca, & McCabe, 1983), most agree that a placebo response is present in many 
medical and psychiatric disorders and advances in neurochemistry and functional 
imaging have helped elucidate the underlying psychobiology (Stein & Mayberg, 2005).  
Thus, in Parkinson’s placebo responders demonstrate increased dopamine release 
consistent with basic work showing such release during reward anticipation (de la 
Fuente-Fernandez et al., 2001; de la Fuente-Fernández & Stoessl, 2004).  Work on 
depressed patients who respond to placebo shows specific activation/deactivation patterns 
in cortical-limbic circuits on functional brain imaging consistent with a role for 
expectancy effects (Leuchter, Cook, Witte, Morgan, & Abrams, 2002; Mayberg et al., 
2002).  In investigating response to an active psychotropic, we therefore need to explore 
both non-intentional processes (eg, the neurotransmitter effects of the psychotropic, 
conditioning effects) and intentional processes (eg, cognitive-affective processing 
focused on the value of being prescribed a psychotropic, expectancy effects) (Bolton et 
al., 1996). 
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Indeed, placebo and nocebo responses can ultimately be understood using the same type 
of schema outlined earlier for understanding the mechanism of action of 
pharmacotherapy and of psychotherapy.  First, the underlying neurocircuitry and its 
associated cognitive-affective functions are delineated.  Second, bottom-up 
(neurogenetics, neurochemistry, etc) and top-down (psychological, social, etc) 
investigations are undertaken.  The bottom-up approach indicates that in Parkinson’s 
disease the dopamine system plays a role in mediating placebo effects, while in 
depression cortico-limbic circuits are important.  One could predict (if not yet 
demonstrate) that psychological and social factors important in expectancy effects 
(Brody, 2000) are ultimately also able to alter the relevant neurochemistry and 
neurocircuitry.  A different constellation of psychobiological and psychosocial factors 
may, however, result in a nocebo effect.  Furthermore, an evolutionary perspective may 
suggest that expectancies in social situations reflect our evolved cognitive abilities, and 
that capacity to have expectancies in therapeutic contexts in particular may have an 
evolutionary advantage (Bendesky & Sonabend, 2005; Evans, 2003; Humphrey, 2002). 
 
A detailed consideration of the ethics of using placebo in randomized controlled trials is 
beyond the scope of the current dissertation.  Nevertheless, it notable that a philosophical 
position has gradually emerged which emphasizes the complexity of such decisions 
(Emanuel & Miller, 2001).  Thus, a particular placebo-controlled design which is less 
acceptable in one context (where the active medication is, for example, already known to 
be effective) may be more acceptable in another (where it may still be necessary, for 
example, to demonstrate the cost-efficacy of the active medication).   Such a view goes 
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beyond a classical view of placebo as merely noise and also beyond a critical view that is 
entirely sceptical of the value of randomized placebo-controlled clinical trials, and is 
consistent with a view of placebo and nocebo responses as complex brain-mind 
phenomena that are mediated by psychobiological mechanisms and that take place within 
particular psychosocial contexts. 
 
Indeed, the question arises of the implications of our accounts of placebo and nocebo 
responses for models of the brain-mind?  They demand a model that is not merely 
symbolic or functional, but that at the same time can ground meaning in psychobiological 
mechanisms.  One interesting philosophical answer to the question of how symbols are 
grounded so that they have meaning has been put forward by Harnad, who describes an 
elegant variant of the Turing Test, the Total Turing Test (TTT) (Harnad, 1989).  In 
addition to simulation of pen-pal (symbolic) interactions, passing the TTT demands 
simulation of "robotic capacity" - all of our sensorimotor capacity to discriminate, 
recognize, identify, manipulate, and describe the world we live in.  Harnard argues that a 
system is grounded only when it has the symbolic and robotic capacity to pass the TTT 
test in a coherent way, that is when its symbolic capacity is grounded in its robotic 
capacity (so that cognition is embodied). 
 
A machine that responded to particular psychotropic agents that also work in humans 
would be extremely similar to humans, to the point that it would likely be more of a 
phenocopy than a model.  More interesting, perhaps, would be a machine that did not 
necessarily respond to pharmaceuticals, but that did respond to placebos.  Indeed, it might 
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be suggested that any machine that is sufficiently complex to pass the TTT would 
necessarily respond to placebos.  It would not simply be a cognitive processing machine, 
but would also be an affect processing machine.  Such a machine would have sufficiently 
complex grounded symbolic capacity, and sufficiently complex interactions, that it would 
find the administration of placebos meaningful.  This could be called the placebo Turing 
test (PTT). 
 
The placebo response also raises the question of how best to conceptualize the 
unconscious.  The person who experiences a response to placebo remains unaware of 
how factors such as the therapeutic relationship, and changes in the meaning of the illness 
experience, result in a therapeutic response.  Of course, a lack of awareness by owners of 
brain-minds of how brain-mind structures and mechanisms lead to thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours, is the rule.  Thus, both psychoanalysis and cognitive science agree that the 
majority of mental processing takes place outside of awareness.  However, where Freud’s 
concept of the unconscious relied on nineteenth century concepts of energy, cognitive 
science has developed a rather different approach to the unconscious, emphasizing the 
contrast between implicit and explicit cognitive and affective processes (Kihlstrom, 1987; 
Stein, 1997). 
 
There are many within the classical tradition who have been sceptical of the notion that 
psychoanalysis is a science (Clark & Wright, 1988; Grunbaum, 1985; Hook, 1959; 
Popper, 1974; Wollheim & Hopkins, 1982).  Wittgenstein suggested that Freud had 
muddled causes with reasons (Wittgenstein, 1982).  As briefly noted above, the objective 
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and ahistorical emphasis of much classical thinking conflicts with psychodynamic 
theory’s embrace of the subjective and of the historic.  On the other hand, a number of 
authors in the psychodynamic tradition have argued that psychoanalysis has the structure 
of other sciences, and that its laws cover unconscious phenomena.  There are strands 
within this tradition that emphasize the energetics underlying mental phenomena (Bilder 
& LeFever, 1998; Ellenberger, 1970), or more recently, the way in which the 
unconscious can be re-conceptualized in terms of symbolic representations (Bowers & 
Meichenbaum, 1984; Erdelyi, 1985) or brain-mind embodiment (Solms & Turnbull, 
2003; Zacharacopoulou, 2006).   
 
Similarly, within the critical tradition, psychoanalysis has had severe critics.  For much of 
the 20th century, psychoanalysis was the predominant paradigm of American psychiatry, 
and was therefore open to accusations of being a non-progressive means of social control.  
On the other hand, a number of authors in the psychodynamic tradition have argued that 
psychoanalysis is a human science, and that its particular approach to narrative and 
interpretation provides unique insights.  As noted earlier, some have conceptualized 
psychotherapy in terms of narrative text, have emphasized the intersubjective aspects of 
analytic phenomena such as the transference, or have focused on the discursive nature of 
the unconscious (Habermas, 1971; Klein, 1976; Mitchell, 1988; Ricoeur, 1970; Ricoeur, 
1981; Schafer, 1976).  
 
From the perspective of cognitive-affective science, the unconscious cognitive-affective 
processes that mediate placebo and nocebo responses, as well as a range of other complex 
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brain-mind phenomena, can be understood by exploring their underlying neuronal 
circuitry and molecular mechanisms.  Once again, the relevant structures and 
mechanisms can be investigated empirically using both bottom-up (neurogenetics, 
neurochemistry, etc) and top-down (psychological, social, etc) methodologies.  
Psychodynamic constructs and theories may change considerably during this process of 
investigation, but a cognitive-affective science of the unconscious with a good deal of 
explanatory power may emerge (Stein, Solms, & van Honk, 2006)51.  Thus, while a 
Cartesian approach may have allowed objectification of the body, in order to develop 
appropriately complex explanations of psychiatric phenomena, and their underlying 
(unconscious) cognitive-affective processes, a detailed understanding of the way in which 
these processes are grounded in the brain-mind is necessary (Leder, 1984).52   
 
This kind of understanding of the placebo process is not merely theoretical, but may have 
important clinical implications.  As noted earlier, a good physician needs to understand 
not only disease, but also illness (the meaning of the disorder).  On the one hand it is 
important to avoid objectification of the patient (ignoring the particular circumstances 
and context of symptoms), on the other hand it is important not to overlook the diagnosis 
of medical conditions and the value of psychotropic agents in patients who present with 
apparently meaningful behavioural symptoms.  A model of the brain-mind that 
simultaneously provides explanations of mechanism and meaning, of symbols and their 
                                                 
51
 Similar considerations may well apply to conscious processes and free will (Armstrong & Malcolm, 
1984; Block, Flanagan, & Güzeldere, 1997; Chalmers, 1995; Churchland, 1995; Dennett, 1991; Dennett, 
2003; Dilman, 1999; Humphrey, 1999; Kane, 2001; Libet, Freeman, & Sutherland, 1999; Lloyd, 2004; 
Marijuán, 2001; Searle, 2006; Spence, Hunter, & Harpin, 2002; Walter, 2001; Watson, 2003; Wegner, 
2002), but these topics go beyond our focus here. 
52
 Merleau-Ponty helped lay the path for such a strategy by arguing that Freud’s energic metaphors needed 
to be replaced by structural metaphors.  He argued that “structure” is the philosophical truth of naturalism 
and realism (Merleau-Ponty, 1942). 
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grounding, of context and its brain-mind embodiment, is therefore key for good medical 
practice, including good psychopharmacology.  Before going on to consider the notion of 
good pharmacotherapy in more detail in the next chapter, we consider distal 
(evolutionary) explanations of psychiatric disorders and treatments. 
 
3)  Evolutionary Psychopharmacology – Explaining Function / 
Dysfunction 
 
Before entering the trial of clomipramine versus behavioural therapy, Fabian had been 
convinced that his washing obsessions and compulsions were the consequence of his 
family environment.  When he was a child, the importance of cleanliness had always been 
emphasized.  He also suspected that family conflict played a role – he always felt pulled 
in one way by his father, and in another by his mother, and this seemed to relate to his 
perpetual uncertainty about things.  However, as he learned more about clomipramine, 
and its effects in people with OCD, he changed his explanatory model.  He was 
particularly interested to learn from his doctor that clomipramine is effective in dogs 
with excessive grooming behaviour;  so-called acral lick dermatitis.  He decided that just 
as acral lick dermatitis represents excessive activation of grooming in canines, so 
obsessive-compulsive disorder represents a kind of false alarm in humans.  This notion 
was instrumental in his decision to continue medication after the end of the trial. 
 
Insofar as the classical perspective downplays the social and cultural context of science, it 
has often been ahistorical in its approach.  Perhaps this helps explains why in medicine 
and psychiatry the focus has been so much on the proximal factors involved in disease, 
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with relatively little attention paid to its distal evolutionary origins (MacLean, 1985; 
Nesse et al., 1994).  Similarly it may help explain why the Freudian emphasis on the 
origins of mental function and psychopathology in childhood experience has been so 
negatively received by philosophers (Grünbaum, 1985).  Less speculatively, it is notable 
that early conceptual analyses criticized biology for not following sufficiently well in the 
footsteps of physics (Mayr, 1988; Ruse, 1989).  With the rapid advances in biological 
science, and a firm basis in evolutionary explanations, a rich conceptual basis for biology 
has developed (Grene & Depew, 2004; Hull & Ruse, 2007; Mayr, 1988; Ruse, 1989), and 
there has been growing scientific interest in evolutionary approaches in medicine and 
psychiatry. 
 
The critical perspective has by and large placed a great deal of emphasis on social and 
cultural context.  Freud, for example, has been commended by many in the critical camp, 
not as a scientist, but as a deep thinker who addresses the meaningfulness of mental 
phenomena (Ricoeur, 1970).  Furthermore, Mayr (Mayr, 1988) has argued that the switch 
from classical essentialist thinking to population thinking is what made the theory of 
evolution possible;  the genotype is shaped by the context of all its preceding ancestors, 
and there is no corresponding kind of distal explanation in the physical sciences.  
Nevertheless, for the critical thinker, context is typically conceptualised in terms of 
human society and culture, rather than in evolutionary terms.  Given the importance of 
meaning and language for the critical perspective, there is a clear division between 
animal and human minds, a scepticism about the implications of evolutionary theory for 
psychology, and an acute awareness that social practices need not be selected for by 
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evolution.  Such views have been emphasized by more critical philosophers of biology 
(Kitcher, 1985; Levins & Lewontin, 1985; Midgley, 1978; Rose & Rose, 2000; Rose, 
1998b; Rose & The Dialectics of Biology Group, 1982; Ruse, 1979). 
 
What does cognitive-affective science say?  Cognitive-affective science is keenly aware 
of biological continuities between animals and humans, and describing the evolution of 
structures and mechanisms across species is of crucial interest.  Evolutionary psychology 
has increasingly become incorporated as one of the sub-disciplines of cognitive science 
(Buss, 2005; Cosmides et al., 2003; Wright, 1995), responsible for augmenting proximate 
psychobiological explanations with distal evolutionary ones.  The brain-mind must be 
understood as an evolutionary product, an adaptation that allows the organism to function 
more effectively in its particular niche (Duchaine et al., 2001).  Nevertheless, there are 
many questions that remain unresolved when this framework is applied to 
psychopathology.  For this dissertation an immediate question is whether evolutionary 
psychology provides a useful framework for thinking about, and providing explanations 
of, psychiatric disorders and their pharmacotherapy. 
 
An important goal for the field of evolutionary psychology is the development of models 
of homeostatic (in-balance) and allostatic (out-of-balance) cognitive-affective processes 
that can be investigated across species.  If the brain-mind mechanisms underlying 
repetitive behaviours have evolved gradually over time, for example, then the study of 
habits in rodents may turn out to involve analogous psychobiological structures and 
functions that are involved in normal repetitive behaviour and abnormal obsessive-
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compulsive behaviours in humans.  Indeed, it is quite remarkable that excessive canine 
grooming respond to the same psychotropic medication that works for OCD symptoms, 
suggesting that similar neurocircuitry mediates both phenomena (Rapoport, Ryland, & 
Kriete, 1992). 
 
Similarly, an evolutionary perspective helps to explain why a handful of psychotropics 
have such powerful effects across behaviours and across species (Stein, 1998; Stein, 
2006).  The power of these agents resides not so much in their own structure, as in the 
effect that they may have on complex, evolved, endogenous neurocircuitry.  This holds 
for both therapeutic drugs and abused substances (a category that, as noted earlier, 
overlaps) (Nesse et al., 1997).  Cannabis works not like a hammer to disrupt the brain-
mind, but rather via endogenous cannabinoid receptors, finely tuned by evolution, on 
which the drug acts to alter cognitive-affective processes.  Analogously, the famous and 
infamous selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), Prozac (or fluoxetine), works 
because it modulates a system that has survived across eons of evolutionary history in 
multiple species.  Thus, both rodents and primates (including humans) get drunk on 
alcohol, and have increased motivation on antidepressants. 
 
What are the implications, then, for this kind of evolutionary thinking for thinking about 
and explaining psychiatric disorder?  One approach, consistent with a more classical 
emphasis on covering laws, is that disorders can be accounted for in terms of an 
evolutionary account of dysfunction.  In this view, we can then differentiate between 
states of unhappiness, of demoralization, and of the disorder of depression, on the basis 
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of whether an explanation involving dysfunction is relevant.  Whereas unhappiness 
(Buss, 2000), and demoralization (Nesse, 2000) may have adaptive functions, there are 
cases of depression that are characterized by dysfunction.  Indeed, several authors have 
tried to define disorder in evolutionary theoretical terms as a “biological disadvantage” 
(Scadding, 1967) or “design failure” (Wakefield, 1999a). 
 
Consistent with a more critical perspective that emphasizes subjective and contextual 
understandings, however, it might be argued that evolutionary accounts may well provide 
an understanding of the origins and adaptiveness of behaviour, but this does not mean 
that they yield definitions of “function” or “dysfunction” in necessary and sufficient 
terms.  A key question is whether evolutionary explanations are sufficient to differentiate 
the idea that the function of the heart is to pump blood from the argument that the sounds 
of the heart function to allow us to listen to it, and then whether we can differentiate 
disorder from normal variants (Hempel, 1965; Wakefield, 1999a).  Critics of an essential 
approach would argue that biological and evolutionary explanations are too complex to 
yield classical conclusions of the form, “the function of the heart is to pump blood”, “a 
heart disorder occurs when this function goes awry”. 
 
While it might be fair, for example, to begin with a first step of saying that the function of 
the heart is to pump blood, a range of other complicating considerations soon come in to 
play.  For a particular elderly person, a certain cardiac output may be enough to live with 
good quality of life, but for a more robust individual, it may be considered crucial to have 
a much higher ventricular ejection.  There might be a gene variant in the population 
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which proves adaptive under some circumstances (eg increasing cardiac output early in 
life, which may allow superior athleticism and improve survival in certain contexts), but 
maladaptive in other circumstances (eg leading to vulnerability to earlier death, which 
may decrease life span and diminish survival in other contexts).  Thus, while 
understanding genes and their variations may provide powerful explanations of medical 
phenomena, such knowledge may not provide a nosology entirely mapped to genes 
(Kendler, 2006).  Similarly, although cognitive-affective science may usefully emphasize 
the value of evolutionary explanations, this may lead to an appreciation of human 
diversity rather than to a neat dichotomy between function and dysfunction (Troisi, 
2005).  
 
In a discussion relevant to the considerations here, Polanyi suggested that we look for 
reasons for the way biological systems work, but that we emphasize instead the causes of 
their failure (Polanyi, 1958).  In this view, evolutionary theory might be particularly 
useful in understanding the survival of normal psychobiological mechanisms, while other 
kinds of non-intentional explanations would be needed to explain pathology.  However, 
as Bolton and Hill (Bolton et al., 1996) emphasize, breakdown can also result from 
intentional processes.  In sickle cell anemia, for example, the underlying responsible trait 
appears to be inherited because of its ability to confer protection against malaria53.  In 
some cases of impulsive-aggression, the relevant gene variant may survive because of the 
                                                 
53
 This exemplar is also discussed by Boorse (Boorse, 1997) and by Wakefield (Wakefield, 1999a), who 
argue that the existence of such an inherited problem is not a design failure.  However, I think Wakefield 
again fails to address adequately the point that variants (including extreme variants) are maintained in the 
population by selection pressure. 
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benefit conferred in resource-limited environments.  Explanations of medical disorder 
often entail an interplay between intentional and non-intentional causal processes54. 
 
Wakefield’s view of disorder as “harmful dysfunction” (Wakefield, 1992a; Wakefield, 
1993; Wakefield, 1995; Wakefield, 1997; Wakefield, 1999a; Wakefield, 1999b; 
Wakefield, 2001), potentially allows him to combine both objective and value-laden 
factors in defining disorder, while retaining a naturalistic approach to explanations 
(which focus on why humans are made like they are).  It is therefore attractive in a 
number of ways, and appears to be an advance over earlier approaches to defining disease 
solely in terms of malfunction (Boorse, 1975).  Nevertheless, he adheres rigorously to the 
logic of an essentialist approach to dysfunction.  In response to a broad range of counter-
examples of the kind noted above (Lilienfeld et al., 1995; Lilienfeld et al., 1999), he 
emphasizes the explanatory power of evolutionary accounts, and argues that such 
accounts differentiate disorders from non-disorders.  When there is a conflict of 
evolutionary accounts of function with human practices and values, he downplays the 
latter (arguing, for example, that decreased cardiac output as one ages is not a 
dysfunction, having gene variants that are associated with high levels of trait aggression 
is not a disorder).  This leads to a view in which many conditions that are currently 
viewed as disorders are defined as non-disorders (Bolton, 2000). 
 
                                                 
54
 For detailed discussion of the philosophy of causal and non-causal (eg, reason-based or folk psychology) 
theories of action, see Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1979) on the human sciences in general, and Fulford and 
colleagues (Fulford et al., 2006) on psychiatry in particular.  Similarly, psychotropics can perhaps work in 
an intentional or a non-intentional way (Bolton, oral communication).  As noted earlier, serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors act on a finely tuned endogenous system, likely upregulating serotonergic responses to the 
environment.  On the other hand, certain nootropics may act to enhance neuronal protection in general. 
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For example, Wakefield argues that social anxiety disorder should only be diagnosed 
when anxiety reaches debilitating levels in species expectable tasks (Wakefield et al., 
2005), and that current operational diagnostic criteria lead to overdiagnosis of such 
conditions (Spitzer & Wakefield, 1999)55.  Nevertheless, as alluded to earlier, there is 
uncertainty about whether or not social anxiety disorder reflects a design failure, and 
there is a strong argument that many cases are associated with significant distress and 
impairment and deserve to be conceptualized as disorders (Campbell-Sills et al., 2005).  
Similarly, although it may be argued that in many cases excessive use of alcohol does not 
involve an underlying design failure, this condition can nevertheless validly be 
considered a disorder (ie, alcoholism)(Clark, 2007)56.  Whereas Wakefield wants to 
revise the current nosology to omit such conditions, other evolutionary thinkers accept 
that evolutionary accounts of function and dysfunction diverge markedly from ordinary 
human standards of value (so that dysfunctions can be beneficial, while mechanisms that 
perform their evolved function can cause disturbing outcomes) (Cosmides & Tooby, 
1999) or emphasize that various phenomena (eg nausea during pregnancy, depression 
after a loss, impulsivity in certain social contexts) challenge the notion that disorders are 
essences distinctly separate from normal conditions (Nesse, 2001).   
 
                                                 
55
 Spitzer and Wakefield argue that the so-called “clinical significance criterion” in DSM-IV is 
conceptually weak, and may lead to overdiagnosis of psychiatric disorders (Spitzer et al., 1999).  However, 
there is also the possibility that the clinical significance criterion leads to underestimation of psychiatric 
disorders in various populations (Coyne & Marcus, 2006; Jablensky, 2005). 
56
 The argument here is not necessarily only about psychiatric disorders.  Wakefield (Wakefield, 1999a) has 
argued that design/environment mismatch obesity should not be considered a disorder, and that cosmetic 
surgery cannot be conceptualized in terms of being used to treat a disorder.  These points do not seem 
defensible. 
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While Wakefield wants “dysfunction” to serve as an essential natural kind (Wakefield, 
1999b) that defines disorder, our view here would instead be that insofar as the concept 
of dysfunction provides an explanation that is similar to that used in the breakdown 
metaphor of disorder, it provides a useful shorthand for thinking about medical and 
psychiatric conditions and their explanations.  Similarly, Lilienfeld and Marino note that 
at the heart of the prototype of disorder is an account that “there is something wrong with 
the body or mind that needs to be fixed” (Lilienfeld et al., 1999).  The attempt, however, 
to explain the function (and corresponding dysfunction) of humans, is one that goes back 
at least to Aristotle (Megone, 1998), and that remains an ongoing project (Berlin, 1980; 
Berry, 1986; Bhaskar, 1986; Blackford, 2006; Buller, 2005; Malik, 2000; Reynolds, 
1976; Richards, 2001; Shotter, 1975).  While it has been suggested that an emphasis on 
the human functions of reasoning capacity (Megone, 1998), or of moral sentiment 
(Schaffner, 1999), provide a useful basis for conceptualizing disorder, what counts as a 
good reason or a right moral are open to contestation.  Indeed, the social frame into which 
one is born influences the way one understands and pursues such goals as surviving and 
flourishing (Johnson, 1993).  Thus, to conceptualize and explain human nature and 
medical disorders in a comprehensive way, we have to go beyond a natural science 
perspective on the way the body and the brain work, to include also a consideration of 
human practices and values (Fulford, 2002; Thornton, 2002).57  
 
                                                 
57
 There is an interesting debate between Wakefield (Wakefield, 1999a) and Lilienfeld and Marino 
(Lilienfeld et al., 1999) on whether dyslexia, amusia, etc. can be explained by an evolutionary analysis.  I 
agree with Lilienfeld and Marion that there is no evolutionarily-based reason for viewing these conditions, 
rather than say inability to cook, as disorders.  However, I disagree with Lilienfedl and Marino, in that I 
think that classifying such conditions as disorders can be argued scientifically (and part of the reasoning 
might include an evolutionary analysis of brain functioning). 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 137
In brief, the integrative conceptual approach taken here is that while scientific 
explanations, including evolutionary explanations, may not yield an essentialist or 
algorithmic solution to defining and understanding human nature or medical disorders, 
they are nevertheless useful in informing the relevant debate on concepts about and 
explanations of these phenomena.  In a typical disorder, there may be little debate, as it is 
clear, from whichever perspective one adopts, that there is a “break-down”, which is 
impairing, and that intervention can potentially reverse the breakdown and associated 
impairment.  In the less typical case, however, explanations from natural science, social 
science, and evolutionary science may yield conflicting conclusions (a cognitive science 
study may indicate that impulsive traits are associated with impairment in decision-
making, while an evolutionary study may note that impulsive traits are associated with 
increased achievement in particular contexts), and considerations that emphasize clinical 
utility (eg, the use of a diagnosis to shape treatment decisions) may conflict with 
considerations that prioritize explanatory power (ie, the use of a diagnosis to emphasize 
etiology) (First et al., 2004; Kendell & Jablensky, 2003; Kendler, 1990; Rounsaville et 
al., 2002; Zachar et al., 2007).  As suggested in the earlier chapter on the construct of 
clinical disorder, debate about how best to classify and conceptualize a condition should 
therefore include a reasoned, and continuously updated, consideration of our shared 
cognitive-affective maps of disorder, of our knowledge of the relevant medical (including 
evolutionary) science, and of the details of the specific clinical cases at hand. 
 
The growing literature on evolutionary medicine is increasingly sophisticated, and so 
already provides a solid basis for an innovative and integrative approach to understanding 
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disorder (Cosmides et al., 1999; Mealey, 1997; Nesse, 2001).  Nesse (Nesse et al., 1994) 
notes that evolutionary explanations of pathology rely on constructs such as evolutionary 
trade-offs (different traits are adaptive in different environments), genome lag (evolved 
traits may be out of step with current environments), and historical constraints (how a 
trait has evolved may result in particular susceptibility to disease).  He emphasizes that 
many evolved defenses (eg pain) and tendencies (eg impulsivity) may allow gene 
survival, but may harm our own lives58.  In the extreme case, for example, where a gene 
variant results in early death we can certainly agree that there is a disorder and harmful 
dysfunction.  But in more atypical cases (eg, many cases of social anxiety, alcoholism), 
there may be no harmful dysfunction (ie, no design failure from an evolutionary 
perspective), but we may nevertheless reasonably agree that a disorder is present (eg, 
given the accompanying clinical distress and negative impact). 
 
Given the focus of this dissertation on cosmetic psychopharmacology, it may be useful to 
consider the quite subtle example of aging (Caplan, 1981; Nesse et al., 1994; Post & 
Binstock, 2004).  Is aging best explained as a function (design) or dysfunction (design 
failure)?  Or is it simply a condition of life (Davis, 2004; Rose, 2002)?  It turns out that a 
species that is sexual and then ages has adaptive advantages compared with one that is 
not sexual and lives longer, so that from an evolutionary perspective aging can be 
explained in functional terms.  However, in progeria, a rare condition, there is premature 
aging prior to procreation – in this prototypical instance, from an evolutionary 
                                                 
58
 Wakefield (Wakefield, 1999a) responds to these kinds of exemplars by saying that he wants to capture 
design failure rather than design/environment mismatch, for “that is how humans are designed”.  However, 
this does not seem a persuasive response - many adaptive phenomena can reasonably be judged to be 
disorders. 
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perspective, this can be understood in terms of a design failure.  Similarly, premature 
Alzheimer’s disorder, with severe cognitive impairment in one’s thirties or forties, can 
arguably be explained in terms of a design failure.   
 
However, a few centuries ago, living into one’s seventies would be considered 
remarkable, whereas nowadays conditions such as osteoarthritis, atherosclerosis, 
prostatism, as well as mild cognitive impairment, in one’s seventies are all considered 
disorders even when they begin at this relatively late stage of life (Dekkers & Rikkert, 
2007; Petersen et al., 2001).  Now these are arguably not best explained as design failures 
(given that the human body is designed to procreate long before senescence, rather than 
to have optimal functioning during senescence).  Further, the benefits of anti-aging 
interventions have often been exaggerated (Turner, 2004).  So perhaps disorders 
associated with aging are best viewed as atypical disorders.  But they would seem to be 
disorders, nonetheless.   Wakefield’s necessary and sufficient criteria, and consequent 
explanations of medical phenomena, may hold for the prototypic center (ie, of the 
disorder progeria, and its explanation as a dysfunction) – as noted, his constructs overlap 
with the common “mechanical breakdown” metaphor of disorder - but they fail at the 
boundaries of disorder.  
 
There may be a deeper problem with evolutionary psychology as a whole (perhaps 
reflecting an over-reliance on classical rule-based concepts).  On the one hand, 
evolutionary psychology performs a valuable service, in emphasizing that not only 
proximal, but also distal mechanisms must be considered in explanations (Nesse et al., 
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1994).   On the other hand, evolutionary psychologists sometimes appear to take a 
Platonic stance to the mind, hypothesizing such formal constructs as a “language 
module”, or a “cheating module”, without specifically exploring the underlying brain-
mind mechanisms that would underpin these  psychological faculties.  It is open to 
debate, however, as to whether evolution psychology should rely, as it so often does, on 
notions of algorithmically defined (Dennett, 1995) behavioural modules (Churchland, 
2002; Cosmides et al., 2003; Panksepp et al., 2000).   
 
The counter-argument (perhaps reflecting a critical perspective on mind and on contexts) 
is that during evolution there are changes in genes, and specific genes are likely to affect 
general aspects of cognitive-affective functioning, as well as gene-environment 
interactions, rather than rule-based behavioural modules.  Thus, a single nucleotide 
polymorphism in a particular gene may have multiple different effects, so that the effects 
of evolutionary change are not restricted to any bounded and non-porous psychological 
faculty, but are instead complex and multi-levelled (so there is unlikely to be “a gene” 
that explains language in humans).  Furthermore, such genetic and behavioural changes 
need to be understood within ever-changing gene-environment contexts;  a particular 
change may be bad for the particular individual at a particular time, but nevertheless be 
selected for because it is good for some individuals at some times (eg the gene that 
increase various impulsive traits including susceptibility to alcoholism (Gerard & Higley, 
2002) and perhaps infidelity).   
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The debate within evolutionary psychology about “spandrels” – by-products of evolution 
that cannot properly be considered to be functions, provides a test case for a more 
integrative approach to evolutionary explanation.  Gould famously pointed out that 
although humans developed a large brain in response to adaptive pressures, the many by-
products of large brains (eg music, religion, writing) should not properly be explained in 
terms of functions (Gould, 1991)59.  Thus evolutionary psychology cannot rely solely on 
explanations of adaptation, but also requires an understanding of so-called exaptation.  
Buss and colleagues have countered that there are criteria that can be applied to the 
assessment of explanations, whether or not these are explicitly evolutionary, and whether 
they involve an adaptation or an exaptation (Buss, Haselton, Shackleford, Bleske, & 
Wakefield, 1998).  From the integrative perspective taken here, the point is not so much 
whether there has been adaptation or exaptation, but rather whether cognitive-affective 
functions can be explained in terms of the relevant underlying structures and 
mechanisms.  Complex cognitive-affective processes such as language and infidelity may 
need to be understood less in terms of rule-based evolved modules, and more as emergent 
properties of humans with brain-minds living in societies (Panksepp et al., 2000).  
 
Put differently, at the more general level of a philosophical consideration of functions and 
evolutionary theory (Boorse, 1976b; Davies, 2003; Dennett, 1995; Fulford, 1999; 
Fulford, 2001; Hempel, 1965; Mayr, 1988; Megone, 2000; Millikan, 1984; Ruse, 1971; 
Sadler & Agich, 1995; Thornton, 2000; Wright, 1976), it can be argued that the very 
                                                 
59
 Gould criticizes a reductionistic view of evolutionary theory, which he terms “Darwinian 
fundamentalism”.  Certainly, a range of non-reductionist approaches have been put forward in evolutionary 
theory, for example, emphasizing gene-culture coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981)and niche 
construction (Olding-Smee, Laland, & Feldman, 2003). 
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concepts of “function” and “dysfunction”, and particularly human cognitive-affective 
function and dysfunction, cannot be specified in a classical way in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, but rather require more powerful explanations that address 
particular aspects of their embodiment and context.  In line with the earlier example of 
sickle cell anemia, let us say that there are brain-mind mechanisms which mean during 
exposure to a particularly well-resourced environment mood is more narrowly regulated, 
but that during exposure to a more adverse environment mood becomes more responsive 
to stressors.  Mood instability may be a brain-mind “dysfunction” only insofar as the 
organism later lives in a well-resourced environment, but it may be an adaptation in 
stressful environments where more risky strategies are beneficial.  Furthermore, when it 
comes to considering people, brain-minds have evolved to interact with complex social 
environments, so that explanations of how brain-mind phenomena and processes are 
adaptive or not, or working well or not, are particularly likely to have to move beyond a 
consideration solely of body-brain mechanisms, to consider also human practices and 
values.  The term “dysfunction” often represents an oversimplification;  in typical cases it 
usefully overlaps with our common metaphors of disorder and serves as a convenient 
explanation, but in many others cases only a detailed understanding of the relevant 
(psychobiological) structures and mechanisms, and of the interactive context in which 
they operate, is important for a full understanding (of psychopathology)60.   
 
                                                 
60
 Parallel considerations may apply to how we think of evolution in general.  Some evolutionary theorists 
have blurred the notion between fitness and goodness, seeing evolution as progressive.  Darwin himself 
rarely used the term “evolution”, instead speaking of “descent with variation”, and emphasizing that 
variations are random and not necessarily progressive (Ruse, 2003). 
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This is not, however, to say that evolutionary theory is unhelpful in contributing to 
questions about human nature in general (Millikan, 1984; Papineau, 1993) and disorder in 
particular (Cosmides et al., 1999; Mealey, 1997; Nesse, 2001).  As noted above, by 
emphasizing context, an evolutionary perspective has highlighted “mismatch” between 
current behaviour and behaviour evolved within the environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness (EEA) (Bowlby, 1980).  In our own context of the 21st century, we need to 
decide as best we can how to intervene when such a mismatch occurs.  Aging may have 
been functional in the EEA, but in the 21st century it may well be entirely reasonable to 
lower our threshold for making aging-related diagnoses and treating accordingly.  At the 
other end of the age spectrum, childhood attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder may not 
involve a design deficit (as evolution makes space for genes that code for impulsivity) - 
but in the context of modern educational requirements and available treatments, such a 
diagnosis may be considered valid.   For Wakefield alcoholism may not be a disorder 
given the absence of an underlying design deficit, but for clinicians working in the 
context of contemporary societies, it provides an extremely useful and entirely valid 
metaphor – alcoholism is not merely a sin or a crime, and it has much in common with 
more prototypic medical disorders. 
 
In summary, in order to understand fully the nature of a disorder, we need not only 
knowledge about the adaptation of particular psychobiological mechanisms over 
evolutionary time, but also a range of other information, including information about the 
relevant underlying structures and mechanisms, and the relevant context in which they 
operate.  Evolutionary theories may propose, for example, that social anxiety is 
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maladaptive (insofar as it is associated with decreased fertility) or adaptive (in that it 
promotes social awareness);  but whether or not we explain social anxiety in terms of a 
disorder (seeing social anxiety – metaphorically – as reflecting an imbalance, a 
breakdown, etc.), in fact depends on a range of other considerations (such as the distress 
and impairment associated with symptoms within a particular cultural and historical 
period).  Evolutionary theory is nevertheless useful insofar as it sheds light on how a 
range of different phenomena can be maladaptive (Cosmides et al., 1999; Mealey, 1997; 
Nesse, 2001), and provides insights into the mechanisms that underpin such phenomena.  
Furthermore as evolutionary theory progresses, and as relevant empirical data 
accumulates, this may contribute in part to changing our ideas about the mapping of a 
particular condition within the prototypic categories of disorder and about using the 
prototypic explanation of dysfunction to account for it. 
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6.  Moral Questions About Psychotropics 
 
In this chapter we address a series of questions about ethical choices.  The classical 
versus critical contrast drawn throughout this dissertation can perhaps also be applied to 
ethics.  A classical approach would take the view that decisions about ethics in general 
and bioethics61 in particular can be made on the basis of moral laws.  Thinkers from Plato 
through Kant have described the rationality of such universal and fixed rules, with more 
recent philosophers such as Rawls viewing moral theory as a kind of grammar (Rawls, 
1971).  In contrast, a critical position emphasizes that such a view is unrealizable given 
that decisions about ethics and bioethics reflect the concerns and values of the particular 
historical and geographical contexts in which they are made.  Hegel, for example, argued 
that a systems of laws loses its meaning when attempts are made to abstract it from its 
grounding in the ethical life of a particular historical community. 
 
Here a realist, naturalist, and embodied position is taken, arguing that insofar as decisions 
about ethics and bioethics are informed by universal biologically-based considerations 
there exists the potential for minimal standards of agreement about ethics and about 
values, and it is possible to debate reasonably (cognitively-affectively) in order to ensure 
that good bioethics decisions are reached62.  Thus, for example, there is near universal 
                                                 
61
 The term “bioethics” was coined by Potter (Potter, 1971).  For a history of how bioethics was given 
impetus by new technologies such as organ transplantation and mechanical ventilation see, for example, 
Rothman (Rothman, 1991) and Jonsen  (Jonsen, 2000). 
62
 The term “naturalist” requires some unpacking here.  Moore famously argued  that the attempt to define 
goodness in descriptive terms commits the “naturalistic fallacy” (Moore, 1903).  In opposition, some 
continue to propose a concept of “natural” good, that depends, for example, on facts about one’s species 
(Foot, 2003; Hursthouse, 1999).  In defending a naturalist virtue based ethics, MacIntyre traces such a 
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agreement that when physicians relieve pain this is a good thing, and it is also possible to 
argue reasonably for the importance of not relieving pain or suffering in particular 
contexts (Barris, 1990; De Botton, 2001; Johnson, 1993) or, conversely, that there has 
been under-medication of pain in certain circumstances.  The aim of the chapter is not to 
argue for this last approach in its own terms, but rather to use this framework to put 
forward a position on three important ethical questions in psychopharmacology, namely,  
1) is treatment of psychiatric disorder a good thing?, 2) is pharmacotherapy a good kind 
of intervention?, and 3) is pharmacotherapy for enhanced performance a good thing? 
 
1)  Is Treatment of Psychiatric Disorder a Good Thing?  
 
“The idea that there might be a single overarching value or conception of human 
flourishing seems highly improbable in light of the diversity of our needs, desires, and 
practices” (Johnson, 1993) 
 
“To those human beings who are of any concern to me I wish suffering, desolation, 
sickness, ill-treatment, indignities” (Nietzche, 1968) 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
position back to Aristotle, who as a biologist, attempted to give an account of the good that was both local 
and particular, and yet also cosmic and universal (MacIntyre, 1981).  A range of writers fall on the 
spectrum between a broader moral naturalism (which holds that a naturalist approach to philosophical 
inquiry in general is adequate for moral philosophy) and a narrower moral naturalism (which holds that 
there are natural moral facts and properties).  The approach developed in this dissertation is to highlight the 
complexity of facts about the human species and the way these interact with human values, consistent with 
a non-reductionistic naturalism.  
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Injari Imsingh visited his doctor after feeling stressed out at work.  He noted that there 
had been conflict there about schedule planning, and that he felt humiliated by his 
supervisor and co-workers.  He wanted a medication to help him sleep better.  This 
would be for a short time, as the Human Resources Dept has agreed to mediate the 
situation soon.  On further questioning he admitted to severe symptoms of depression.  
However, when the option of referral to a psychiatrist for treatment was discussed, he 
stated that if he took such a step, then this would mean that his colleagues had truly 
defeated him.  He indicated that he really wanted the mediation process to work in his 
favour;  he felt  that this was the key step towards feeling less humiliated.  He also 
believed that his corporation was an essentially inhumane one, in which individuals 
could not truly flourish.  There was little chance that he would ever advance beyond his 
current rather inferior position in the company. 
 
A classical perspective on the concept and explanation of disorder, may regard 
depression as a disorder because it is characterized by dysfunction.  Symptoms of this 
disorder include negatively biased cognitive distortions about the self, about the world, 
and about the future, and these are then an appropriate focus of treatment.  Cognitive 
therapy, for example, aims to change cognitive distortions, so that a person is able to 
function more realistically and more happily in the world.  Cognitive therapy relies on an 
alliance between clinician and patient, and an agreement to examine closely the data of 
the world.  When this is done in therapy, it turns out that negative thinking about the self, 
the world, and the future, can be shown to be unrealistic.  This exploration gradually 
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persuades the patient to think more clearly, and so to develop a more positive outlook on 
the self, the world, and the future. 
 
A critical perspective on the concept and explanation of symptoms may, however, 
emphasize normal variations in mood, the possibility that some events are so horrific that 
depression seems a reasonable response (Elliott, 2007)63, and the phenomenon of 
“depressive realism” (people with depressive symptoms can in fact be more realistic 
about a number of things, such as judging contingencies between their responses and 
subsequent outcomes (Haaga et al., 1995)).  Thus it has been argued that the depressive 
“has a keener eye for the truth” (Freud, 1917), and that “depressives’ thoughts are 
painfully truthful, whereas non-depressives’ thoughts are unrealistically positive” (Layne, 
1983).  Aristotle, Heidegger and others have famously argued that depression and anxiety 
can lead to philosophical insights (Graham, 1990; Radden, 2000; Simon, 1978; Svenaeus, 
2007).64  The fact of depressive realism demonstrates that cognitive therapy is not at all 
“scientific” in its methods or “objective” in its goals.  Rather therapy is a way of 
persuading patients to conform to social practices.  Societies are characterized by 
particular ideologies, and these may include overly optimistic views of the world and its 
future.  Psychotherapy, like other medical interventions, promotes the ideology of a 
particular time and place, reduces social deviance, and may well diminish creativity. 
 
                                                 
63
 Elliott gives the example of Sisyphus on Prozac;  he argues that even if Sisyphus appreciated the 
prescription, this would not mean he had a mental health problem, as given that he will be pushing a 
boulder up the mountain for eternity, alienation is an appropriate response.  Conversely he argues that some 
lives are better than other lives, regardless of the psychological well-being of the person who is living them 
(Elliott, 2007). 
64
 Indeed, Camus has claimed that suicide is the only serious philosophical question.  In a more light-
hearted vein, Bentall has built on such claims and proposed that happiness is a psychiatric disorder 
(Bentall, 1992). 
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Analogous positions on a range of psychiatric disorders and symptoms can be found in 
the bioethics literature.  A classical position, for example, argues that where medical 
conditions (eg social anxiety disorder) involve dysfunction, then they are disorders 
deserving of treatment (Sabin et al., 1994).  This position may rely on necessary and 
sufficient definitions of important terms (such as the term “person” in debate on abortion) 
(Goldman, I, 1993a; Johnson, 1993; Stich, 1993), or may attempt to strictly parse the 
descriptive and evaluative components of a particular construct (such as “disorder”) 
(Wakefield, 1992a; Williams, 1985)65.  Further, in this position, applied ethics in general, 
and bioethics in particular, is able to justify its prescriptions in terms of the rational 
application of moral theories to medical situations (Hedgecoe, 2004; Rawls, 1971).   
 
On the basis of a determination about whether a relevant condition involves say a 
dysfunction (a matter of fact), and a determination about whether say maximum benefit 
for the community is being achieved (a matter of value), for example, a principled 
decision can be made as to whether or not to treat.  In this classic view, modern bioethics 
is able to resolve questions raised by the practice of medicine, including problems raised 
by new technologies, by means of moral rules, which apply universally (Macklin, 1999), 
and sustain the important distinction between facts and values.  An influential form of 
principle-based ethics or principlism (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001),  has attempted to 
reconcile deontological rules (such as those proposed by Kant (Kant, 1785)) and duty-
                                                 
65
 Questions about the is-ought distinction date at least back to Hume (Hume, 1739).  As noted in a 
previous footnote, Moore  made an influential case against ethical naturalism (Moore, 1903).  Ayer later 
wrote, “We hold that one really never does dispute about questions of value” (Ayer, 1936), while Hare 
distinguished between descriptive and evaluative expressions (Hare, 1952).  Ironically, this denial of the 
role of reason in moral debate means that there is a thread of relativism running from Moore’s intuitionism 
to contemporary emotivism (MacIntyre, 1981). 
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based ethics with utilitarian rules (such as those proposed by Mill (Mill, 1863)) and a 
consequentialist ethics, by emphasizing “mid-level” principles that are subject to change 
depending on the relevant context.   
 
In contrast, a critical position may argue that emotional distress (eg anxiety in social 
situations, suffering after trauma) is often a normal and even valuable phenomenon 
(Tedeschi, Park, & Calhoun, 1998), that our constructs (or “idioms”) of distress are 
culture-bound (Young, 1995), and that such distress need not necessarily be medicalized 
(Kleinman, 1988).  Increased prescriptions of psychotropics for emotions in women may 
reflect an unwarranted pathologizing of femininity (Hamilton, Jensvold, & Rothblum, 
1995; Metzl, 2003).  Application of the Western construct of social anxiety disorder in 
the East, where people instead experience taijin kyofusho (worry about offending others) 
or lek (fear of disrupting one’s cultural role in a social performance), and insistence on 
Western treatment, may be inappropriate.  This position emphasizes that decisions about 
ethics and bioethics reflect the concerns and values of the particular historical and 
geographical contexts in which they are made.  Part of the meaning of particular words 
(such as “person”), is a certain moral attitude (Elliott, 1999; Johnston, 1989).  Certainly, a 
close examination of the words and metaphors used in moral reasoning (Johnson, 1993; 
Putnam, 2002) and of the nature of bioethics (Alderson, 1990; Bosk, 1992; DeVries & 
Subedi, 1998; Elliott, 1999; Evans, 2002; Fox & Swazey, 1992; Hoffmaster, 2000; 
Komesaroff, 1995; Lock & Kaufert, 1998; Shildrick & Mykitiuk, 2005; Stevens, 2000) 
seem to refute the notion of a fact-value distinction.   
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From a critical perspective, therefore, there is a need for bioethical principlism to be 
replaced by approaches such as narrative, pragmatic, and critical ethics (Chambers, 1999; 
Eldridge, 1989; Frank, 1979; Gardner, 1978; Hedgecoe, 2004; MacIntyre, 1981; McGee, 
1997; Nelson, 1997; Nussbaum, 1990; Toulmin, 2001; Zaner, 1993).  One well-known 
approach, known as care ethics, argues that rules such as the deontological emphasis on 
autonomy, or the utilitarian focus on impartiality, ignore the interpersonal dimension of 
moral life (Baier, 1985).  Given that no principle can claim primacy in a society 
characterized by diverse moral views, it instead draws on Aristotelean theory in calling 
for the cultivation of virtuous traits such as sympathy and compassion to promote ethical 
clinical behaviour, and emphasizes Hume’s argument that ethical behaviour derives from 
these kinds of sentiment (Bloch & Green, 2006). 
 
This dissertation cannot adequately cover the large philosophical literature that has 
debated these issues.  Consistent with the approach taken throughout, a position that is 
able to avoid classic concepts of categories, but at the same time not slide into the 
relativism of some critical thinkers, would be attractive (Johnson, 1993; Lovibond, 1983; 
Williams, 1985).  Similarly, a position that allowed a space for cognitive-affective 
science within ethical thinking, would be appealing (Goldman, I, 1993a; Williams, 1985).  
Various writers on the values and ethics of psychiatry have attempted to formulate a 
position that balances objectivism and subjectivism (Bloch et al., 2006; Thornton, 2000).  
However, again in keeping with the approach throughout the dissertation, rather than 
attempt to defend such a position on its own terms, we will first turn to the data, to see 
whether these can help sustain such a position.  In the relatively simple case of whether to 
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treat psychiatric disorder, the data do seem informative.  In later parts of the chapter, 
more subtle questions are addressed, and there is arguably less data available. 
 
What does the data from cognitive-affective science reveal about whether or not to treat 
depression in particular, and psychiatric disorder in general?  Our cognitive-affective 
maps allow us to reason precisely and accurately about the physical world, and the 
instruments of science (eg microscopy, telescopy) have extended our knowledge of its 
structures and mechanisms (Giere, 1988).  Indeed, our sensorimotor-affective systems 
arguably evolved in order to help us function in the physical and social world (Duchaine 
et al., 2001).  On the other hand, our cognitive-affective maps are also designed to make 
sure that we function effectively in the social world, and this may require that we are 
unrealistically optimistic in some respects (Goleman, 1996).  For example, we need to 
devote extraordinary resources to our offspring, and believe that this will reap happiness 
for us, whereas bringing up kids is in fact a risky and not necessarily productive 
endeavour. 
 
From this kind of data and theory about human brain-minds, there is no reason why we 
should have evolved to be happy with our lot; instead, people who are always striving for 
more resources may have an advantage when circumstances change and they are able to 
use their surplus stock.  A certain amount of depressive realism may be particularly 
adaptive under some circumstances – for example, when our strategies require rethinking 
(Nesse, 2000).  Nevertheless, there is also a good deal of evidence to support the idea that 
once symptoms of depression have achieved a particular level of severity, then compared 
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with healthy volunteers, patients demonstrate marked changes in their underlying 
neurocircuitry, neurochemistry, and cognitive-affective processes (Stein, 2003; Stein, 
Schatzberg, & Kupfer, 2006).  Thus, we can develop sophisticated causal classifications 
of depression, based on a nuanced understanding of the interaction of biology and culture 
(Hansen et al., 2005). 
 
Furthermore, there is a good deal of clinical data demonstrating that when patients meet 
criteria for major depression and have clinical distress, they then suffer from significant 
impairment (eg in social, occupational, and family functioning).  In addition, there is a 
good deal of clinical data showing that various psychiatric interventions, including both 
pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy, can reduce depressive symptoms, that such 
improvement is accompanied by normalization of neurocircuitry and neurochemistry, by 
changes in cognitive-affective processes, and by reduced distress and impairment.  Thus 
appropriate psychiatric treatment can help patients lead “good lives” (Reznek, 1991).  
Finally, when depression has a particular level of severity and impairment then such an 
outcome can be achieved cost-effectively (Chisholm, Sanderson, Ayuso-Mateos, & 
Saxena, 2004).   
 
Thus it seems that there is the possibility that medical decision-making, such as a 
decision to treat a case of depression, even though value-laden, can usefully be informed 
by scientific data (Haimes, 2002; Hedgecoe, 2004).  It is notable that patients who have 
to make such decisions appear to rely less on classical constructs (such as disorder), and 
more on real world impacts (Rapp, 2000).  People may choose a particular ethical rule to 
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apply based not on universal principles, but rather on the particularity of their specific 
interests and values (Alderson, 1990).  Rather than attempt to find a neutral answer to all 
similar cases, it is more reasonable to refine our bioethical reasoning by examining 
empirically how medical decision-making works, and by reflexively refining the 
constructs and methods which underpin such decision-making (Hedgecoe, 2004).  More 
broadly, although we can perhaps expect diversity rather than convergence in moral 
reasoning  (Hampshire, 1983), and certainly ongoing debate about the nature of human 
nature in general, good reasons can be found for a particular individual to make specific 
choices in life (Johnson, 1993; Williams, 1985). 
 
Are there any data to support the argument that although medical decision-making 
appears to involve both facts and values (Bolt et al., 2002; Canguilhem, 1966; Fulford et 
al., 2005; Fulford, 1989; Hare, 1983; Sadler, 1997; Sadler, 2002; Schaffner, 1999; 
Wakefield, 1992b), it can nevertheless be reasonable?  Certainly, there is growing interest 
in empirical work on the cognitive-affective science of decision-making in general and of 
medical decision-making in particular.  It is notable that such work demonstrates a range 
of important biases in human cognitive-affective processes, including biases in judging 
values (Ainslie, 2001; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 2000; Piatelli-Palmarini, 1994).  At the same time, humans are experts at 
weighing up human practices and interests; accurate evaluation of such phenomena is key 
to our success in social interactions.  And it can be argued that as our understanding of 
the mechanisms underlying medical decision-making improves, so our ability to reach 
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better decisions will also potentially be enhanced (although this proposal remains to be 
fully demonstrated). 
 
With this research on human brain-minds and their decision-making in mind, we can 
return to the case outlined above.  Although Injari’s depression may well be a 
consequence of circumstances at work, it can reasonably be considered a medical 
disorder that deserves treatment.  We may not be able to rely on an evolutionary theory of 
dysfunction (see above), or on algorithmic ethical principles, to define when depressive 
symptoms should be characterized as a disorder and treatment initiated.  Rather this is a 
clinical decision which includes a range of considerations, including our explanation of 
the relevant proximal (psychobiological) and distal (evolutionary) mechanisms, our 
understanding of the extent of suffering and impairment of the individual patient, and our 
consideration of the efficacy and cost-effectiveness  of possible intervention. 
 
It may be countered that the argument here is somewhat disingenuous in that depression 
is a more typical disorder (which is disvalued), so that any conclusions about the benefit 
of data on treatments which show a reduction in symptoms (which is valued) is 
tautological.  As suggested earlier, judgments about the typicality of disorders may reflect 
universal biologically-based considerations;   an acute infection for example, may occur 
in a previously healthy person and severely disrupt body function, and in this instance 
there is little  disagreement from place to place, and time to time, that this would 
represent a medical condition deserving of treatment.  Similarly, although the classical 
and critical approaches might differ in their views of depression, both a lay and a 
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scientific view can readily converge on the conclusion that this is a medical disorder that 
deserves treatment.  We have previously referred to other psychiatric conditions, 
however, which have more atypical features, and where the term “disorder” is therefore 
more contentious, namely social anxiety disorder and impulsivity.  Are these deserving of 
psychiatric treatment?   
 
Although we can posit that social anxiety disorder is indicative of pathological activation 
of a normal social anxiety alarm, there may well be a continuum between variation in 
normal personality traits and this condition, and in any particular individual any assertion 
about the presence of a disease process can only be inferred.  On the other hand, there is a 
growing range of data indicating that the experience of severe social anxiety in both the 
West (social anxiety disorder) and East (taijin kyofusho) is mediated by overlapping 
psychobiological mechanisms, is accompanied by significant distress and impairment, 
and responds effectively and cost-effectively to the same class of medication (Stein & 
Matsunaga, 2001).  Thus, in the realist compromise outlined in this dissertation, social 
anxiety disorder and taijin kyofusho are validly considered as related disorders, and it is 
reasonable to treat them with psychiatric interventions, albeit bearing in mind differences 
in the way social anxiety is expressed and experienced in different contexts (Stein et al., 
2001).   
 
This is not to say that we should treat all socially anxious individuals, but it is to argue 
that promotion of awareness of this diagnosis and of its treatment is reasonable.  Murray 
Stein, an expert on social anxiety disorder asks the question, “Are we needlessly 
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‘medicalising’ a normal variant of temperament, performing cosmetic 
psychopharmacology to remove blemishes of the personality?” (Stein, 1996b).  He and 
other psychiatrists working in the area answer with an emphatic no, emphasizing factors 
such as the growing understanding of the psychobiology of social anxiety disorder, the 
associated distress and impairment, and the availability of effective and cost-effective 
treatments (Campbell-Sills et al., 2005).  Wakefield and colleagues argue that most cases 
of social anxiety disorder should not be understood as disorder, but nevertheless agree 
that social anxiety can be accompanied by enormous suffering, and that those who have 
such anxiety deserve clinical attention as a matter of compassion and justice (Wakefield 
et al., 2005). 
 
What about impulsivity?  Does impulsive-aggression, for example, merely represent a 
spectrum of deviant behaviour, for which the person must take responsibility, and which 
falls under the jurisdiction of the law and the church, or should it be considered a medical 
disorder (intermittent explosive disorder, in DSM-IV-TR) that deserves treatment (Duff, 
1986; Elliott, 1996; Flew, 1973; Glover, 1970; Hart, 1968; Lucas, 1993; Tam, 1996)?66  
As we discover more about the subtle psychobiological alterations underlying impulsive 
behaviours (including those characteristic of substance use disorders and so-called 
behavioural addictions (Elster, 1999b)), learn more about the disability associated with 
these impulsivity and its psychobiological correlates, and develop more effective and 
cost-effective medical interventions that normalize this psychobiology, decrease 
                                                 
66
 Here one is reminded of Samuel Butler’s “Erewhon”, where criminals are treated as ill, and vice versa.  
This book is also one of the first to write about the possibility that machines develop consciousness. 
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impulsive behaviours, and improve impairment, then it may well become increasingly 
sensible to medicalize some of these behaviours. 
 
At the same time, optimal interventions for decreasing impulsivity do seem to include an 
emphasis on accepting personal responsibility and on the importance of social limits and 
boundaries (whether instantiated in the therapeutic milieu, or in the structures of the 
justice system).  In the case of antisocial personality disorder, even though 
psychobiological disturbances may well be present, medical interventions are also 
singularly unimpressive in efficacy.  Thus, an individualized approach again seems 
necessary;  for a particular person at a particular time psychiatric treatment may be a 
justifiable intervention to decrease impulsive-aggression (Stein, 1996a; Stein, 1994), but 
in other cases there is also a reasonable role for interventions such as legal sanction 
(Dennett, 2003; Garland, 2004; Greene & Cohen, 2005; Masters & McGuire, 1994; 
McCall Smith, 2004; Morse, 2006; Reznek, 1997)67.  Psychiatric research aims to provide 
better prognosticators of what intervention will work optimally for whom. 
 
 
2)  Is Pharmacotherapy a Good Kind of Intervention?  
 
“Now, it is to retreat before stress, and to reject one’s responsibilities to ask a drug to 
create indifference and oblivion in the face of one’s duties;  this is a fatal renunciation 
which can only end in compromises and failure.” (Pope Pius XII) 
                                                 
67
 The philosophical literature on concepts such as free will, determinism, autonomy, and responsibility is 
too large to review here.  In general, the approach here is consistent with a compatabilist view, which 
emphasises degrees of freedom.  Similarly, an approach that balances different accounts and consequences, 
may be relevant for thinking about weakness of will, or akrasia (Davidson, 1984; Williams, 1985). 
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“People who fall back on rules and moral laws are people who are either afraid of the 
indeterminancy and contingency of life, or morally obtuse, or both” (Johnson, 1993) 
 
Injari’s mediation went poorly for him.  He was told that he must accept the work 
scheduling as developed by his supervisor and agreed to by his colleagues.  Given the 
increased severity of his depressive symptoms, he agreed to take an antidepressant.  
Within a few weeks he felt significantly better.  A few months later he reported that not 
only had his earlier depression resolved, but that he was thinking about his work in an 
entirely different way.  He felt that his corporation was really rather a good one, and that 
Human Resources had gone out of their way to establish programs to help individuals to 
grow and develop.  He felt optimistic about his future in the company, and believed that 
with some luck he could progress up the corporate ladder. 
 
If judgments about the disvalue of disorders, and about the benefit of treatment, reflect 
universal biologically-based considerations, then as noted in the previous section, there is 
likely to be a good deal of consensus about the value of such intervention, particularly 
when the disorders, and their treatments, are more typical in nature.  In the last section, 
we briefly considered some atypical disorders.  In this section and the next, we focus on 
different kinds of treatments.   Our first question is whether pharmacotherapy can be 
justified, given the availability of other kinds of interventions, which may be viewed as 
more conventional ways of acting to alter disturbed behaviour.  Thus, if a psychiatric 
disorder can be treated with two equally effective interventions, one a pharmacotherapy 
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and another a psychotherapy, which one should be used as a first-line strategy?  And 
what if a psychiatric disorder can be overcome with entirely non-medical interventions, 
such as more exercise, or prayer;  should these not be the approach of choice? 
 
In the classical position different therapeutic options can be evaluated with the data at 
hand;  this might include direct comparisons of two different modalities of intervention 
on symptom reduction, or examination of other kinds of data such as the economic costs 
of treatment.  Evidence-based medicine provides a range of scientific methodologies for 
undertaking such comparisons, and it turns out there is good data for efficacy and cost-
efficacy for pharmacotherapy, for cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy, and even for 
exercise for a number of psychiatric disorders.  In these cases, then, the choice of 
treatment modality becomes a matter of physician capability and of patient preference.  
There is no reason not to be optimistic about future progress in biotechnology (Buchanan, 
Brock, Daniels, & Wikler, 2000; Resnik, Steinkraus, & Langer, 1999; Stock, 2002). 
 
The critical position highlights, however, that different kinds of intervention have 
different kinds of meaning, and therefore different consequences, for different people.  
Some might view medication as merely a quick and superficial fix for behavioural 
problems, and would prefer the personal growth offered by an insight-oriented 
psychotherapy.  After all, some have defined psychoanalysis as “the search for truth 
about oneself”.  Others might, however, regard cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy, 
which aims at decreasing symptoms rather than at self-discovery as the most appropriate 
kind of psychotherapy.  Indeed, some argue that a contemporary “culture of therapy” has 
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led to an abdication of moral responsibility in favour of self-obsession and self-
absorption (Rosen, 1977; Sommers & Satel, 2004).  For still others, non-medical 
interventions are invariably a preferred choice.  To focus only on the “thin” technological 
endpoints of symptom recovery misses the “thick” process whereby the method used to 
achieve change has a range of other consequences, and the particular values of 
psychotherapy (Cole-Turner, 1998; Goldberg, 2007; Holmes & Lindley, 1989; Rieff, 
1979). 
 
The meaning of any particular intervention in turn reflects the relevant historical and 
cultural context.  In the 21st century, where science and technology have such powerful 
positive connotations, many of us have a growing trust in and reliance on medical 
technologies and medication, including psychotropics.  Modern medication has major 
advantages, not only directly because of its efficacy and cost-effectiveness, but also 
indirectly by emphasizing the biological component of psychiatric disorders, encouraging 
suffers to talk openly about their illness, and facilitating a humane medical approach to 
those with brain-mind disorders (whose deviant behaviour may otherwise be classified as 
illegal or as evil) (Reznek, 1991; Stein & Gureje, 2004).   
 
Increasingly consumer advocacy groups with an interest in psychiatric disorders such as 
depression argue that such conditions are “brain disorders”, and lobby for increased 
availability of psychiatric medications.  They argue for the importance of increased 
mental health literacy amongst the population at large (Jorm, 2000), hoping that greater 
knowledge of the neurobiology of psychiatric disorders will help lower the multiple 
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individual and social barriers to seeking help (Seedat, Stein, Berk, & Wilson, 2002), and 
lead to improved diagnosis and earlier treatment.  This view has the potential advantage 
of emphasizing that psychiatric disorders are medical disorders, and of therefore 
increasing resources for these conditions as well as decreasing the enormous 
stigmatization that is associated with suffering from a psychiatric disorder and with 
receiving treatment with psychiatric agents.   
 
On the other hand, there have also been warnings from some philosophers about the 
dangers of technology (Heidegger, 1999), and our era is characterized by a strong view 
that medical technologies have a dehumanizing element and do not provide us with a 
sufficient sense of meaning (Bullard, 2002; Dworkin, 2006; Fukuyama, 2002; 
Greenhalgh et al., 1998; Kriel, 2000; Schwartz et al., 1986).  This view is associated with 
a wariness about relying on medication in general, and psychotropics in particular.  The 
pharmacological management of our mental lives threatens to confer on us “a fraudulent 
happiness” and to be character-deforming (The President's Council on Bioethics, 2003).  
Medicalization does not necessarily lead to a lack of stigma (eg, people with HIV are 
often found blameworthy).  Disease mongering has important disadvantages including 
iatrogenic harm (from adverse events associated with medication) and wasting of 
resources (Moynihan et al., 2006), while over-medicalization leads to indirect problems 
such as the neglect of the socio-political factors in explaining and combating ill health 
and prioritizing the wrong kinds of health care research (Callahan, 2003).   
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The notion that psychiatric medication should be used as sparingly as possible has been 
termed “pharmacological Calvinism” (Klerman, 1972).  To extend the quotation above of 
one (Catholic) authority, “Life every day brings burdens and problems which must be 
confronted with lucidity, and resolved with Christian faith and wisdom.  Now, it is to 
retreat before stress, and to reject one’s responsibilities to ask a drug to create 
indifference and oblivion in the face of one’s duties;  this is a fatal renunciation which 
can only end in compromises and failure.  An anxiety must take of itself, mobilizing its 
strength to draw up plans and bring realistic behaviour to a successful conclusion, 
whereby the Christian derives something from faith, hope, and charity” (Thullier, 1999).  
Such a view has the potential advantage of helping to prevent inappropriate overoptimism 
about psychotropics (for example, the introduction of barbiturates was accompanied by 
publicity about “happy pills” and “aspirin for the soul” despite their significant adverse 
events (Smith, 1991)). 
 
Following the approach taken throughout this dissertation, an integrative perspective 
would be wary of any attempt to find a universal rule that judged some therapeutic 
modality better than others, or that rejected the possibility of any reasonable decision 
about the relative value of different modalities.  A key point is that for any particular 
individual, a great deal of conceptual and empirical work may be required to determine 
what the best intervention is, at any particular point in time.  Further, in some cases, the 
best psychiatric intervention may in fact be no psychiatric treatment (Frances & Clarkin, 
1981).  During the course of psychiatric evaluation and intervention, the clinician ought 
to make every effort to understand the patient, from the perspective of both 
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(psychobiological) mechanisms and (personal) meanings, to consider carefully whether 
pharmacotherapy and/or psychotherapy is the best choice, and then to evaluate 
empirically the effects of such intervention.  Whether or not medication is used in an 
authentic way depends not simply on the medication itself, but on the context in which it 
is administered.  
 
Do the data from cognitive-affective science support such a stance?  Cognitive-affective 
science is always interested in the relevant underlying mechanisms.  Looking at the 
neuronal circuitry which mediates psychopathology, as described in the previous chapter, 
it seems clear that both particular medications and specific psychotherapies can alter 
neurocircuitry and effectively reduce psychiatric symptoms (Baxter et al., 1992; Furmark 
et al., 2002; Paquetta et al., 2003; Roffman et al., 2005; Straube et al., 2006).  It turns out 
that exercise and prayer also have powerful brain-mind effects.  However, brain imaging 
data also shows different predictors of response to different modalities (for example, in 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, decreased frontal activity is a positive predictor of 
response to medication, but a negative predictor of response to psychotherapy) (Brody et 
al., 1998).  In addition, different treatment modalities are experienced in entirely different 
ways by different people, and there is a growing understanding of the relevant 
mechanisms (as alluded to in the earlier discussion of the placebo response). 
 
Indeed, in psychiatric practice, a range of different modalities are used, not so much 
because such a strategy is evidence-based (ie based on data from studies comparing 
different modalities), but rather because each modality has distinct advantages and 
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disadvantages for particular individuals.  As noted earlier, it is also often a useful clinical 
strategy to not only investigate symptoms and their underpinnings (the disease), but to 
also explore the person’s understanding of their experience (the illness) (Kleinman, 1988; 
Stein, 1993).  A decision can then be negotiated between clinician and patient that takes 
into account not only the scientific data on treatment, but also the meaning of particular 
interventions.  Thus, for a particular person, in a particular context, pharmacotherapy (or 
psychotherapy, or a decision not to employ psychiatric treatment) may be an optimal 
psychiatric intervention68. 
 
Returning to the case of Injari, while psychotherapy might well have been useful in 
addressing his conflicts at work, a model focused on medication turned out to be 
acceptable and effective.   More generally, in clinical practice, it can be argued that it is 
paramount to understand each individual that presents for treatment, and to try choose the 
best intervention for a particular person at a particular time.  This position is one that 
goes beyond the views that medical decision-making involves merely a consideration of 
the observable data of the universe in general and of the world of clinical trials in 
particular (the classical position), or that medical decision-making is merely reflective of 
a particular time and place and therefore entirely subjective or relativistic (the critical 
position).  In particular circumstances, either pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy can be 
an “authentic” choice (Elliott, 2003) that is in the best interests of the patient.   
 
                                                 
68
 Notably, there is a growing empirical literature investigating the predictors of different explanatory 
models of disorder and attitudes towards pharmacotherapy (Horne et al., 2004), the effects of such models 
and attitudes on outcomes (Garfield, Smith, & Francis, 2003; Lam, Salkovskis, & Warwick, 2005), and the 
impact of new psychotropics on such models and attitudes (Metzl & Angel, 2004). 
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What about cases where psychological mechanisms appear paramount?  Certainly, in 
cases where exposure to psychological trauma has led to posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), clinical tradition has emphasized the value of psychotherapeutic intervention.  
There is a literature which emphasizes that suffering after severe psychological trauma is 
better understood as a meaningful response to an abnormal event than as a disorder, and 
which notes that a meaningful psychosocial response can lead to healing and even to 
post-traumatic psychological growth (Tedeschi et al., 1998).  Nevertheless, a more recent 
literature emphasizes that PTSD, like other psychiatric disorders, involves a range of 
vulnerability factors, and is characterized by psychobiological disruption (Rauch et al., 
1998; Yehuda et al., 1995).  There is a growing literature which indicates that both 
pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy can be useful in people with PTSD.   
 
Counter-intuitively, in the immediate aftermath of exposure to psychological trauma,  
debriefing is ineffective (Rose, Bisson, Churchill, & Wessely, 2002), while 
pharmacotherapy may help prevent PTSD (Pitman, Sanders, Zusman, & et al, 2002).  
Although additional empirical work is clearly needed in this area (Glannon, 2006b; 
Henry, Fishman, & Younger, 2007), the ethics of erasing painful memories have already 
been questioned (The President's Council on Bioethics, 2003).  Certainly, there are good 
reasons for emphasizing that after exposure to trauma, we should emphasize that 
psychiatric symptoms are typically transient, and encourage resilience and bravery (Stein, 
Seedat, Iversen, & Wessely, 2007).  At the same time, the general argument put forward 
here, emphasizing the potential value of pharmacotherapy in certain individuals (for 
example, those who are at particularly high-risk for developing  PTSD) may well apply. 
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Importantly, however, in the practice of good psychiatry, it is false to contrast a scientific 
pharmacotherapy with non-scientific psychotherapy.  Good pharmacotherapy requires a 
sensitive understanding of the other person (and therefore may evoke a placebo 
response).  Good psychotherapy is based on a scientific knowledge of the empirical 
database of psychotherapy studies, and of explanations about how particular cognitive-
affective schemas act to disrupt personal relationships, including the doctor-patient 
relationship (which may therefore evoke a nocebo response).  There is no universal rule 
about pharmacotherapy that can decide between the black and white choices of utopian 
optimism and dystopian Calvinism, between epicurean pill-popping and stoic denial;  
rather each case must be judged on its merits, which may involve many subtle shades of 
grey. 
 
As Peter Kramer (Kramer, 1997) writes, “Pharmacotherapy, when looked at closely, will 
appear to be as arbitrary – as much an art, not least in the derogatory sense of being 
impressionistic where ideally it should be objective – as psychotherapy.  Like any other 
serious assessment of human emotional life, pharmacotherapy rests on fallible attempts at 
intimate understanding of another person”69.  Phrased in a more positive way, both 
pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy (Engelhardt, 1973) involve a doctor-patient 
relationship in which there is an attempt to understand the patient, not solely as an object 
of technical manipulation, but also as a person, and to determine what is best for him or 
her.  It is no accident, then, that considerations not only about the role of reason, but also 
                                                 
69
 Johnson provides an extensive discussion of how moral reasoning is in many ways aesthetic in nature 
(Johnson, 1993). 
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about the importance of empathy, lie at heart of so much thinking on both psychiatric 
care (Stein, 2005), and moral philosophy (Blum, 1980; Flanagan, 1991; Goldman, I, 
1993a; Hare, 1963; Hume, 1739; Rawls, 1971; Schopenhauer, 1965; Smith, 2002). 
 
3)  Is  Pharmacotherapy for Enhanced Performance a Good Thing? 
 
“And if ever, by some unlucky chance, anything unpleasant should happen, why, there’s 
always soma to give a holiday from the facts.  And there’s always soma to calm your 
anger, to reconcile you to your enemies, to make you patient and long-suffering.  In the 
past you could only accomplish these things by making a great effort and after years of 
moral training.  Now, you swallow two or three half-gramme tables, and there you are.  
Anybody can be virtuous now” (Huxley, 1932).  
 
“Most people in Pala take the moksha medicine only a few times a year, and its effects 
are compared to those of meditation – a practice which has an important place in 
everyday Palanese life … Both meditation and moksha-medicine improve social 
intelligence, self-knowledge, and self-understanding  …  moksha-medicine helps one by 
‘getting to know oneself to the point where one won’t be compelled by one’s unconscious 
to do all the ugly, absurd, self-stultifying things that one so often finds oneself 
doing’”(Huxley, 1962). 
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  A) Jinverness Jidlewood presented to his psychiatrist with a history of having been 
abused as a child, and as having ongoing significant difficulties in interpersonal 
relationships.  His relationship with therapists had similarly been characterized 
by a great deal of conflict;  he often felt abused by therapists, and indeed in one 
case the psychotherapy did sound inappropriately harsh.  Multiple trials of 
medications had failed to improve his low self-esteem and distrust of others.  
However, Jinverness had recently read Peter Kramer’s book, and had reached 
the conclusion that Prozac was different, this was an ideal medication that would, 
he was certain, save his life. 
 B) Kaley Kawalsky had been in insight-oriented psychotherapy for several years, 
and felt that she had gained a great deal.  On the other hand, she suffered from a 
continuous sense of anhedonia.  Although she herself did not meet the official 
criteria for a diagnosis of depression, several members of her family had suffered 
from this condition, and had responded well to fluoxetine.  After reading a book 
about advances in the neurobiology of depression Kalley decided that it was 
worth a trial of this medication.  She discussed it with her therapist, and 
concluded that even if it failed, at least she would have tried all the options at her 
disposal. 
 
In his volume, “Listening to Prozac”, Kramer described the effects of serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors in a series of patients who were in psychotherapy with him (Kramer, 1997).  
He noted that not only did symptoms of major depression improve, but that in some cases 
patients also experienced a fundamental change in the way they felt about life, viewed the 
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world, and interacted with people.  He therefore put forward the concept of “cosmetic 
psychopharmacology”;  the potential use of psychotropics by people to improve 
relatively minor mood problems or to enhance temperament, analogous to the use of 
cosmetic surgery to enhance physical form.  The value of enhancement therapies has 
been debated at length in the areas of genetic engineering and reproductive 
technologies70.  It has also increasingly occupied authors interested in cosmetic surgery, 
endocrinology, sports medicine, and psychiatry71.  An ongoing debate about the value of 
biotechnology and technology in general takes an often analogous form (Lightman, 
Sarewitz, & Desser, 2003; McKibben, 2003; Reiser, 1978; Rifkin, 1998; Shrader-
Frechette & Westra, 1997; Stivers, 2004). 
 
A classical view of medicine has tended to focus on disease rather than on physical or 
mental well-being.  One reason for this may be the difficulty in finding consensus on 
what might constitute a decrease in well-being and in reliably measuring subtle forms of 
decreased well-being.  There are, however, also ethical arguments for making a 
distinction between doctoring (treating dysfunction) and schmoctering (focusing on 
                                                 
70
 A range of authors have contributed to this literature (Anderson, 1989; Bayertz, 1994; Bostrom, 2007; 
Buchanan et al., 2000; Budinger & Budinger, 2006; Daniels, 1994; Davis, 2001; Deane-Drummond & 
Scott, 2006; Fletcher, 1974; Fox, 2007; Fukuyama, 2002; Garreau, 2005; Gehring, V, 2004; Glover, 1984; 
Habermas, 2003; Harris, 1992; Harris, 2007; Hattingh, 1992; Jonas, 1974; Jones, 2005; Kitcher, 1996; 
Kurzweil, 2005; McGee, 1997; Mehlman, 2003; Murray, 2007; Naam, 2005; Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, 2002; O'Donovan, 1984; O'Neill, 1985; Raymond, 1993; Reiss & Straughan, 1996; Resnik et al., 
1999; Resnik & Vorhaus, 2006; Rifken, 1983; Robertson, 1994; Sandel, 2007; Silver, 1998; Stock, 2002; 
Stock & Campbell, 2000; Wailoo & Pemberton, 2006; Walters et al., 1997) 
71
 A range of authors have contributed to this literature (Allen et al., 1990; Bolt & Mul, 2001; Brown, 1984; 
Caplan, 2003; Caplan & Elliott, 2004; Charlton, 2003; Chatterjee, 2006; Davis, 1995a; de Beaufort, Bolt, 
Hilhorst, & Wijsbek, 2000; DeGrazia, 2005; Diller, 1996; Elliott, 2003; Elliott & Chambers, 2004; 
Engelhardt, 1990; Ewing & Rosenbaum, 1994; Farah et al., 2004; Farah & Wolpe, 2004; Fox Keller, 1995; 
Fuchs, 2006; Glannon, 2006a; Gordijn, 2006; Hall, 2003; Hawthorne, 2007; Helmchen, 2005; Jacobson, 
2000; Juengst, 2002; Kamm, 2005; Lock, 1993; Miah, 2004; Moreno, 2006a; Murray, Gaylin, & Macklin, 
1984; Parens, 1998a; Parens, 1998b; Parens, 2006; Pellegrino, 2004; Perring, 1997b; Rees & Rose, 2004; 
Restak, 2003; Rose, 2002; Rothman & Rothman, 2003; Schwartz, 1991; Seaman, 2003; Tånnsjö & 
Tamburrini, 2000; Weisberger, 1995; Whitehouse & et al, 1997; Wijsbek, 2000; Wolpe, 2002).   
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enhancement) and avoiding the latter (Parens, 1998b).  Some authors (Daniels, 1994; 
Sabin et al., 1994) argue on the basis of the principles of distributive justice that society 
need only provide resources for the former72.  Others (bioconservatives73) argue that 
when medicine focuses on enhancement, it risks upsetting the natural order of things 
(Kass, 1985; Kass, 1995; The President's Council on Bioethics, 2003).  In the United 
States, the President’s Council on Bioethics has argued that “[T]he naturalness of means 
matters.  It lies not in the fact that the assisting drugs or devices are artefacts, but in the 
danger of violating or deforming the nature of human agency …  biotechnology 
interventions act directly on the human body and mind to bring about their effects on a 
passive subject (The President's Council on Bioethics, 2003).  
 
From a critical perspective, enhancement technologies, ranging from cosmetic surgery to 
cosmetic psychopharmacology, reinforce particular social constructions and values.  The 
extension of medicine to include enhancement technologies is consistent with its role in 
decreasing social deviance, and is problematic insofar as it focuses on pathology and 
ignores resilience, overemphasizes technology and dehumanizes people, and ignores our 
overall physical, psychological, and spiritual well-being.  Some psychotherapies may be 
useful in fostering self-knowledge and even self-trancendence (Cloninger, 2004), and 
                                                 
72
 Although one set of objections against enhancement has emphasized their costs (whether in terms of side 
effects or in terms of costs of equal access), these apply to both enhancements and treatments, and so are 
not a focus of the conceptual debate here.  Instead the focus here is mainly on the values associated with 
using enhancements (eg, concerns about undermining natural order and eroding personal responsibility, or 
enforcing dubious norms and engendering psychological inauthenticity).  Nevertheless, in a world where 
billions have little access to health care, but where some spend billions on baldness remedies, the costs of 
treatments-enhancements deserve to be a crucial consideration in our moral reasoning about their use 
(Mwase, 2005).   
73
 I first came across this term in Jones (Jones, 2006).  There is a long history in Catholic thought of 
determining the “proper” functions of biological processes or organs of the body;  for example, an 
emphasis on the procreative function of sexual discourse is used to argue against the use of contraceptives 
(Blackford, 2006). 
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some psychotropics (eg substances) may be of interest insofar as they allow an 
interrogation and deconstruction of “reality”.  However, just as cosmetic surgery 
reinforces particular social values (for example, equating women’s looks with their 
value), so cosmetic psychopharmacology acts primarily as a conservative force, 
promoting inauthenticity and interfering with self-understanding (Crossley, 2003; Elliott, 
2003; Murray, 2007; Rose, 1998a; Rose, 2007).  As Murray (Murray, 2007), for example, 
writes “Medicine is now the problem of the self; and medicine, we are told is the 
necessary solution to the problem - a problem that this medical discourse has in fact 
secretly produced and systematically obscured  …the modern self remains constrained by 
a medical morality:  I am morally remiss, my life is a life unworthy of living if I fail to 
submit to medical examinations, to doctors’ and psychiatrists’ recommendations”.   
 
Williams (Williams, 1985) compares hyper-traditional societies, where there has been no 
exposure to contrasting views, with our modern world, where there is increasing exposure 
to a range of opinions.  In a hyper-traditional society, there may be little reflexive thought 
on where the boundaries of treatment should lie, the natural order of things is obvious.  
But since the dawn of the modern world, the lines between doctoring and schmoctoring 
have been open to debate, and ever shifting.  Following the approach of this dissertation, 
and of the previous section, an integrative perspective would be wary of any attempt to 
find a universal rule that differentiated between treatment and enhancement, or 
conversely, that rejected any possibility of a reasonable decision about where this line 
should be drawn.  Again, the argument can be made that for any particular individual, 
conceptual and empirical work can help determine what the best intervention is, at any 
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particular point in time.  Still, although advances in biotechnology may be useful for a 
specific individual, the practices that they bring into play may also come with important 
costs.   
 
As noted briefly in the introduction, there is a tension in Western society between values 
of self-improvement and self-creation, which would encourage people to use novel 
technologies including medical enhancement, and values around tradition and nature and 
about true self-discovery which argue that such changes are not authentic (Elliott, 2003; 
Parens, 1998b).  In Huxley’s “Island” the moksha-medicine suggests the possibility of 
using medication to enhance authenticity, but in his “Brave New World” soma serves to 
illustrate how psychopharmacological enhancement can be dehumanizing (Schermer, 
2007).  Given the emphasis that we place on effort in assigning responsibility for 
achievement, many view enhancement as representing diminished agency on the part of 
the person whose achievement is enhanced.  Sandel, a member of the President’s 
Council, counter-argues however that both enhancement technologies, and also 
particularly high pressure kinds of parenting (or “hyperparenting”), represent not so much 
a loss of agency, but rather hyperagency – an aspiration to remake nature, including 
human nature (Sandel, 2004) .  Mastery over nature, and self-improvement, have obvious 
benefits.  But there is also the risk that viewing our talents solely as achievements for 
which we are responsible, leads to hubris about ourselves (we are self-made and self-
sufficient rather than merely fortunate), and a lack of solidarity with others less fortunate 
(who are deserving of their fate rather than merely unfortunate) (Sandel, 2004).  
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What do the data from cognitive-affective science say?  Earlier we used cognitive-
affective data to argue that although the boundaries between disorder and normality are 
porous, our theory and value-based decisions about where to draw these lines can be 
reasonable ones.  We also pointed out that although there were porous boundaries 
between psychotropics, nutrients, and substances, reasonable demarcations could be 
drawn.  Similarly, if data emerge to show that particular interventions once considered 
“enhancements” are better understood as “treatments”, these may appropriately move 
away from the domain of “schmoctering” and into that of “doctoring”.  Conversely, 
based on considered debate, we ought to be able to conclude that various medical 
interventions to help “normalize” people (for example, providing psychotherapy to turn 
gay people straight) should be scrapped.  As Parens writes, “As one side emphasises our 
obligation to remember that life is a gift and that we need to learn to let things be, the 
other emphasizes our obligation to transform that gift and to exhibit our creativity” 
(Parens, 2005). 
 
Johnson has argued persuasively that moral reasoning is a special case of general 
(cognitive-affective) reasoning, and therefore must rely not so much on algorithmic rules, 
as on the use of embodied metaphors (Johnson, 1993).  He notes that a moral tradition 
dating back to Plato, and including Descartes74, Kant and Rawls, makes a division 
between our bodies with their needs and passions, and a realm of freedom and reasons.  
However, moral rules do not exist as abstract entities, instead moral reasoning is 
                                                 
74
 Throughout the dissertation, Descartes has been criticized.  This is somewhat unfair;  it has been argued 
that his view of embodiment did more to permit the achievements of modern medicine than could any 
particular scientific theory, as it opened up the very possibility of a scientific medicine.  Furthermore, he 
noted that feelings such as pain demonstrate that the mind is closely united with the body (Leder, 1984). 
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embodied in our brain-minds and in our social practices.  It is precisely when our 
concepts of what is natural are challenged, for example, by new technologies, that the 
question of which metaphor to apply becomes particularly crucial.75  Thus, in the case of 
cosmetic psychopharmacology (and other new technologies), we are left with the 
question of whether the MEDICAL metaphor of self-treatment (typically applied when 
some kind of unnatural breakdown occurs) or the MORAL metaphor of self-discovery 
(typically applied to everyday or apparently natural life), or a combination of the two, is 
more appropriate76.  Life often presents us with conflicting moral solutions that cannot be 
hierarchically ordered by any universal principle .  Those using psychotropics may find 
themselves using different metaphors at different times (Litton, 2005; Singh, 2005).  
Indeed, in medical practice in general, and in cosmetic psychopharmacology in particular, 
the right balance between over-use and under-use of medical metaphors, remains a matter 
of judgment.   
 
Routine vaccination and fluoride supplementation are paradigmatic of health care 
interventions that are undertaken in healthy children to strengthen them (rather than to 
treat a disorder), and that are now correctly viewed as good doctoring.  Similarly, folic 
acid is added to food to prevent neural tube defects in newborns, and vitamin 
supplementation is recommended in healthy adults (Willett & Stampfer, 2001).  Although 
the benefits of such practices have on balance been enormous, there have been significant 
costs for particular individuals (for example, those who have serious adverse reactions to 
                                                 
75
 Earlier, we noted that drugs can sometimes transform self-understanding.  Johnson, following Dewey and 
Merleau-Ponty, notes that moral deliberation is also an activity of critical self-reflection and self-formation 
(Johnson, 1993). 
76
 In this context it is interesting to note the debate over whether bioethics should be a discipline of 
medicine or of philosophy. 
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vaccination). As interventions for high cholesterol and high blood pressure have been 
introduced, and become cheaper, so our cut-points for deciding who to treat have become 
less and less conservative.  In the past it has been argued that antidepressants are only 
useful in those with major depression, but there is now evidence that minor disorders are 
accompanied by significant disability (Kessler et al., 2003) and also respond to these 
agents (Judd et al., 2004).  The risk-benefit of such interventions can be calculated using 
statistical measures such as numbers needed to treat and numbers needed to harm. 
 
Although the analysis here has focus on disorder, analogous considerations would argue 
that no essentialist definition of health is possible, and its boundaries must be decided as 
reasonably as possible.  The construct of “well-being” is often a component of our 
cognitive-affective maps for decision-making and moral judgments (Lakoff et al., 1999), 
and may be more relevant to considering “enhancements” rather than “treatments”.  
Given that humans do have some design flaws, and given advances in pharmaceuticals 
and psychotropics, it is not unlikely that more and more of these agents will be 
appropriately prescribed to more and more people for the purposes of well-being 
(Charlton, 2003; Chatterjee, 2006; Hall, 2003).  It is not at all clear that there is any a 
priori ethical reason for rejecting a shift from a hyper-traditional view of doctoring, and 
moving to one that allows the employment of biotechnological advances to improve well-
being (Caplan, 2003).  Arguments that such advances threaten the natural order, for 
example, may simply reflect culture-specific views about what sort of conditions are 
needed for a good life (Blackford, 2006)77.  Indeed, political philosophers may disagree 
                                                 
77
 Hume (Hume, 1739) emphasized that concepts of virtue could not be based on the “natural”.  Mill 
elaborated such distinctions further (Mill, 1998).  Wittgenstein noted, “If you believe that our concepts are 
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on whether a particular heritable disposition is a “natural primary good” (ie is valued 
across a range of diverse lives)78 (Buchanan et al., 2000; Fox, 2007), and on the extent to 
which enhancement technologies should be regulated by the state (Resnik et al., 1999; 
Stock, 2002).  Nevertheless, even in the case of genetic engineering, many have defended 
a place for enhancement technologies in a society that allows its members to pursue well-
being (Agar, 2004; Nozick, 1977; Rawls, 1971).79 
 
On the other hand, there may be important costs associated with this kind of extension of 
doctoring. Given how well humans have been designed by evolution, the difficulties 
facing innovative science (Nightingale & Martin, 2004), and the high placebo response in 
those who suffer only mild impairment, it is hard to generate data showing that 
interventions to improve physical or psychological well-being are in fact effective and 
cost-effective.  A growing empirical literature on happiness and well-being (Haidt, 2006) 
supports the view that gaining achievement at the cost of social connectedness is 
ultimately experienced as disadvantageous.  Furthermore, raising expectations about the 
existence and value of enhancement technologies may be one of the reasons for the so-
called “paradox of health” in contemporary societies; where populations that are in fact 
well, but also well-informed about pathology, complain more about disorder than unwell 
                                                                                                                                                 
the right ones, the ones suited to intelligent human beings … then imagine certain general facts of nature 
different from the way they are, and concept structures different from our own will appear natural to you” 
(Wittgenstein, 1980).  More recent authors have further argued that our ideas about what is natural reflect 
culture-specific views about the basic background conditions to human choice (Holland, 2003; Norman, 
1996) (explaining why such ideas are ordinarily viewed using the MORAL metaphor).  However, we do 
not have to assume that apparently natural ways of doing things are incapable of improvement (Singer, 
1993), and in a pluralistic society with changing background conditions (due to changing technology) what 
counts as an improvement may differ from individual to individual (Blackford, 2006). 
78
 This idea draws on Rawls’s concept of social primary goods (Rawls, 1971). 
79
 The case of vaccination demonstrates how some prophylactic and promotive technologies may come to 
be seen as the responsibility of the state, albeit a contested responsibility (Bayer & Colgrove, 2002), where 
there is disagreement about the appropriateness of a MEDICAL versus MORAL approach. 
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but uninformed groups (Barsky, 2005).  Thus, the employment of biotechnological 
advances to improve well-being may at times be bad doctoring.   
 
Earlier on we discussed the case of Abigail;  she initially did not think of herself as 
having a disorder, but then after treatment came to a different conclusion.  Conversely, 
however, there may well be cases where people inappropriately perceive themselves as 
requiring enhancement80.  In a competitive society, for example, there may be an 
exaggeration of the extent to which cosmetic surgery or medication can give people an 
advantage.  The pharmaceutical, alternative, and indigenous medicines industries and the 
media may play a particularly important role in encouraging the use of “lifestyle” 
surgeries and medications.  Women and minorities may be particularly important targets 
(Davis, 1995a; Russell, Wilson, & Hall, 1992).  While it may be too far a reach to argue 
that advertisements about cosmetic surgery force women to undergo surgery, it certainly 
seems reasonable to argue that more varied ideals of beauty should be offered by society, 
that more rigorous evaluation of the motives of those wanting cosmetic surgery should be 
done, that more information should be given about the pros and cons of surgery, and that 
more knowledge about alternative approaches should be made available (Bolt et al., 
2002). 
 
Neither evolutionary theory, nor blanket ethical principles, provide sufficient guidance 
for deciding on whether or not to medically intervene.  A good example of this is the 
                                                 
80
 The term “critical interests” has been used to describe interests where satisfaction of interests would 
make a person’s life genuinely better, and where a person would be genuinely mistaken if they did not 
recognize these interests (Dworkin, 1993; Nelson, 1995). 
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Dutch experiment with cosmetic surgery, which attempted to provide clinicians with 
rules such as “when a women looks 10 years beyond her age, surgery is permissible”, and 
failed (Parens, 1998b).  Suffering is a particularly important consideration in such 
decisions (Bolt et al., 2002), but even here there are complexities, for example in 
determining the extent and appropriateness of suffering (and certainly not everyone who 
is distressed by imagined ugliness should receive cosmetic surgery (Phillips, McElroy, 
Keck, & et al, 1993)).  In typical cases there is little debate;  we can readily agree that 
plastic surgery to restore a normal appearance to a child who has suffered a severe facial 
burn is good doctoring, that using plastic surgery for an abused woman who believes that 
a changed appearance will stop her husband physically abusing her is bad doctoring, and 
that plastic surgery for a person who would like to look more like a favoured celebrity is 
schmoctering.  In more atypical medical cases, however, an individualized clinical 
decision is required.   
 
Similar considerations apply to the use of psychotropics.  There is general agreement that 
prescribing psychotropics for depression is useful (see earlier section), that providing 
psychotropics to an abused woman in order to take away the pain in her current abusive 
relationship without supporting attempts to change or discontinue the relationship is bad 
doctoring (see the case of Jinverness above, where there may be over-optimism about the 
value of medication), and that using steroids with terrible side effects to enhance athletic 
performance is bad schmoctoring.  On the other hand, in some cases it would seem good 
judgment to try an “enhancement” in the hope that it would in fact serve as a useful 
“treatment” (eg, as in the case of Kaley above, a person with a strong family history of 
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affective disorder, a genotype consistent with response to SSRI, and the wish to see if his 
low-grade mood improves on the medication).  This position is consistent with a realist 
view that emphasizes an individualist approach to clinical decision-making, and that is 
neither overly optimistic nor unduly pessimistic about biotechnological advances.81   
 
Just as the media cannot be held wholly responsible for modern ideals of beauty, so the 
pharmaceutical industry cannot be said to have entirely manufactured our concepts of 
either psychiatric disorder or mental fitness82.  On the other hand, just as it is important to 
interrogate media constructs of beauty and to offer alternatives, so it is crucial to assess 
the extent to which the claims of the pharmaceutical, alternative, and indigenous 
medicines industries and other promoters of psychotropics go beyond the relevant 
science, and to offer a range of alternatives to those who may understandably want to use 
these agents to change their lives for the better.  Psychopharmacology has the potential to 
liberate us by reducing the limits imposed on us by disorder, but to imprison us by 
imposing societal demands (Schwartz, 1991).  In weighing up alternatives, it is certainly 
important to remember the excesses of past marketing campaigns (Angell, 2004; 
                                                 
81
 Clinicians think about optimism and pessimism primarly in the context of prognosis.  However, in the 
context of a debate about morality, one is reminded here of Strawson’s contrast between pessimists who 
hold that deterministic causal explanations weaken concepts of responsibility and moral obligation, 
optimists who try to argue against this view, and Strawson’s own attempt to reach a compatabilist position 
which is able to ground our moral concepts (Strawson, 1974).  Flanagan also attempts an integrative 
approach to mind and morality, taking a naturalist approach and defending optimism (Flanagan, 2007).  In 
discussing the future of biotechnology, Garreau contrasts a “Heaven Scenario”, a “Hell Scenario”, and a 
“Prevail Scenario” – a future in which technological crises are met with human resilience (Garreau, 2005).  
In putting forward an evolutionary perspective on modern culture, Humphrey compares “natural man” and 
“artificial man”, and describes their possible interaction in terms of a civil war, a creative alliance, or a 
perfidious conspiracy – where we have to face the best and worse of modern civilization (Humphrey, 
1999).   
82
 There are circular interactions here;  cultural norms encourage technologies, and technologies in turn 
reinforce cultural norms.  In rarer cases, there is also more explicit coercion;  for example, cosmetic surgery 
may be required for success in certain professions, and use of psychotropics to enhance performance in the 
military raises the possibility that this could be insisted upon. 
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Degrandpre, 2006; Healy, 2004; McHenry, 2006; Moynihan et al., 2002; Smith, 1991; 
Starcevic, 2002; Szasz, 2001; Valenstein, 1998), and the overoptimism of researchers and 
clinicians about novel breakthroughs in psychopharmacology (van Praag, 1998).  At the 
same time, and for particular individuals, at particular times, there is no reason to remain 
completely closed to the possibility that a specific psychotropic will turn out to be 
remarkably helpful.  Good clinical practice invariably involves the kind of equipoise that 
comes from successfully balancing the perennial tensions described in this dissertation 
between the objective and subjective, explanation and understanding, and conflicting 
values.   
 
Kaley’s family history reminds us that a crucial area of advance in cognitive-affective 
science is human genomics.  We now know that specific genetic variants, in interaction 
with particular environments, determine set-points in various neuronal circuits (Caspi et 
al., 2006; Mattay et al., 2003; Pezawas et al., 2005).  We can no longer infer that all 
people experience pain or anxiety in the same way.  Similarly, for particular individuals, 
certain psychotropics may be useful;  people with the val-val polymorphism of the 
catechol-0-methyltransferase (COMT) gene are characterized by lower prefrontal 
dopamine levels and worse performance on working memory tasks, and may do well on 
certain medications - whereas people with the met-met COMT polymorphism have 
higher prefrontal dopamine levels and better performance, and may respond less well to 
the same agents (Stein, Newman, Savitz, & Ramesar, 2006).  On the basis of existing 
cognitive-affective science it is possible to predict that in the future, physicians and 
psychopharmacologists will obtain detailed profiling of patients’ genetic variants, and 
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offer an individualized battery of medications and psychotropics (Buchanan et al., 2002; 
Rothstein, 2003; van Delden, Bolt, Kalis, Derijks, & Leufkens, 2004).  There is the 
possibility that this will be done not merely to reduce conditions such as social anxiety 
and impulsivity, but also to increase well-being and enhance cognition. 
 
On the other hand, it is important to emphasize the complexity of our genes and their 
interactions (Kendler, 2006), the unintended consequences of medication use, and the 
difficulties of coming up with elixirs that can outdo our evolutionary design (Jones, 2006; 
Nebert, Jorge-Nebert, & Vesell, 2003; Nesse et al., 1994).  An intervention that acts on 
only a few receptor targets may ultimately affect multiple processes in unpredictable 
ways.  Just like the earlier “clinical gaze” (Foucault, 1973),  so the more recent 
“molecular gaze” (Murray, 2007; Rose, 1998a) has its limitations.  Indeed, despite much 
back-slapping about the value of current psychopharmacology, there has also been a great 
deal of exaggeration (van Praag, 1998).  It is notable that currently available medications 
all work via only a few mechanisms, reflecting how difficult it is to make real 
breakthroughs in our pharmacopoeia.  Similarly, current medications act on a fairly 
narrow range of phenomena (primarily mood and anxiety), and are relatively unhelpful 
for changing a range of other traits that may play a role in determining well-being (eg 
empathy).  Again, to date, it is not yet clear that available agents are better than, say, 
caffeine, or exercise, as cognitive enhancers.  Thus, despite the already widespread use of 
psychotropics to improve well-being and enhance cognition, only time will tell how 
valuable for humans the field of cosmetic psychopharmacology will ultimately be. 
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The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) deserve particular mention, as they 
have been key to this debate since the work of Kramer.  It should be emphasized that to 
date there is relatively little empirical data on the use of psychotropics such as SSRIs in 
healthy volunteers.  It is interesting that some controlled research demonstrates subtle 
changes in emotional processing and social behaviour in normals, sometimes outside of 
the awareness of subjects (Harmer, Shelley, Cowen, & Goodwin, 2004; Knutson, 
Wolkowitz, & Cole, 1998; Tse & Bond, 2002).  Nevertheless, closer examination of such 
phenomena, as well as of the use of SSRIs in those with more significant 
symptomatology (even if it did not meet criteria for “major depression” or similar 
disorders) would be necessary to determine whether it was worthwhile or not.  Currently 
there is insufficient evidence to argue that administration of an SSRI to healthy subjects 
results in increased well-being (Rego, 2005).  Conversely, there is some evidence that 
SSRIs can flip predisposed people into a hypomanic state.  However, this is an issue for 
further empirical work.  Nutraceuticals, such as caffeine, and psychostimulant 
medications are widely used to enhance attention and memory, but again the evidence-
base to support the value of newer psychotropics as cognitive enhancers is currently 
sparse (Dekkers et al., 2007; Hall, 2003). 
 
The difficulty of predicting response also applies to the particular case.  We earlier gave 
the example of someone who decided that medication was a good/authentic choice only 
after starting medication.  Indeed, authenticity is not a static construct;  Firlik (Firlik, 
1991) and subsequent commentators (Elliott, 1999) provide a thought-provoking case of 
a woman who was against the artificial prolongation of life prior to suffering from 
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dementia, but who can be seen as authentically in favour of artificial life support given 
her demented state.  This is reminiscent of the earlier discussion, drawing from Parfit 
(Parfit, 1984), on personal identity;  people are not fixed and immutable essences, they 
are more like clubs than like tables.  In the absence of knowledge of pharmacogenetic 
predictors of response, and likely even if these were available, the ultimate value of a 
particular psychotropic for a patient may be difficult to predict until after it has been 
prescribed.   
 
In summary, a classical approach to ethics in general, and to bioethics in particular, 
attempts to find moral rules for particular situations.  In contrast, a critical approach 
argues that values inhere in our ways of life, and that ethics can’t be algorithmized.  An 
integrative approach would argue that yes, values inhere in our way of life but first, these 
are closely related to our human nature – many would agree that pain is bad – and second 
they can be reasonably (ie cognitive-affectively) debated against the backdrop of 
particular circumstances (there are particular contexts in which pain may in fact be a 
reasonable value).  We cannot always reach universal conclusions about the nature of 
humans in general, or even the value of psychotropics (good or bad) in a specific patient. 
In the more subtle cases of cosmetic psychopharmacology a lack of ethical convergence 
is reinforced by a relative absence of empirical data.  Nevertheless, in particular instances 
we can reach reasonable decisions – some lives are better than others.  Relevant 
considerations for moral reasoning-imagining83 about enhancements include both the 
potential value of stoic acceptance of life’s fate (including imperfections and aging, day-
                                                 
83
 To emphasize the importance of affect in reasoning, including moral reasoning, and drawing on 
Johnson’s ideas about the importance of moral imagination, I use the double-barrel term reasoning-
imagining here. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 185
to-day distress, and idiosyncracies in personality), as well as the potential value of 
attempts to change the hand one is dealt (whether by virtue of pharmacotherapy, 
psychotherapy, or non-medical means).  Some would argue that there can even be 
progress in moral reasoning (Bhaskar, 1979; MacIntyre, 1981)84. 
 
The approach here is compatible with a growing interest in the field of neuroethics, with 
an emphasis on the value of empirical research in bioethics (Borry, Schotsmans, & 
Dierickx, 2004), and with scientific work indicating that complex decision-making and 
moral judgments involve our cognitive-affective maps, which in turn are based on 
sensorimotor-affective neuronal circuitry and the way this allows interaction with the 
world85.  It is notable that such work suggests that ethical concepts are learned by first 
understanding prototypical exemplars (Churchland, 2002; Stich, 2003), that moral 
reasoning involves both cognitive and affective processes and brain regions (Goldman, I, 
1993a; Greene et al., 2002), and that it becomes increasingly sophisticated during 
development (Kagan, 2006; Kohlberg, 1981).  Further work by cognitive psychologists, 
linguists, neuroscientists, anthropologists, developmental and evolutionary scientists, and 
others are likely to lead to additional insights into the cognitive-affective bases of moral 
judgment (Stich, 1993).  At the same time, the approach taken here has emphasized that 
human nature is sufficiently complex that debate about it will continue into the 
                                                 
84
 A further, more controversial claim, is that there are “moral facts” (Casebeer, 2003; Dancy, 1993; 
McDowell, 1998). 
85
 Work relevant to this assertion has been undertaken by a range of authors (Churchland, 1998; de Waal, 
Macedo, Ober, & Korsgaard, 2006; Farah, 2005; Gibbard, 1990a; Goldman, I, 1993a; Greene & Haidt, 
2002; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Hauser, 2006; Illes, 2006; Johnson, 1993; 
Joyce, 2006; Katz, 2001; Marcus, 2002; May, Friedman, & Clark, 1996; Panksepp, 1998; Tancredi, 2005).  
Although “neuroethics” is a relatively new field, some of its concepts have early roots.  Consider, for 
example, Aristotle’s ideas about considering various exemplars to train oneself in moral reasoning, and  
Darwin’s work “On the moral sense” (Goldman, I, 1993a). 
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foreseeable future, and that even a detailed knowledge of the psychobiological basis of 
morality may encourage a diversity of values rather than a convergence in ethical 
thinking.  Decisions about whether or not to use psychotropics are likely to remain 
controversial and given the relative complexity and difficulty of such decisions, this is 
certainly appropriate.   
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7.  Conclusion 
 
The Possibility of a Naturalistic Approach to the Philosophy of 
Psychopharmacology 
 
Throughout this dissertation, we have begun by contrasting a classical approach (often 
referencing the viewpoint of one or other philosopher within the linguistic-analytic 
tradition) with various critiques of such an approach (often referencing the viewpoint of 
one or other continental philosopher).  Then, rather than attempting to resolve this debate 
on its own philosophical terms, we have asked whether an integrative approach that uses 
some constructs drawn from each, and that is consistent with a realist philosophy, can be 
supported by data from contemporary cognitive-affective science.  It has been suggested 
that such data generally reinforce a view that the mind-brain is embodied;  sensorimotor 
and affective neuronal circuitry allows humans to interact with their physical and social 
world, and this in turn leads to the development of basic-level and abstract cognitive-
affective maps (or metaphors) for understanding the world.  These data support particular 
ways of approaching conceptual, explanatory and ethical questions in general, and issues 
in psychopharmacology in particular. 
 
Is this the right way to do philosophy?  It is certainly not one that would be widely 
accepted.  Nevertheless, in my immediate defence, I would say that there is an important 
tradition in which philosophy is intended to be panoramic in scope, considering and 
integrating theories across disciplines and sciences.  In ancient Greece, philosophy, or the 
“love of wisdom” covered a broad spectrum of questions.  An early editor, however, 
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divided Aristotle’s corpus into the “Physica” (ie nature), which addressed natural 
philosophy, and the “Metaphysica” (ie the book after the Physica), where he addressed a 
series of more general questions and where he used the term “first philosophy”.  A formal 
split between natural philosophy (science) and philosophy is a relatively recent one, was 
not at all endorsed by Aristotle, and has been criticized by those interested in 
emphasizing that the subject matter of philosophy and of science is continuous.86  
Thornton, for example, has characterized philosophy of psychiatry as continuous with 
self-conscious psychiatry (Thornton, 2007b). 
 
Still, even if the subject matter of philosophy and of science is continuous, they may be 
very different endeavours, with quite different methods. Russell, a key philosopher in the 
classical tradition, argued that philosophy gives way to science only when conceptual 
issues have been sufficiently clarified that they can be empirically investigated (Russell, 
1912).  Similarly, the logical positivists and Wittgenstein emphasized the importance of 
dissolving meaningless philosophical questions.  In this view, philosophy (which 
determines whether concepts make sense) plays a crucial role in assisting the sciences 
(which determines whether hypotheses make sense).  In contrast, there are those who are 
more sceptical about the methods of science or philosophy.  Philosophy may be useful 
insofar it allows a more sceptical and critical view of science than science has of itself 
(Habermas, 1985).  Philosophy may also be valuable in allowing reflection on possible 
solutions to profound questions, although the aim of solving such deep problems may be 
                                                 
86
 As Piaget (Piaget, 1972b) put it, philosophy occupies itself with the study of knowledge as a whole, 
while science occupies itself with specific questions.  Or, philosophy tends towards the study of being qua 
being, and science towards the knowledge of specific beings. 
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a futile one (McGinn, 1996).  Thus, both the classical and critical views see philosophy 
and science as rather different fields of academic work.   
 
On the other hand, many have argued that philosophy must increasingly address scientific 
data.  For James and Jaspers, who contributed to philosophy and to psychology, 
delineating the bonds between philosophy and science is a crucial task  As Meleau-Ponty 
writes, “From the interrogation of science, philosophy stands to gain an encounter with 
certain articulations of being which otherwise it would find very difficult to uncover” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1963a).  An approach which emphasizes the value of scientific data has 
perhaps already won the battle for questions about the ultimate nature of matter 
(ontology), where philosophy in the absence of physics is no longer acceptable 
(Churchland, 2002).  Furthermore, this view seems increasingly relevant to questions 
about explanation (epistemology), where an empirical epistemology (or neurophilosophy) 
now seems more and more desirable (Changeux, 2004; Quine, 1969).  Finally, as noted 
briefly in the previous chapter, there is growing interest in the possibility that scientific 
data can also shed light on questions about moral judgment (ethics), so leading to an 
integration of science with ethics (or  neuroethics) (Marcus, 2002)87.  It might also be 
argued that instead of using language solely as an analytic probe, philosophy could 
benefit by focusing on data that emerge from the science of linguistics. 
 
                                                 
87
 Dewey wrote that “the need for constant revision and expansion of moral knowledge is one great reason 
why there is no gulf between non-moral knowledge from that which is truly moral.  At any moment 
concepts which once seemed to belong exclusively to the biological or psychological realm may assume 
moral import” (Dewey, 1960). 
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One view which keeps philosophy and science as somewhat different endeavours, but 
which also emphasizes their continuities, is that philosophy, like science, is comprised of 
hypotheses.  Locke viewed philosophy as removing impediments to knowledge, as an 
“underlabourer” to those who produced science (Locke, 1694).  Bhaskar similarly views 
philosophy as conceptual science (Bhaskar, 1979), arguing that philosophy can serve to 
underpin or bootstrap empirical work.  This view is perhaps consistent with the idea that 
philosophy is one of the cognitive-affective sciences;  its methods are more conceptual 
than empirical.  Much contemporary philosophical writing is certainly naturalist in that it 
entails a view of humans as part of nature;  a naturalistic view of ethics, for example, may 
be contrasted with a supernaturalist view, and implies a focus on understanding ethics in 
worldly terms, rather than in terms of God or another transcendental authority (Grayling, 
2004; Parfit, 1984; Williams, 1985).  This kind of naturalistic approach to philosophy is 
again consistent with that taken in this dissertation, and would be accepted by many in 
the field. 
 
Throughout this dissertation, when faced with complex classical and critical perspectives, 
we have asked the question of what the cognitive-affective data say.  We have repeatedly 
argued that such data emphasize that human categories are not simply essentialist, but at 
the same time are not merely relativistic.  Is there any evidence that science and 
philosophy themselves are human categories which cannot be defined using necessary 
and sufficient terms, but yet are not wholly subjective?  Addressing this question in full 
falls outside the remit of this dissertation.  Nevertheless it is notable that efforts to define 
either the scientific or the philosophical method in an essentialist or algorithmic way 
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remain incomplete.  In particular, defining what counts as evidence remains a matter that 
is not straightforward;  there is no “view from nowhere” (Nagel, 1989) from which such 
decisions can be made, instead they seem to require good judgment (for example, about 
conflicting scientific and philosophical virtues)88. 
 
Indeed, questions about key constructs for science and philosophy, whether raised in the 
classic tradition (eg, attempts by ancient philosophers and by Hume to define the nature 
of causation), or in the critical tradition (eg, attempts to delineate human understanding 
and the space of reason), remain difficult to answer.  Constructs such as “cause” may 
rather need to be understood in terms of prototypic exemplars, which are then extended to 
cover other phenomena (Johnson, 2003; Lakoff et al., 1999; Piaget, 1972a). Churchland 
argues, for example, that scientists can agree on what counts as a prototypic explanation, 
but a range of more atypical exemplars may result in disagreement.  Thus, good scientists 
use a mixture of conceptual thinking, empirical data and scientific values to make 
judgments about when to shift paradigms or change classifications.  Analogously, 
Johnson (Johnson, 1993) has argued that the concept of morality is itself a radial 
category.  Again, good clinicians use a mixture of conceptual thinking, empirical data and 
scientific values to make judgments about when to use the medical model and offer 
treatment. 
 
                                                 
88
 Piaget asks,  “does there exist an objective technique, that is to say, universally valid for the whole of 
knowledge?”.  And consistent with the position taken in the current dissertation, he answers, “ Clearly there 
is none which would unite all thinkers:  the concept of knowledge is still (and perhaps always will be) a 
matter of provisional synthesis, a synthesis which is in part subjective because it is in fact dominated by 
value judgments which are not universally applicable” (Piaget, 1972b). 
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But how do scientific and philosophical reasoning differ from everyday reasoning then?   
From one perspective on the cognitive-affective capacities of the brain-mind (Duchaine 
et al., 2001), it could be argued that there is no privileged a priori approach to truth;  
instead day-to-day cognition, science, and philosophy – all involve living in the world, 
developing hypotheses, and modifying these based on experience.  Pragmatists such as 
Peirce (Peirce, 1992) have suggested that there is no ultimate foundation to knowledge 
(scientific or philosophical), there is nothing that beats observing, experimenting, and 
analysing – using our brain-minds to re-examine our assumptions and revise them where 
necessary.  At the same time, as our theoretical concepts become more sophisticated, and 
as our empirical database (including cognitive-affective data) increases, so our 
philosophical-scientific concepts become sharper and our explanations become more 
powerful (Churchland, 2002; Johnson, 1993; Lakoff et al., 1999).   
 
In this view, then, both scientific and philosophical reasoning, like other kinds of 
cognitive-affective processes and products, although not simply reducible to a set of 
formal and “objective” algorithms, have the potential to go beyond that which is merely 
“subjective” or relativistic.  Like science, philosophical reasoning involves aspects that 
are both transitive (it is based within a social context) and intransitive (it is about the 
world) (Bhaskar, 1978; Winch, 1970).  It involves schemas which are on the one hand 
based in brain-mind, and on the other moulded by the participation of the brain-mind in 
the world.  A naturalist approach to philosophy is consistent with scientific realism in 
general (Bhaskar, 1978) and embodied realism in particular (Lakoff et al., 1999).  It is 
also consistent with views that it is useful for philosophy to pay very close attention to 
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scientific data (Churchland, 2002; Lakoff et al., 1999), that philosophical and scientific 
hypotheses and explanations can themselves be the subject of useful empirical 
investigation (Carruthers, Stich, & Siegal, 2002; Dunbar & Blanchette, 2001; Feist, 2006; 
Giere, 1988; Merton, 1973; Thagard, 1993; Thagard, 2000), and that scientific realism is 
a conceptual hypothesis that helps to explain the success of science (Putnam, 1984).   
 
We began the dissertation by emphasizing that any attempt to include a whole range of 
thinkers under a simple rubric (such as “classical” or “critical”) must fail, and the aim of 
many of the contrasts drawn was to attempt to show some family resemblances, rather 
than to stake out necessary and sufficient criteria for belonging to the divergent schools 
of thought represented by the contrasting approaches to various philosophical questions 
posed here.  We have gone on to suggest that cognitive-affective science holds that 
prototypes and metaphors are useful not only in understanding our day-to-day context, 
but also lie at the heart of our most sophisticated scientific and philosophical constructs.  
The categories of “classical” and “critical” themselves seem to reflect everyday mappings 
of crucial differences between notions of objective-disease/explanatory-cause/medical-
treatment versus subjective-illness/understanding-reason/moral-acceptance – between 
choosing a MEDICAL and a MORAL metaphor.  It is comforting that there is a certain 
consistency to the approach here;  although little attempt was made to address directly the 
classical and critical approaches in their own conceptual terms, the strategy of relying on 
the relevant data from cognitive-affective science is compatible with a view that is 
sceptical of formal definitions of constructs, and also with the idea of using philosophical 
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constructs as bootstraps to help conceptualize data and to reach valid explanations of the 
world. 
 
Arguments that the approach here is consistent with a range of other work in philosophy, 
and also self-consistent, are perhaps not as pertinent, however, if the current dissertation 
does not take its premise of attempting to do conceptual science seriously.  Has the work 
here made a contribution to its particular focus, namely the philosophy of psychiatry in 
general, and the philosophy of psychopharmacology in particular?  Can it help provide a 
foundation for good clinical practice?  I would begin by pointing out that in many ways 
this is a relatively undeveloped area of work.  The psychiatrist and philosopher Karl 
Jaspers was perhaps the first to provide a rigorous philosophical analysis of the 
foundations of psychiatry, but this intersection requires further development.  As Elliott 
(Elliott, 1999) argues, many philosophers have seen the problems raised by medicine and 
psychiatry as boring diversions, or as something altogether different from philosophy.  
However, with the introduction of new medical technologies, including psychotropics, 
new and important questions press for resolution.  
 
After Jaspers, a range of thinkers considered the philosophical foundations of 
psychoanalysis, and defended psychiatry from the attacks of anti-psychiatry (Clare, 1967; 
Reznek, 1991; Roth & Kroll, 1986; Wing, 1978).  During the further development of 
psychiatry and neuroscience, significant contributions continued to be made to 
developing the conceptual basis for psychiatric and clinical psychology practice and 
research, and to outlining the intersections between philosophy, psychopathology, and 
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neuroscience.89  The current dissertation contributes by demonstrating that 
psychopharmacology is a useful area for such work;  it is valuable in addressing a range 
of conceptual issues (eg integrating facts and values in clinical nosology), explanatory 
issues (eg using explanation and understanding in the clinical practice), and ethical issues 
(eg balancing the appreciation of nature with a willingness to change it) that lie at the 
heart of the philosophy of psychiatry, and that are crucial for clinical practice. 
  
A key conceptual issue in the dissertation was the nature of disorder in general.  We 
argued that disorder cannot be understood in essentialist terms, but rather that disorder 
was a socially constructed category that was theory-driven and value-laden.  We also 
argued, however, that our categories of disorder are not merely arbitrary or relativistic, 
but rather that typical disorders reflect universal biologically-based concerns, and that 
decisions about whether to treat (pun intended) more atypical conditions as exemplars of 
disorder can be made in a reasonable way.  Good nosology is based on well-considered 
judgments about concepts, data, and values.  Psychiatric intervention is based on 
scientific knowledge, but its arts and practice also aim at the alleviation of human 
suffering.  Thus, this dissertation falls within the Hippocratic tradition’s emphasis on 
medicine as a science that engages with the complex realities of the human condition, and 
                                                 
89
 A range of authors have contributed to developing the conceptual basis for psychiatric and clinical 
psychology practice and research research (Bolton, 2008; Bolton et al., 1996; Brendel, 2006; Colby & Spar, 
1983; Culver & Gert, 1982; Fulford, Morris, Sadler, & Stanghellini, 2003; Fulford et al., 2006; Ghaemi, 
2003; Gillett, 1999; Graham & Stephens, 1994; Griffiths, 1995; Hacking, 1998; Havens, 2004; Hundert, 
1989; Kandel, 1998; Kendler, 2005; Kopelman, 1992; McHugh et al., 1988; Miller, 1992; Radden, 2004; 
Sadler et al., 1994; Schramme & Thome, 2004; Svensson, 1990; Tengland, 2001; Thornton, 2007a; Tyrer 
& Steinberg, 2005; Valentine, 1982; Wiggins & Schwartz, 1991; Zachar, 2000), and to outlining the 
intersections between philosophy, psychopathology, and neuroscience (Bechtel et al., 2001; Bennett et al., 
2003; Bickle, 2003; Brook & Akins, 2005; Churchland, 2002; Illes, 2002; Illes, 2006; Marcus, 2002; 
Mishara, 2007).   
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with the emphasis in the Hippocratic oath on practising with both skill and judgment 
(Gillett, 2006)90.   
 
Additional conceptual issues revolved around differentiating different kinds of 
psychotropic agents, addressing the nature of emotion, and considering various concepts 
of the self.  Once again we took an approach that essentialist definitions of complex 
biological and psychiatric phenomena were unlikely to be found, but that it was 
nevertheless possible to defend a stance that was not entirely relativistic or subjective.  
Again, we argued that a realist position, which allowed for a scientific understanding of 
the structures and mechanisms of the world, including the embodiment of emotion and 
the self in the brain-mind and its interactions with the world, is supported by the 
cognitive-affective data in general, and by those from psychopharmacology in particular.   
Brain-minds are built on a constantly changing psychobiological foundation, and can be 
altered in powerful and unpredictable ways by nutrients, substances, nutraceuticals, and 
pharmaceuticals.  For an individual patient, good clinical psychopharmacological practice 
requires an understanding not only of disease, but also of illness.   
 
A number of explanatory issues were addressed, including the question of how best to 
explain pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy, how best to account for placebo responses, 
and the role of both proximal and distal (evolutionary) explanations.  We argued that a 
functionalist account of the mind was not useful in explaining psychopharmacological 
                                                 
90
 Ghaemi has emphasized that Hippocrates took a cautious view towards medication, given that nature is 
the source of healing, and the job of the physician is to aid nature in the process of healing (Ghaemi, 2006).  
Others have, however, emphasized a view that the Hippocratic tradition involves finding moderation in the 
balance between opposite tendencies. 
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phenomena.  To understand how a psychotherapy changes the brain, or how the placebo 
effect is a crucial component of response to medication, or how a range of other 
conscious and unconscious cognitive-affective processes occur, we need a more complex 
model of the brain-mind that provides explanations of symbols and their grounding, and 
of context and its brain-mind embodiment.  Psychopharmacological phenomena are a 
useful tool-with-which-to-think about the links between explanation and understanding, 
mechanism and meaning, the sciences and the humanities, in psychology in general, and 
in biological psychiatry in particular. 
 
In terms of ethical questions, we again attempted to move beyond classical and critical 
approaches, and to argue for an integrated position that psychopharmacology should not 
be viewed with unrealistic optimism or with undue pessimism.  Although there has not 
been a great deal of conceptual analysis in this area, some of those who have addressed 
the field of psychopharmacology appear to have suffered from psychotropic hedonism 
and from being overly optimistic about the future, others from pharmacological 
Calvinism and being overly pessimistic (Fukuyama, 2002; Klerman, 1972; van Praag, 
1998).  While we may not be able to reach complete ethical convergence about the value 
of modern psychotropics, in particular instances we can reach reasonable decisions for 
particular patients – some lives are better than others.   Questions in psychopharmacology 
are a useful tool for addressing the broader philosophical debate on biotechnology in 
general;  the view here may usefully be extended into other, structurally related, debates.  
Indeed, it is perhaps precisely when there are advances in science, when our concepts of 
the natural are challenged and where there is a need to bridge neuroscience and the 
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person, that questions of which metaphor to apply become particularly interesting, and 
where practical questions can invigorate philosophy (Toulmin, 1982). 
 
In summary, the hypotheses put forward here are useful insofar as they provide some 
conceptual progress towards laying out a path to the important goal of a better clinical 
psychopharmacology.   We have offered a view of psychiatry and psychopharmacology 
that is naturalist insofar as it is based in the sciences, focused on the self and its disorders 
as embodied in the brain-mind and in social interactions, and employing relevant 
explanations (incorporating mechanisms and meanings, nature-nurture and their 
interaction, and proximal and distal variables).  At the same time, we have aimed for a 
humanistic and non-reductionistic naturalism;  psychiatry and psychopharmacology must 
aim to engage fully with the complexities of the human condition, and to improve the 
lives of patients.  Psychiatric disorders comprise a large portion of the global burden of 
disease, and there are ongoing efforts to find effective and cost-effective treatments.  
Nevertheless, psychiatry has been accused of being either brainless or mindless 
(Eisenberg, 1995), with conceptual underpinnings that are often simplistic or dualist 
(Bolton et al., 1996) .  This dissertation hopefully makes a contribution by providing a 
more sophisticated account that integrates a range of perennial conceptual tensions in the 
field (objectivity/ subjectivity, explanation/understanding, absolutism/relativism), and so 
assists the important goal of putting psychiatry and psychopharmacology on firmer 
footing.  
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